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Thursday, May 07, 2009

Christians Pray and Murder..

without skipping a beat.

CHRISTIAN RELIGION is satanist. They pray for mass murder.

I am an Atheist.

APRIL 2009 --- PASTORAL NEWSLETTER --. Rev. Larry K. Loree Sr.

Tuesday, March 3, 2009 started like any normal day, with the usual array of phone calls and other duties
that go along with the season of Lent. Later that day, upon returning from hospital visitations, my
phone rang and a voice on the other end said, .This is Senator Randy Richardville.s secretary in
Lansing, and the Senator would like to know if you would be willing to officiate as chaplain for the
opening of the Michigan Senate on March 12

at 10:00 a.m.. Knowing that the senator is a Christian,
and having previously worked with him in Monroe County in numerous veteran memorial services and
other veteran events, I replied that I would be honored to open the senate session. I then asked her for
some guidelines and insights, since I had never served as chaplain at the state level. I asked her what I
could say and what I couldn.t say in the invocation. There was a pause, so I asked, .Is it okay if I say
God?. .Well...Yes,. came the reply. .Is it okay if I say Jesus or Jesus Christ?. I asked.
.Well............ (the remainder of her response is confidential.) I replied that I would be
pleased to serve as chaplain for this event and that I would take full responsibility for anything that I
said. When I asked the secretary if she was a Christian, she answered, .Yes.. That was a relief in light
of all the political correctness that is expected of everyone who comes into contact with government.
On Thursday, March 12, 2009, at 10:00 a.m., I stood with Senator Richardville in the front of the senate
chambers at the podium and was introduced by Lt. Governor John D. Cherry to the senate members as.
Chaplain Larry K. Loree Sr. . Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 1138 and Pastor of Holy Ghost Lutheran
Church, Monroe, Michigan. Below you find the actual invocation that presented to the senate:
<beginning of invocation>
Invocation for the opening of the Michigan Senate session of March 12, 2009
.Dear Honorable Members of the Senate, Ladies, Gentlemen, and students in the gallery:
I bring greetings to you from every Michigan Veteran, especially the members of the Veterans of Foreign
Wars . Post 1138, Monroe, MI. I personally thank Senator Randy Richardville, for offering me the
privilege of serving you on this occasion and thank him and each of you, for your strong support of our
I begin in the name of the God of General Paul W. Tibbets Jr., his crew of the Enola Gay, and countless other brave
American Veterans who have served our nation with honor.
What America needs right now are both military and civil leaders with courage and honor as we develop
solutions to correct what is ailing our nation today. I will use the example of General Tibbets, whom I
had the honor of meeting in 2001 at the Monroe County Air show, over which I presided as Chaplain.
Because he was my boyhood hero, I knew that this great American hero was well acquainted with
challenges. We discussed his mission of August 6, 1945, target: Hiroshima.
At one point, I asked General Tibbets if he thought that God had played an important part in his
successful mission that resulted in ending WWII. With a somewhat surprised look, a slight smile and
firm voice, he said, .Just before we took off from Tinian Island, the crew and I were a bit on edge, and
my chaplain knew it. Just before we took off, he offered a prayer that we scarcely heard, because of the
noise. He handed me a piece of paper just before we took off, and I put it in my pocket. I had no time to
read it then. After we were airborne and things seemed to be under control, I reached into my pocket
for something and pulled out the piece of paper my chaplain had given me. I read it several times, then
got on the intercom and read it to my crew. I did that several times during the flight. As a result,
everyone was calm and we did our jobs. We flew that mission on a wing and a prayer.
(Continued on next page)
Page 2
I will read the prayer that his chaplain wrote for Col. Tibbets and the crew of the B-29, named .Enola Gay:
"Almighty Father, who wilt hear the prayer of them that love thee, we pray thee to be with those who
brave the heights of thy heaven and who carry the battle to our enemies. Guard and protect them, we
pray thee, as they fly their appointed rounds. May they, as well as we, know thy strength and power, and
armed with thy might may they bring this war to a rapid end.
We pray thee that the end of the war may come soon, and that once more we may know peace on earth.
May the men who fly this night be kept safe in thy care, and may they be returned safely to us. We shall
go forward trusting in thee, knowing that we are in thy care now and forever. In the name of Jesus
Christ. Amen." - Chaplain William Downey, 509th Composite Bomb Group
If Chaplain Downey was offering this invocation for you today, I believe his prayer would sound like this. If you
wish, you may bow your heads;
Almighty Father, who wilt hear the prayer of them that love thee, we pray thee to be with these members
of the Senate who brave long hours and sometimes criticism as they seek solutions to neutralize our
present enemies of a declining economy, job loss, security and numerous other problems that afflict the
citizens of this state. Guard and protect them, we pray thee, as they diligently and prayerfully seek your
guidance and strength. May our senators, as well as our citizens know thy strength and
power, and armed with thy might may they bring these problems to a rapid end.
We pray thee that the end of Michigan.s and America.s woes may come soon, and that once more we may
know security and prosperity on earth. May the senators who work this day be kept safe in thy
care, and may you return them safely to their families when their work is finished for another day. We
shall go forward trusting in thee, knowing that we are in thy care now and forever.
In the name of Him who led Col. Paul W. Tibbets and his crew to victory over America.s enemies.

On behalf of , 509th Composite Bomb Group, I thank you.
I leave you with this final thought. It is a composition that I wrote, summarizing the meeting I had with
General Paul W. Tibbets Jr., and is dedicated to his memory:
.Fear that is controlled and then forged in God.s furnace of faith, turns to courage and wisdom, and when
these weapons are used against any enemy, with God.s help, the result is victory..

Larry K. Loree Sr.

God bless you, as you serve Michigan and God bless America!. <end of invocation>
Recorded in the Michigan Senate Journal . Thursday, March 12, 2009
What ran through my mind as I left the senate chambers that day, is something that our Lord Jesus
Christ said and continues to say to His Christians today: "You must be on your guard. You will be handed
over to the local councils and flogged in the synagogues. On account of me you will stand before governors
and kings as witnesses to them. And the gospel must first be preached to all nations. Whenever you are
arrested and brought to trial, do not worry beforehand about what to say. Just say whatever is given you at
the time, for it is not you speaking, but the Holy Spirit. Brother will betray brother to death, and a father his
child. Children will rebel against their parents and have them put to death. All men will hate you because
of me, but he who stands firm to the end will be saved.. -
Mark 13:9-13
Satan and his human agents are hard at work in America today, working through Communist / Socialist
organizations and politicians attempting to silence you, me, and all Christians and finally destroy the
Christian Church. But, Satan.s power is no match for our Crucified and Risen Savior Jesus Christ, who
strengthens us and enables us to, .Contend for the faith. Jude 3. Thanks be to God!
In Christ Jesus - Pastor Larry K. Loree Sr

They even had the murderous spite to make a prayer in Japanese:

Atomic Bombing Of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

By Matin Zuberi


On the Hiroshima Cenotaph are inscribed the words: "Please rest in peace, for the error will not be repeated". Was the error the atomic bombing or Japanese militarism? On August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay, piloted by Col. Paul W. Tibbets, dropped the world's first atomic bomb on Hiroshima and gave the world "a peep into hell". And on August 9, 1945, the town of Nagasaki was subjected to the same horrible fate. August as a month became synonymous with the Apoclypse of Hiroshima in 1945. Originally intended as a deterrent to the German threat, the atomic bomb became an offensive weapon to be used to coerce Japan to surrender and bring World War II to an end. This article discusses this major shift in policy and recalls the history of one of the most devastating events of our times.

The voice of the waves

That rises before me

Is not so loud

That I am left behind.

inutes before the plane carrying the atomic bomb took off for its destination, Hiroshima, Chaplain William Downey recited in a richly resonant voice before the assembled crew a prayer that he had especially prepared for the occasion:

Almighty Father, who wilt hear the prayer of those that love Thee, we pray Thee to be with those who brave heights of Thy heaven and who carry the battle to our enemies. Guard and protect them, we pray Thee, as they fly the appointed rounds. May they, as well as we, know Thy strength and power, and armed with Thy might may they bring this war to a rapid end. We pray Thee that the end of the war may come soon and once more we may know peace on earth. May the men who fly this night be kept safe in Thy care, and may they be returned safely to us. We shall go forward in trusting Thee knowing that we are in Thy care now and for ever. In the name of Jesus Christ, Amen!. 2

A Special Bombing Mission, with Col. Paul Tibbets as its leader, was stationed on the island of Tinian in the Pacific. Laboratory facilities along with scientists from the Los Alamos laboratory for the final assembly of the bombs and for the experiments to be conducted during the fateful missions were also set up. Some of these scientists flew in the accompanying planes that were virtually flying laboratories. General Curtis LeMay, who later became the first commander of the US Strategic Air Command, brought with him to Tinian the order that set the date for the atomic strike as August 6, 1945. Hiroshima was the primary target while Kokura and Nagasaki were the secondary and tertiary targets respectively. Tibbets, pilot of the plane that was to drop the bomb on Hiroshima, got his mother's name Enola Gay painted on the aircraft. Unknown to his companions, he carried a small box containing twelve cyanide capsules that were to be distributed to the crew in case of any crisis during the flight over Japan. 3

The take-off weight of the plane was 150,000 pounds, including 9,000 pounds of the bomb and 7,000 gallons of fuel. Fearing the possibility of a crash during the takeoff, Captain William Parsons decided to defy explicit orders by not arming the bomb before the takeoff. At 7:30 a.m. on the way to Hiroshima, he inserted the explosive charge and the detonator into the bomb. 4 As he was the only man on the flight who knew every detail about the bomb, he arranged for a pistol to be used against him in case of any danger of his being captured by the Japanese. After the bomb was finally ready for use, Tibbets addressed the crew: "We are carrying the world's first atomic bomb." It was inscribed with messages to the Japanese people, some of them obscene. At 8:16:2 A.M. Hiroshima time on August 6, 1945, having travelled a distance of about six miles, the bomb exploded over Dr Shima's clinic. The temperature at the core of the glowing fireball was 50,000 degrees. As ethereal glow illuminated the cockpit of the plane and the crew had "a peep into hell". The plane made three circles around Hiroshima taking photographs and completing experiments while shock waves from the blast were bouncing it higher. 5 The mushroom cloud was visible from the plane for 373 miles in its return flight.

In my mind's eye, like a waking dream, I could still see the tongue of fire at work on bodies of men. 6

The "Atomic Bomb Countermeasures Committee" of the Japanese War, Navy, and Home Ministries denied the possibility of an atomic bomb and merely sent physicist Yoshio Nishina to find out what kind of bomb had destroyed Hiroshima. Nishina, in a letter to an associate, wrote that if the Americans had actually dropped an atomic bomb, it was time those involved in the Japanese bomb programme including himself "should commit harakiri." The time of the suicide was to be decided on his return from Hiroshima. American and British scientists had won a big victory over the Japanese. "Their character", according to him, "exceeded the level of our character." After completing his investigations in Hiroshima, Nishina proceeded to Nagasaki. 7

The idea of a second atomic strike originated from a coterie of officers consisting of General Leslie Groves, the domineering officer who pushed the Manhattan Project at a fast pace, and his close aides, Admiral Purnell and General Farrel. It was Purnell who first proposed that it would take two atomic bombs to bring about Japan's surrender, the first to demonstrate its power and the second to convince the Japanese that the United States had a large arsenal. 8 Groves eagerly accepted the proposal because it fitted into his own schemes of things. He knew that two bombs were being fabricated, based on the supply of enriched uranium from Oak Ridge and plutonium from Hanford; the destructiveness of the two types had to be demonstrated during the war. It was also assumed that the second atomic strike should be launched soon after the first. As early as July 24, Groves started pressing the scientific team on Tinian to speed up the second bombing. 9 The civilian leadership never articulated the strategy of two speedy atomic blows; the coterie around Groves simply assumed that it was merely a tactical matter not requiring a political decision.

"The controlling factor," according to Groves, "was the date by which a sufficient amount of plutonium could be processed and delivered... After that, all that was needed was suitable weather." 10 The date chosen for the second attack was amazingly decided not in Washington but on Tinian Island. The destruction of Nagasaki could have been avoided if Washington had retained control over scheduling of the bombing raids. Japanese leaders were not given sufficient time to absorb the shock of the Hiroshima disaster; Groves was in a tearing hurry to drop the second bomb. As the forecast was of bad weather, the Nagasaki bombing was brought forward from the tentative schedule of August 11 to August 9. The scientists, dog-tired, warned that the hurried schedule would prevent them from completing their final preparations for the bomb.11 Groves would not allow anything to delay the second atomic strike; he decided to take the chance.

Remembering their former Berkeley colleague Riyokichi Sagane, who was professor of physics at the University of Tokyo, physicists Luis Alvarez and Robert Serber decided to send him a letter appealing to him to inform the Japanese government about the impending nuclear devastation. Alvarez, who later won the Nobel Prize, drafted the letter and Serber and another colleague, Philip Morrison, edited it. Then Alvarez wrote out the final version and made two carbon copies, sealed them into envelopes, and taped them to the three parachute gauges to be dropped from the second plane as the bomb fell from the first. 12 The message stated: "Within the space of three weeks we have proof-fired one bomb in the American desert, exploded one in Hiroshima, and fired the third this morning." The three physicists from Los Alamos assured Sagane that they deplored "the use to which a beautiful discovery has been put!" They, however, added a warning: "We can assure you that unless Japan surrenders at once this rain of atomic bombs will increase manifold in fury." 13 Sagane saw the letter only after the Japanese surrender. He later gave it to his former American colleague. 14

The bomb was loaded in the aircraft called Bock's Car, named after its usual Commander Frederick Bock, late on August 8. Major General Charles Sweeney piloted it. The bomb was four a half feet wide, ten and a half feet long, and weighed five tons. 15 The takeoff, according to the senior scientist on Tinian, Norman Ramsay, was at 3 a.m., "We all aged ten years until the plane cleared the island", he recalled. 16 Bock's Car was bedevilled by problems all the way to Nagasaki. Its fuel transfer pump was defective and 600 gallons of fuel were uselessly trapped in a reserved tank. This reduced flying time. Despite detection of this problem, it was decided to persist with the flight. The primary target, Kokura, was enveloped in a thick cloud. The plane circled three times over the city waiting for a parting of the cloud allowing visual bombing. Because of the shortage of fuel, the mission could have been aborted and the plane could have returned to its base. Instead, pilot Major General Sweeney decided to rush to Nagasaki, the secondary target. That city too was covered in a cloud. By then, the fuel was sufficient only for one pass over the city. At the bombing altitude of 37,000 feet and carrying a bomb weighing 10,000 pounds, fuel consumption was rapid-over 1,000 gallons per hour. 17 Encountering a thick cloud over Nagasaki as well, it as decided to defy explicit orders for visual bombing. The bomb-bay door had already opened when suddenly there was a large hole in the cloud and the entire city was visible. Thus, the fate of Nagasaki was sealed at 11:02 A.M. local time on August 9.

Visible shock waves reached the aircraft. As a reporter, specially assigned to witness the explosion from the aircraft, wrote; "We watched a giant pillar of purple fire 10,000 feet high, shoot upward like a meteor coming from the earth instead of from outer space... It was a living thing". Even as he watched "a giant mushroom came shooting out of the top to 45,000 feet...seething and boiling in a white fury of creamy foam, a thousand geysers rolled into one. It kept struggling in an elemental fury, like a creation in the act of breaking the bounds that held it down." The gigantic cloud grew even bigger and "seemed to be laughing at its victims down below". The giant thunderclap was followed by a continuous roar and then the silence of death. As Bock's Car was rushing away from the mushroom cloud, Second Lieutenant Nobukazu Komatsu and his crew were heading right into it. His plane was flying at 10,000 feet, and it passed through the ominous cloud in eight minutes. 18

Out of the 6,250 gallons of fuel the plane had started with, not counting the trapped fuel, it had just seven gallons of fuel left when it had a bumpy landing about ten feet short of the end of the runway in Okinawa. 19 According to Alvarez, the Nagasaki mission was "as abominably run a raid as any in the history of strategic warfare." He also takes the bit about a hole in the cloud before the bombing "with a grain of salt" because the bomb missed the target by two miles that was a reasonable radar error in those days. 20

It was an astonishing feat to restore power supply for the entire city of Nagasaki by the evening of August 11. The odious job of cremating the thousands of "unknown" dead was assigned to a group of workers; 16 gallons of sake were brought, and each worker was allowed a glass of sake both before and after his time in the field. It was hoped that the potent drink would keep them sane. 21

As the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a uranium bomb, which had never been tested before, the Hiroshima bombing was actually a test. When a team of American scientists visited the devastated ruins of the city shortly after the Japanese surrender, Dr. Masao Tsuzuki, a radiobiologist sarcastically said to Philip Morrison: "I did the experiment some years ago, but it was on rats. But you Americans-you are wonderful. You have made the human experiment". Narrating the episode, Morrison wrote, "No one could fail to carry the scar of such a cutting thrust." There was, however, no need to apologise, and American science and industry did not bear the guilt for those tragic deaths. It was a total war, a war for the survival of culture. 22 Interestingly, the Japanese scientist avoided any reference to the Japanese bomb programme. 23

It was a plutonium bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki. A similar device had been tested on July 16, 1945. As one Manhattan scientist wrote, "The Hiroshima bomb was easy; no effort at all, except the separation of uranium 235...The plutonium bomb was the challenge and the triumph of Los Alamos." The scientists chosen to assemble it "were considered the lucky ones; others stood by, ready to be called to mount the next weapon." 24 Could it be that the effect of this bomb dropped from an aircraft on a city was also conceived as an experiment? Ever since the end of the war, world public attention has been focussed on Hiroshima; and Nagasaki became a forgotten city. As the saying goes, "To be atom-bombed is bad, but to be second is worse!" 25


There were various alternatives to bring about the surrender of Japan, especially after the German capitulation on May 8, 1945. Conventional bombing, naval blockade, invasion of the Japanese islands, and atomic bombing were the four military options. Then there was the "Russian option"-exploiting the shock of a Soviet declaration of war against Japan. This was part of the agreed war plans of the Allied Powers. There was also a diplomatic option: modification of the terms of surrender.

Conventional Bombing and Naval Blockade

General Billy Mitchell had written in the 1930s that Japanese cities were ideal targets for aerial attack. Those cities, "built largely of wood and paper, form the greatest aerial targets the world has ever seen...Incendiary projectiles would burn the cities to the ground in short order." 26 General LeMay assumed command of the strategic bombing of Japan in January 1945. His bombers were now burning them day after day. On the night of March 9, 1945, 334 bombers attacked Tokyo with 2,000 tons of incendiary bombs. It was till then the most destructive conventional air raid in history. Robert Gullian, a French journalist, observed Japanese "uttering cries of admiration" at the unholy beauty of what they were witnessing. The city was "illuminated like the forest of brightly lighted Christmas trees." The bombs, visible in a grandiose spectacle, "descended rather slowly like a cascade of silvery water." They "scattered a kind of flaming dew that skittered along the roofs, setting fire to everything it splashed and spreading a wash of dancing flames everywhere." 27 In the ensuing firestorm, a quarter of the city was destroyed. The crew could smell burning flesh and felt that they were flying in Dante's Inferno. All Tokyo was visible from the air. As the bombers returned, the glow of the fire could be seen for 150 miles. This raid caused more deaths than the number killed in Hiroshima. On May 23, the bombers dropped 3,646 tons in incendiary bombs on Tokyo. The bombs were dropping for two hours at the average rate of 1,000 bombs per second. Tokyo was then deleted from the list of incendiary targets.

Japanese urban areas were being destroyed at an incremental cost of about $3 million per square mile; this was substantially cheaper than the first atomic bomb. 28 By July 1945, more than 41,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on Japanese cites. 29 The toll of incendiary bombing was heavy. About 40 per cent of the urban area of 66 Japanese cities was attacked; and 2.2 billion civilian casualties, including 9 million deaths, were inflicted. And 22 million people were rendered homeless. 31 "Shortly", noted the US Air Force's Combined Intelligence Committee, "Japan will become a nation without cities."31 Air Force General Arnold asked LeMay in June how long the war would last. LeMay replied, "Give me thirty minutes and I'll give you the date." He then came up with September 1, 1945, when he would have run out of targets. 32 The naval blockade was strangling the Japanese economy besides cutting off far-flung Japanese forces from their supplies. A Japanese study conducted by Rear Admiral Tagaki had concluded as early as March 1944 that Japanese losses of shipping were prohibitive and raw materials could no longer be imported. 33 The Services were competing, not only for their role in bringing about the surrender but also for the post-War prestige and appropriations. The navy and the air force hoped that the naval blockade and strategic bombing respectively would suffice, while the army considered an invasion necessary for the termination of the war.

Japanese Peace Moves

A new government headed by Admiral Kantarop Suzuki, a war hero who had seen action in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, had come to power in April 1945. He had to select members for the Supreme Court for the Direction of the War. He picked Shigenori Togo, an outspoken proponent of ending the war quickly, as his foreign minister. The navy and the army nominated their own ministers, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and General Korechika Anami respectively. (The army minister was often called the war minister.) The two chiefs of staff were Yoshijiro Umezu of the army and Soemu Toyoda of the navy. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Marquis Koichi Kido was the link between the Supreme War Council and Emperor Hirohito. 34 With the German surrender on May 8, 1945, Japan alone faced a most formidable military coalition; its relations with even the Soviet Union, which had not yet declared war against Japan, were deteriorating rapidly.

On May 11, while Robert Oppenheimer and his colleagues at the Los Alamos laboratory were selecting targets in Japan for the nuclear attack, Suzuki, Togo, Yonai Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda-the Big Six-met in Tokyo to consider their country's options. In view of ominous Soviet troop movements, it was decided to start negotiations with the Soviet Union, the objective being Soviet mediation in obtaining acceptable terms of surrender. Fanatical elements within the Japanese forces were also active. Vice-Admiral Takajiro Onishi, who had introduced the kamikaze tactics, boasted about 20 million suicide fighters. 35 At his own initiative, Hirohito summoned the Supreme War Council on June 22, the day Okinawa fell. He desired studies made for the termination of the war and asked that a special envoy be sent to Moscow. 36 Kido was the central figure in the group of Japanese leaders seeking negotiated peace. Foreign Minister Togo was pressing Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow to request the Soviet government to use its good offices to obtain modification of the Allied terms of surrender. All that was needed was an assurance regarding the retention of the emperor. It was proposed that Prince Konoye be sent as an envoy to Mosocw. The Togo-Sato messages were quickly decoded because the US navy cryptographers had broken the Japanese codes. 37 Soviet leaders, however, delayed contacts with Sato; they "let the Japanese dangle at the end of the Moscow wire as long as possible". Had they pointed out the futility of Japanese hopes, Tokyo might have directly sued for peace with the Western powers. 38 Truman and his advisers were aware of these Japanese peace feelers. Moreover, the Japanese military attache in Switzerland, General Okamoto, and Navy Commander Fujimura were in contact with American secret agents for months. 39

The Russian Option

The main American anxiety regarding the prospect of an invasion of the Japanese islands centred on the Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria. It was feared that as American troops landed, this army would be summoned to reinforce Japanese resistance, thereby, causing heavy American casualties. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired "Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations." Roosevelt succeeded in obtaining Stalin's assurance at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 about a Soviet declaration of war against Japan three months after the German surrender. 40 Soviet entry into the Pacific War was greatly feared in Japan. The Supreme War Council stated that "once the Soviets enter the war, Japan will face inevitable defeat." 41 Truman again sought this assurance at the Potsdam Conference. Stalin confirmed it. He also personally told Truman and Byrnes about a Japanese request to send Prince Konoye, and read out his answer. He hastened to add that the Japanese approach did not indicate any willingness to surrender unconditionally but was calculated to obtain Soviet support in furtherance of Japanese objectives. 42 Reassured, Truman wrote in his dairy on July 18, "Japs will fold up before Russia comes in." 43

Modification of Terms of Surrender

Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, who had been ambassador to Japan from 1932 until 1941, advocated retention of the Japanese emperor, as a constitutional monarch. With his intimate knowledge of Japanese society, he emphasised the central role of the emperor, who could even facilitate an orderly capitulation of all Japanese troops in distant theatres of the Pacific War. Modification of the terms of surrender could avoid further loss of life. "The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese", Grew wrote in a memorandum of May 28, 1945, "is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne." If some indication could be given that the Japanese people would be permitted to determine their future political structure, they would have a face-saving device without which surrender would be highly unlikely. Navy Secretary James Forestall, and a large group of civilian and military officials shared his views. 44 Secretary for War Henry Stimson, a man of tender conscience, alternated between worrying about the consequences of the atomic bombing and being excited by the prospect of having what he called the "royal straight flush." 45 Throughout this crucial period, he wavered from one position to the other as his capacity to influence declined. At times, he shared Grew's anxieties regarding the demand for unconditional surrender. Grew met Truman on June 18 to press his point of view, knowing the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to meet at the White House within a few hours.

Proposed Invasion of Japan

The crucial meeting on June 18 was convened by Truman to discuss the invasion plan, Operation OLYMPIC, scheduled to begin on November 1, 1945. Chief of Army Staff General George Marshall, a representative of Air Force General Arnold, Truman's Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy and Admiral King, Navy Secretary Forrestal, Secretary for War Stimson and Assistant Secretary for War John McCloy attended the meeting. Strangely, neither Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew nor any other representative of the State Department was invited. The day before the White House meeting, McCloy had told Stimson that there were no more Japanese cities to be bombed, no more carriers to sink or battleships to shell; some other means to terminate the war should be explored. 46

General Marshall strongly supported at the White House meeting the need to bring Red Army into the military equation. "The entry of Russia", he said, "on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation". As the political leaders thought of the bomb not as an entirely new force of destruction but merely a more powerful weapon, one would expect that at this meeting there would be serious consideration of the possible use of the bomb. The fact that the bomb had not yet been tested does not explain why Truman's military advisers did not explore its possible use. This is all the more puzzling because General Marshall later revealed that the original invasion plan called for using nine atomic bombs in three strikes. Nevertheless, the startling fact is that nobody mentioned it until at the end of the meeting when the participants were picking up their papers, Truman said to McCloy: "You didn't express yourself and nobody gets out of this room without standing up and being counted."

McCloy said, "We ought to have heads examined if we don't explore some other method" to bring about the surrender of Japan. He then suggested a political solution and raised the question of giving a warning to the Japanese about the possible use of the bomb. "Well, as soon as I mentioned the 'bomb'...even in that select circle it was a sort of a shock", McCloy later revealed. "You didn't mention the bomb out loud...It just wasn't done." A kind of shudder seemed to go through the room in the White House at the first mention of the word. He added that the United States' moral position would be enhanced if Japan were given a "specific warning of the bomb." 47 Truman indicated to McCloy that his own thinking was along similar lines and asked him to take up the matter with James Byrnes, who was soon to be appointed secretary of state. Byrnes, however, was opposed to any "deal" involving the retention of the emperor. 48 He feared a backlash; the war propaganda had depicted the emperor as an arch criminal and the atrocities committed by Japanese troops had inflamed American public opinion.

Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945

On June 26, Stimson, Forrestal, Grew, and McCloy agreed that a clarification of the terms of surrender should be issued before the invasion and with "ample time to permit a national reaction to set in." McCloy was asked to prepare a draft of what became the Potsdam Declaration. It contained an assurance that Japan could have a "constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty." James Byrnes, Truman's mentor in the Senate and old rival for the post of vice-president, took over on July 3, as secretary of state. "A little sheepish", in the words of a recent commentator, "that he, not his mentor, was in the White House, Truman deferred to Byrnes' judgement." The recent biographer of Byrnes has summarised his agenda on the nuclear issue. He was opposed to sharing the 'secret' of the bomb with the Soviet Union; he was keen to use the bomb "as quickly as possible in order to 'show results';" and he wanted it to be "used without warning." 49

On July 16, the British Chief of Staff Alan Brooke argued in favour of retention of the emperor at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the emperor's position safeguarded for military reasons. They even arranged the British Chiefs of Staff to persuade Churchill to discuss modification of the terms of surrender with Truman. On July 18, however, they shifted their position. They now wanted the sentence assuring a constitutional monarchy to be deleted; but, at the same time, they were anxious to utilise the emperor's authority to enforce surrender. General Marshall cautioned against any move to remove the emperor because it could lead to a "last-ditch defence by the Japanese". Stimson also pleaded with Byrnes for an explicit warning about the destructiveness of the bomb and for an assurance regarding constitutional monarchy after the war. Byrnes cut him off by saying that he had already persuaded Truman to delete such assurances from the Potsdam Declaration. Thus, while practically every senior American civilian and military adviser, with the exception of Byrnes, as well as Churchill and his top military advisers, urged a negotiated surrender, the assurance regarding a constitutional monarchy in the draft document was deleted. 50 Such an assurance would have amounted to changing the Allied policy of unconditional surrender. This would have necessitated obtaining Soviet consent, as Stalin consulted Truman and Churchill on his response to the Japanese peace moves. Byrnes, however, was determined to keep the Soviet Union out of the war in the Pacific. Thus, the Declaration merely promised "a peacefully inclined and responsible government" that was to be "established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." It did not contain any warning about the destructiveness of the new weapon, but called upon Japan to surrender unconditionally or face "prompt and utter destruction." 51


American planes dropped thousands of leaflets over Japanese cities explaining the Declaration. Unless Japan surrendered unconditionally, Otaru, Akita, Hachinoke, Fukushima, Urawa, Takayama, Iwakumi, Tottori, Imabaru, Yawata, Miyakonojo, and Saga would be bombed. Significantly, the nuclear targets, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Niigata were not mentioned. 52 Foreign Minister Togo wanted the Declaration to be treated "with utmost circumspection" and favoured an effort to obtain a clarification and, if possible, mitigation of its terms, through the Soviet Union. Representatives of the army urged total rejection. The Cabinet finally decided to publish the Declaration without any comment, pending clarification of Soviet intentions. Prime Minister Suzuki, addressing a Press conference on July 28, said his government had "decided to mokusatsu it." This colloquial expression is susceptible to various interpretations: moku means " to keep silent" and satsu means "to kill". 53 The expression was meant to imply "to kill with silence", "ignore", or, "treat with silent contempt." Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu had advised Suzuki to use the expression. Togo later said that mokusatsu was a flagrant violation of the Cabinet decision to "withhold comment". The Japanese response was taken as more hostile than it actually was; it was dismissed as a contemptuous rejection of the Potsdam Declaration. 54


Japan 'Always' the Target

Originally intended as a deterrent to a German threat, the atomic bomb became an offensive weapon to be used against Japan. How did this major shift in policy occur? British intelligence had concluded that German scientists would not be able to produce the bomb in the foreseeable future. The estimate in the Manhattam Project was that the bomb would be available by August 1945. The military situation in Europe indicated that not only was it not needed to deter a German bomb, it was not even required to bring about the German surrender. Moreover, it was realised that the bomb would be too heavy to be dropped on Germany by an American plane in the European theatre. It could, however, be done from a British Lancaster; but a foreign plane, obviously, could not drop an American bomb on which $2 billion had been spent. The B-29 could certainly do the job against Japan from American bases in the Pacific. 55 This major policy decision-shifting the target of the bombs from Germany to Japan-occurred without any formal scrutiny of its political implications. 56 Manhattan scientists, when recently told about Japan being always the target, were amazed and shocked; they believed the bomb was being produced only as a deterrent against Hitler's feared bomb. 57

The earliest recorded discussion of a combat use of the bomb was at a meeting on May 5, 1943, of the Military Policy Committee, with General Groves virtually its executive officer. Significantly, this was only five months after the chain reaction achieved by a team led by Enrico Fermi. There were still scientific and technological unknowns then about producing the bomb. A suggestion to drop the bomb on Tokyo was rejected because it was feared that it might not explode. The meeting concluded, "The best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet concentration in the Harbour of Truk" because the Japanese "would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it as would the Germans" 58 This is an interesting case of an embryonic form of nuclear deterrence already in operation. The mere knowledge of a German bomb programme was a deterrent! Had the Americans known about Japan's small scale bomb effort, the committee might have had second thoughts about the bomb's use on a Japanese target. 59 Roosevelt and Churchill later agreed that when the bomb was finally available, "it might perhaps after due consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender." 60 Roosevelt's advisers were not informed of this secret commitment. As we shall see later, neither was mature consideration given to the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor was a warning of such a disaster given to the Japanese leaders. Soon after, the Military Policy Committee discussed the criteria for the selection of targets. It was decided that the targets should be undamaged from conventional bombing so that the effects of the bomb could be accurately assessed.

Operation Silver Plate

General Groves persuaded the air force in September 1944 to create a special group consisting of over 1,500 men, codenamed Operation Silver Plate, to start training for the atomic bombing. Col. Paul W. Tibbets was selected as its leader. Detailed instructions about the technical aspects of the bomb were given to the group at Los Alamos. Scientists disguised as sanitary engineers discussed the complex process of dropping the atomic bomb with members of this group. At one such meeting, Robert Oppenheimer startled Tibbets with the remark: "Colonel, your biggest problem may be after the bomb has left the aircraft. The shock waves from the detonation could crush your plane. I am afraid that I can give you no guarantee that you will survive." 61

An ordnance group was assembled; it included one convicted murderer, three men guilty of manslaughter and several felons who, after escaping from various prisons, had joined the army under false names as the safest place for them to remain undetected. Their special technical expertise was spotted during a worldwide search of the American armed forces. The criminals were naturally delighted with the security arrangements. They were told that if they did their job well, their dossiers would be given to them along with matchboxes after the war was over. 62 They were dazed and stunned by this turn in fortune's wheel and worked with redoubled energy.

The group under Col. Tibbets was later moved to Havana to get accustomed to flying over long stretches of water. Then it was moved to the island of Tinian in the Pacific for further training. Laboratory facilities for the final assembly of the bomb were also established on the island. In order to accustom the Japanese to the sight of a small group of American planes flying over their country, the group began training flights in clusters of three planes and dropping a single bomb before returning to the base. It was hoped that this practice would enable the planes carrying the bombs to do their job without any Japanese opposition. 63 Tense and chain-smoking, Oppenheimer gave last minute instructions for the Hiroshima bombing: "Go to see the target. No radar bombing... Of course it doesn't matter if they check the drop with radar, but it must be a visual drop. If they drop it at night there should be a moon; that would be the best...Don't let them detonate it too high. The figure fixed is just right. Don't let it go up or the target won't get as much damage." 64

President Roosevelt had never mentioned the bomb project to Vice President Truman. As a Democratic senator presiding over a special investigating committee, Truman had tried in March 1944 to probe the expensive Manhattan Project. Stimson, who persuaded him to discontinue with his investigation, described Truman in his private diary as "a nuisance and pretty untrustworthy...He talks smoothly but acts meanly." Roosevelt's sudden death on April 12, 1945 now catapulted the prying senator into the presidential chair. When Stimson and Groves gave a detailed briefing to the new president on April 25, Groves told him that Japan had "always been the target" of an atomic strike. It seems to have been an automatic assumption. Only Undersecretary Robert Patterson questioned this assumption after the defeat of Germany. 65

Selecting the Targets

The next stage was the establishment of a committee to select the targets. Groves himself suggested to General Marshall that someone should be appointed to take charge of operational planning. Marshall retorted, "I don't like to bring too many people into this matter. Is there any reason why you can't take this over and do it yourself?" 66 Groves was only too eager to take control of the bombing operation. This decision, taken casually, institutionalised in the person of Groves the nexus between the development of the bomb and its operational control. He had a stake in its early combat use. His style was to take initiatives, leaving the onus for rescinding them on his superiors, Stimson and Marshall, both of whom were too burdened to spare time. Groves then brazenly decided to cricumvent a formal consideration of the atomic strike by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He discussed the bombing of cities only with Stimson and Marshall; he knew that Admiral Leahy, Truman's Chief of Staff, was opposed to the use of the bomb, making it extremely difficult to obtain the approval of the Joint Chiefs. Groves had by then accumulated enormous power and had in effect usurped a political role by default. 67 He now headed what amounted to a "nuclear strike command, with fifteen aircraft and...two atomic bombs." And he was determined to use them. 68

The Target Committee had more scientists on it than military officers. Groves, General Louise Norstad of the air force, Robert Oppenheimer, the great mathematician John von Neumann, and William Penney who was a member of the British team at Los Alamos and was an expert on explosives, served on it. Groves, at its first meeting on April 27, 1945, insisted on visual, not radar, bombing. This necessitated clear weather. A number of cities including Tokyo, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Nagasaki, and Yokohama were listed "for study". Hiroshima was the largest city untouched by conventional bombing. Neumann's calculations, however, revealed that its surrounding mountains were not sufficiently close to enhance the bomb's effects.

The committee meeting on May 11 narrowed the list to five target cities. The "AA" targets were Kyoto, Hiroshima, Kokura, and Yokohama. Niigata was labelled a "B" target. All these doomed cities were to be exempted from conventional bombing and "reserved" for an atomic strike. The committee held its final meeting on May 28. Groves especially wanted Kyoto as a target because it was large enough to gain complete knowledge about the effects of the bomb. The Target Committee gave priority to it because its residents were "more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon!" If the highly intelligent people of Kyoto survived from the nuclear blast, the committee presumably expected them to tell the rest of the world how deadly the bomb was! 69

Stimson found himself presiding over the incessant torching of city after city in Japan. He discussed the matter with Truman on June 6. He did not want his country to "get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities," and he was also afraid that Japan might be "so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon would not have a fair background to show its strength." Truman "laughed and said he understood." Stimson, however, was determined on a comparatively minor issue: despite General Groves repeated efforts, he deleted Kyoto from the list of doomed cities. He told Groves. "This is a question I am settling myself. Marshall is not making that decision." It must be remembered, however, that Stimson was not keen to save the lives of Kyoto's residents but only wanted to save its cultural relics so that the Japanese would not be too embittered to become allies in the post-War world. 70

The sagacious General Marshall, according to McCloy, had maintained that the use of the bomb had such enormous political consequences that "he looked to the civilians to make the decision in regard to the bomb" and that he did not presume to exercise any direction over it. 71 This was a balanced view of the appropriate relationship between the civilians and the military in the nuclear age. Even on May 29, Marshall said the bomb "might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation." If necessary, it should be used against a number of "large manufacturing areas" after a warning so that people had an opportunity to flee from the doomed area. He emphasised the moral value of advance warning to Japan: "Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear", he said. The United States, he warned, "must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force." 72 It must, however, be added that Marshall had no military incentive to oppose use of the bomb. "For him", as Barton Bernstein has rightly pointed out, "nuclear weapons and invasion were likely alternatives, and he wanted to avoid invasion." 73


As the Manhattan Project reached its final stage, there were rumblings of discontent and doubt among some scientists. Ironically, the German surrender on May 8, 1945, did not slacken efforts at Los Alamos. The race against a German bomb had already been turned into a race against the war itself. "I don't think", Oppenheimer later confessed, "there was any time when we worked harder on the speed-up than in the period after the German surrender and the actual combat use of the bomb." 74 Those who had doubts and anxieties found the presence and advice of Oppenheimer most reassuring. They were, of course, unaware of his deep involvement in the selection of targets and the training of the crew that was to drop the bombs. Working at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, however, were three of the most politically concerned scientists: Nobel Laureate, James Franck, Leo Szilard, and Eugene Rabinowitch. Franck had joined the project only after being promised that he would be given an opportunity to give his views on the use of the bomb. The indefatigable Szilard, whose restless mind first perceived the possibility of an atomic bomb, was to make personal efforts to warn decision-makers of the grave consequences of a military use of the weapon. Rabinowitch later became the co-founder and editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

The Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel

Meanwhile, Stimson appointed an Interim Committee to deliberate and advise him on future developments relating to atomic energy. Chaired by Stimson, it included his trusted aides Harvey Bundy and George Harrison. Other members were Under Secretary of State William Clayton, Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, Truman's representative James Byrnes and three barons of science-Harvard President James Conant, Vannevar Bush, and Karl Compton. In view of the growing unrest within the Manhattan Project, it was considered advisable to appoint a Scientific Panel. Concerned about the post-War diplomacy of his country, Conant advised that the government should obtain the full support of the scientists so that there would be "no public bickering among experts" when secrecy would be lifted. He recommended the names of Robert Oppenheimer, and Nobel Laureates Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi. The first three were administrators of the Manhattan Project. Fermi, according to Conant, was "a quiet, non-political type of scientist." Obviously, the panel was to perform the role of a surrogate for the scientists, not to speak on their behalf. 75

Except for Stimson and Bard, as well as General Marshall and Groves who attended the meetings of the committee by invitation, other members were not familiar with the military operations against Japan. As Oppenheimer later recalled: "We didn't know beans about the military situation in Japan. We didn't know whether they could be caused to surrender by other means or whether the invasion was really invitable. But in the backs of our minds was the notion that the invasion was inevitable because we had been told that." 76 The committee members shared some unstated assumptions: that the bomb was a legitimate weapon to be used in war; that the American public would support its use; that it would have a profound impact upon Japanese leaders; and that it would have a salutary effect on post-War relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the structure of the committee, its crowded agenda, and its cursory knowledge of the military situation did not allow a detailed discussion of alternative options for the surrender of Japan. 77 The Military Policy Committee and the Target Committee controlled by Groves, however, were taking crucial decisions.

Szilard was disturbed by the composition of the Scientific Panel because its members "were men who could be expected to play ball on this occasion". He tried to convey the views of those scientists who were agitated about the possible use of the bomb to Truman, whose office directed him to meet James Byrnes. Truman had already decided to appoint the former senator as his secretary of state; Szilard was unaware of this secret decision. Szilard met Byrnes on May 28, 1945, three days before the crucial meeting of the Scientific Panel with the Interim Committee. When Szilard suggested that the Soviet Union might soon produce nuclear weapons, Byrnes observed that "General Groves tells me there is no uranium in Russia". Szilard suggested that the United States should refrain from testing its bomb, thereby giving the Russians the impression that the Manhattan Project had failed. This would have been a truly curious culmination of the project. The politically astute future secretary of state revealed his grasp of the American political process as well as his awareness of the concerns of the nuclear scientists. He asked Szilard: "How would you get Congress to appropriate money for atomic energy research if you do not show results from the money which has been spent already?"

Szilard and Byrnes did not speak the same language and their concerns were in different time-frames. Szilard was worried about the dire consequences of the sudden use of the bomb, while Byrnes was measuring the impact of the bomb on post-War diplomacy. Byrnes asked: "Well you come from Hungary. You would not want the Russians to stay in Hungary indefinitely". Szilard was "flabbergasted by the assumption that rattling the bomb might make Russia manageable"; the suggestion offended his "sense of proportion". He thought to himself how much better the world might be had he "been born in America and become influential in American politics and had Byrnes been born in Hungary and studied physics". 78 Byrnes, in turn, found Szilard too aggressive, and whose "desire to participate in policy-making" made an unfavourable impression on him. 79 Scientists should do their work in their laboratories and leave the conduct of war to others.

The Interim Committee held its fourth meeting on May 31, 1945, to which the Scientific Panel was also invited. Stimson and General Marshall tried to 'manage' the scientists and to impress upon them how seriously members of the committee viewed their assignment. Stimson observed that the bomb was not a military weapon because it introduced "a revolutionary change in the relations of man to the universe." In his diary, he noted with satisfaction that the committee members succeeded in impressing the scientists that they were dealing with the matter "like statesmen and not like merely soldiers anxious to win the war at any cost." Moving on to a discussion about the use of the bomb, Stimson said that it should make a "profound psychological impression on as many inhabitants as possible." At the suggestion of Conant, it was decided that "the more desirable target should be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses."

Oppenheimer proposed several simultaneous atomic strikes, a proposal immediately opposed by Groves. He was against a rush job; moreover, he wanted to collect information about each successive atomic strike sufficiently distinct from the conventional bombing programme. He then complained that the Manhattan Project had been "plagued since its inception by the presence of certain scientists of doubtful discretion and uncertain loyalty." Groves had been especially suspicious of Szilard and was furious with him for his unauthorised meeting with Byrnes. The committee, however, asserted that "nothing could be done about dismissing these men until after the bomb had actually been used or, at best, until after the test" had been conducted. According to Arthur Compton, it was "a foregone conclusion that the bomb would be used. It was regarding only the details of strategy and tactics that differing views were expressed." 80 The committee reconvened the next day and on the advice of James Byrnes, formally adopted a resolution saying that the bomb should be dropped on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes and that "it be used without warning." 81

Groves had authoritarian and anti-Semitic views that made him suspicious of Szilard, while Szilard considered Groves to be the greatest fool in the Manhattan Project. In October 1942, Groves had even drafted a letter to be signed by Stimson requesting the attorney general to keep Szilard under detention for the duration of the war. Stimson, however, refused to sign it. Groves then assigned special agents to monitor Szilard's movements. 82 Their reports occasionally read "like a script from Marx Brothers." In June 1943, he directed that "the investigation of Szilard should continue despite the barrenness of the results." 83

The Franck Committee Report, June 11, 1945

The day after the Interim Committee meeting of June 1, Compton solicited proposals from his colleagues at the Chicago laboratory for the Scientific Panel's consideration. A committee chaired by James Franck, and including Szilard and Rabinowitch, hurriedly produced a report. Disclaiming any authority to pronounce on problems of high strategy, the Franck Report explained why the scientists were straying beyond their narrow field of specialisation. They found themselves "by force of events during the last five years, in the position of a small group of citizens cognizant of a grave danger for the safety of this country as well as for the future of all other nations, of which the rest of mankind is unaware". This was a grave self-indictment indeed, coming as it did from the scientists who had lobbied for the making of the bomb and had tirelessly worked to make it a reality. 84 It was a modest, contrite protest.

The report maintained that the manner in which the new weapon was used would determine the future course of history. It warned, "The race for nuclear armament will be on in earnest not later than the morning after our first demonstration of the existence of nuclear weapons." It suggested a demonstration of the destructiveness of the bomb before representatives of member countries of the United Nations on a desert or a barren island. It might later be used against Japan with the sanction of the United Nations and after an ultimatum to surrender. 85 The report, with a covering letter by Compton that was rather a dissent than an endorsement of its recommendations, was delivered to Stimson's office. Neither the Scientific Panel nor the Interim Committee considered its recommendations. Members of the Franck Committee waited in vain for some reaction; they could "as well have dropped this report into Lake Michigan." 86 Crucial decisions were being taken elsewhere.

The Scientific Panel met at Los Alamos on June 15-16, 1945. Scientists were already worried about future funding for research in atomic energy; the Panel, therefore recommended that the Interim Committee should encourage it with an annual budget of $1 billion. It also recommended that along with Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China be told about progress in the bomb project and the possibility of its imminent use. The Panel disclaimed any special competence in solving the complex social, political, and military problems presented by the advent of atomic power. At the same time, it was aware of an obligation to use the weapon to help save American lives. It, therefore, categorically stated, "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." 87

The Interim Committee, at its final meeting on June 21, simply reaffirmed the earlier decision that the weapon be used at the earliest opportunity, and that it be used without warning. It recommended that Truman should inform Stalin at the Potsdam Conference about the bomb project and that the United States intended to use it against Japan. Under Secretary Ralph Bard of the Navy Department, increasingly uneasy about the decisions of the Interim Committee, submitted a memorandum on June 27 stating that Japan should be given a "preliminary warning for say two or three days" before the bomb was dropped. This was necessary because of the position of the United States "as a great humanitarian nation." He suggested that emissaries should contact Japanese representatives and warn them about the impending use of the bomb, with assurances regarding the future status of the emperor. Bard was opposed to dropping the bomb without warning. 88 He resigned on July 1, 1945.

The Scientists' Petition

Szilard was not aware of the Trinity test of July 16 when he circulated a petition that was eventually forwarded to Truman. Many eminent nuclear physicists signed it. Most chemists were, however, conspicuously absent from the list of signatories. The final version of the petition, dated July 17, 1945, warned that there was no limit to the destructive power that would become available in the course of the development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, "a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of destruction on an unimaginable scale". Referring to the danger of the sudden annihilation of cities in the United States and other countries, it stated that the prevention of such a danger was "the solemn responsibility of the United States-singled out by virtue of her lead in the field of atomic power". It further added that the material strength that this lead conferred on the United States entailed "the obligation of restraint"; any violation of the obligation would weaken the moral position of the country "in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes". The petition urged Truman to exercise his powers as commander-in-chief not to resort to the use of the bomb unless the terms of surrender had been made public in detail and had been categorically rejected by the Japanese government. Szilard knew the circulation of a petition might not have the desired result. For the reputation of the scientists in the next few years, however, it was desirable that a minority of them "should have gone on record in favour of giving greater weight to moral arguments and should have exercised their right given to them by the Constitution to petition the President". 89

Szilard sent a copy of an earlier draft to his friend Edward Teller for circulation in the Los Alamos laboratory. In his covering letter dated July 4, 1945, Szilard admitted that "on the basis of expediency, many arguments could be put forward both for and against our use of atomic bombs against Japan." American scientists, however, were in a position to raise their voice on moral grounds "without running risks to life and liberty" even if they incurred the displeasure of those in charge of the Manhattan Project. He added that the American people were unaware of the choices being made on their behalf; only the Manhattan scientists were "in a position to form an opinion and declare their stand." Teller showed the draft petition to Oppenheimer with whom he wanted to be on friendly terms. Oppenheimer was critical of the Chicago scientists in general and Szilard in particular. He maintained that scientists had no right to influence political decisions. He conveyed to Teller "in glowing terms the deep concern, thoroughness, and wisdom with which these questions were being handled in Washington." Conscientious men who "understood the psychology of the Japanese", and who had crucial information that scientists did not possess, were taking momentous decisions. 90 This homily came from a scientist who had been deeply involved in the selection of targets and the training of the crew for the atomic bombing!

Teller's own views on the subject are of interest because of his subsequent role in the nuclear arms race. In a letter to Szilard dated July 2, Teller said that he had participated in the bomb project because of scientific curiosity and had no hope of clearing his conscience. "The things we are working on are so terrible that no amount of protesting or fiddling with politics will save our souls." The accident that had resulted in the production of "this dreadful thing" did not involve a responsibility of "having a voice in how it is to be used". This responsibility had to be shifted to the American people and an "actual combat use" of the bomb might make them aware of its dangerous consequences. He felt that he would not be doing the right thing if he "tried to say how to tie the toe of the ghost of the bottle" from which the scientists had just helped it to escape. 91 Teller sent this convoluted letter knowing that Oppenheimer would certainly see it because all mail was censored.

Groves declared the scientists' petition a classified document thereby restricting its circulation. He also asked Compton to commission a poll among the Chicago scientists to counter the impact of Szilard's activities. Determined to stop a dissenting voice of scientists from reaching Truman, he held the petition until August 1, when he was assured from the Tinian Island that the bomb was ready for use against Japan. Groves then forwarded it to Stimson who was still in Potsdam. 92 There is no documentary evidence to suggest that Truman ever saw the petition addressed to him.

Oppenheimer's role at this critical time is of great significance. In January 1945, physicist Robert Wilson arranged a meeting of Los Alamos scientists to discuss, "What shall we do about the Gadget?" The assembled scientists discussed whether they should continue with their work on the bomb when they knew that Germany was essentially defeated. Oppenheimer, having failed to persuade Wilson not to call such a meeting as the security staff would object to it, attended it and put forward an ingenious argument for the production and use of the bomb. It was absolutely essential, he observed, to demonstrate the destructive potential of the bomb before the establishment of the United Nations so that it could effectively deal with the problem from its inception. 93 Oppenheimer, as director of the project, had developed a stake in its use. He had convinced his colleagues that "the decisions were in the hands of wise and humane people" and the scientists could not influence them directly. 94 He was, moreover, being cross-examined by the security staff regarding his past associations and his loyalty was implicitly being questioned. James Conant also thought that only a combat use of the bomb would alert world public opinion about the nuclear danger. 95

Other scientists in the Manhattan Project wondered, after producing the bomb at great cost, how the American government could justify not using it to save American lives. Were not American servicemen part of the nation ? If the weapon produced in the American laboratories could save their lives, why should it not be dropped on Japanese cities? 96 The scientists were not aware of the military situation and the impending collapse of Japan. Crucial decisions were already taken; their reports and petitions were duly filed for the record. The conflicting pressures under which the various segments of the Manhattan Project were working, the secrecy surrounding the whole project, making it difficult for scientists in one laboratory to communicate freely with their colleagues in other parts of the Manhattan Project, and the total insulation from those involved in the actual conduct of war, rendered the scientists' efforts futile. Moreover, many of them were not fully aware of the deep involvement of Oppenheimer and other members of the Scientific Panel in the detailed planning of the use of the bomb. They looked upon these popes and cardinals of nuclear physics as their spokesmen in the corridors of power. Ironically, many scientists who, before the atomic bombings, were most critical of the bomb's surprise use, did not publicly condemn it afterwards. 97 They simply avoided discussion on it for tactical reasons. Interestingly, Edward Teller felt strongly that dropping the bomb "without prior warning or demonstration was a mistake." He later commented on the remarkable coincidence that the scientists who favoured prior warning to Japan later supported the development of nuclear weapons, while those who recommended immediate use of the bomb "argued after the war for the cessation of all further development." 98 Nobel Laureate Isador Rabi asserted in 1949 that "the wailing over Hiroshima finds no echo in Japan." As it was a legitimate target, the Japanese were glad that anything happened to stop the insane war. He, however, added that "with sufficient propaganda, they might in time be induced to feel that they were greatly wronged. Hiroshima, by the way, is largely rebuilt." 99


Trinity Test, July 16, 1945

A detailed report on the successful Trinity test, communicated to Truman at Potsdam, described the explosion as "unprecedented, magnificient, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying." It referred to "the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to the Almighty." 100 While from that moment, American use of the atomic bomb against Japanese targets became an impending possibility, it did not lessen the importance of Soviet support to the war effort in the Far East; substantial technical problems of atomic bomb-delivery remained. Soviet assistance in engaging the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was welcome; but Russian participation in the occupation of Japan was an unwelcome prospect. Anxieties about the human cost of the projected invasion were now replaced by confidence in the bomb as a weapon of intimidation. "Neither the President", wrote Byrnes, "nor I were anxious to have them (the Russians) enter the war after we had learned of this successful test." Stimson agreed with this assessment. "The bomb as a mere probable weapon had seemed a weak reed on which to rely, but the bomb as a colossal reality was very different", he wrote. In a letter to his wife Margaret, Truman confessed: "All of us wanted Russia in the Japanese War. Had we known what the Atomic Bomb would do, we we'd have never wanted the Bear in the picture." 101

Stimson succeeded in persuading Truman at Potsdam to drop Kyoto from the target list. A message was then sent to Washington suggesting the inclusion of Nagasaki. While Kyoto met all the prescribed criteria for atomic bombing, the odd fact is that Nagasaki did not. It was not on the reserved list and had been conventionally bombed. Moreover, the city was long and narrow, divided between two ranges of hills that would have the effect of deflecting the blast wave of the explosion. There was an intense debate in Washington about the suitability of Nagasaki as a target.

Bombing Order, July 25, 1945

Then on July 23, Groves revised the directive he had prepared as early as May 1945. Eventually dated July 25, the bombing order, signed by Marshall's deputy General Thomas Handy, was addressed to General Carl A. Spaatz, commanding general of the newly created United States Strategic Air Force. It listed Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki for visual bombing after August 3, 1945, depending on weather conditions. The plane with the bomb was to be accompanied by another aircraft carrying scientific personnel to record the effects of the explosion. "Additional bombs" were to be delivered "as soon as made ready." 102 Thus, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted from a single order. Moreover, it was deliberately worded to allow considerable latitude to the field commander for the exact date, timing of attack, and choice of targets. There is no evidence that Truman ever saw the order. Copies of this order were to be personally delivered to the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, commander of the American Fleet in the Pacific; they were, thus, being informed of the existence of the bomb at the last possible moment. Had bad weather not delayed the bombing of Hiroshima, MacArthur would have learnt about it on the very day it was dropped. On being the last commander to be briefed, MacArthur laconically observed. "This will completely change all our ideas of warfare". Originally it was thought that a verbal order could suffice, but General Spaatz insisted that "if I am going to kill 100,000 people, I'm not going to do it on verbal orders. I want a piece of paper". 103 In an extraordinary sequence, instead of being contingent on the Japanese response to the Allied ultimatum issued from Potsdam, the bombing order was issued a day before the warning. It only increased the velocity of the military wheels that had been set moving much earlier. As far as Groves was concerned, Truman's decision "was one of noninterference-basically a decision not to upset the existing plans." 104

The exact date for the bombing depended on weather forecasts. General Curtis LeMay had reached Guam to take charge of the operation. He had already established contact with Mao Zedong's guerillas who, in return for medical supplies and materials, had agreed to send him regular weather forecasts. 105 These reports proved to be invaluable for American pilots operating from Chengtu airfields and dropping incendiary bombs over Japanese cities. The pilots often drank toasts to Mao Zedong. LeMay continued to rely on these weather reports even when he moved to Guam. These reports to American forces in the Pacific were supplied in good faith as part of the Allied effort against Japan. The Chinese were, however, completely unaware of American intentions of dropping the atomic bomb on Japanese cities.

Policy-makers were planning to drop at least three bombs in August and more in September. Physicist Philip Morrison remembers that at Los Alamos "a date near August tenth was a mysterious final date" that those readying the bomb "had to meet at whatever cost in risk or money or good development policy." 106 The third bomb was to be dropped on Kokura around August 20. On the morning of August 10, physicist Robert Bacher was supervising at Los Alamos the transfer of a completed plutonium core to San Francisco and then to Tinian. He saw Oppenheimer running towards him. He had received an urgent call from Washington telling him that Truman had ordered the atomic bombing to stop. This decision not to drop the third bomb restored Truman's control over the policy process. Commanding General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold later confessed that "the abrupt surrender of Japan came more or less as a surprise." 107

According to a secret agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill, British consent to the war-time use of the bomb was obligatory. In view of the ravages of war, Britain was keen on an early end to hostilities. British forces were poised for an invasion of Malaya that would have involved heavy casualties. British consent was, therefore, promptly given. In Churchill's words, the atomic bombing "was never even an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement..." 108


A Cluster of Catastrophes, August 6-9, 1945

Hiroshima's history as a military centre began with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95; it played the same function during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. On Monday, August 6, an air raid warning was sounded at 7:09 a.m. As there were no bombers to be seen, at 7:31 a.m., there was an all-clear sign. Shortly before 8 o'clock, there was another air raid warning and three B-29s were winging their way toward Hiroshima through the clear blue sky. The bomb released the equivalent of 13,500 tons of TNT. "Almost all watches and clocks had been destroyed...the people of Hiroshima had...a different sense of time: all that day of August 6 they wondered how soon they would die and how soon the people around them would die. That was the only sense of time that remained for them." 109

On August 8, Foreign Minister Togo showed the emperor preliminary reports from Hiroshima. Physicist Yoshio Nishina came to the office of Secretary to the Cabinet Sakumizu and said in a tremulous voice: "It can only be an atomic bomb to cause such havoc. We scientists must apologise to the nation for our incompetence." Premier Suzuki declared, "This is not a defeat of the Japanese armed forces at the hands of US forces, but rather the defeat of Japanese science and technology by US technology. Therefore, the military should not speak of prestige." 110 The same day Foreign Minister Molotov received Ambassador Sato at 3 p.m. Molotov curtly told him that from August 9 the Soviet Union would "consider herself in a state of war with Japan." 111 Stalin honoured his promise to Roosevelt at Yalta by declaring war against Japan three months to the day after the surrender of Germany. An hour after midnight, Tokyo time, the Red Army crossed the Manchurian frontier in fulfillment of Stalin's promise at Yalta and Potsdam. Since the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was Japan's main fighting force in case of invasion, the rapid advance of the Red Army had a devastating effect on the morale of the Japanese leadership. When Suzuki was told that the Manchurian defences were hopelessly inadequate, he muttered, "Then the game is up." Suzuki and Togo had pinned their hopes on Soviet mediation to mitigate the terms of surrender. These hopes were now shattered. 112 A second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The Soviet declaration of war was overshadowed by the atomic bombings.

The First Imperial Decision

The Japanese Supreme War Council assembled on August 9 at 11 a.m. at the very moment when the bomb was being dropped on Nagasaki. Unaware of this disaster, the Japanese leaders continued to argue their conflicting points of view. Umezu asserted that the Japanese troops had not yet been defeated, and that the word "capitulation" could not be found in the country's military dictionary. 113 The Soviet declaration of war was a greater stunning blow than the disaster reported from Hiroshima. The Council was evenly divided on the question of the terms of surrender. Members were not discussing whether to surrender but whether to insist on one or four conditions. Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai were for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, provided the imperial institution or kokutai was retained. Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda insisted on three additional conditions: voluntary withdrawal of Japanese forces overseas under their own commanders; no Allied occupation of Japan; and those responsible for the war to be tried by the Japanese themselves. Togo argued that the four conditions would not be acceptable to the Allied Powers. In the midst of this deadlock, one of the prime minister's aides burst into the room to announce the bombing of Nagasaki. An "impassioned" discussion followed and then the War Council adjourned, still split three against three. The 16 members of the Cabinet met in the afternoon. Again there was no consensus. Nine voted for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration with a proviso regarding kokutai, four wanted the three additional conditions to be fulfilled, and three were undecided. 114

Suzuki then resorted to an unprecedented device-holding a meeting of the Supreme War Council in the presence of the emperor. "It was, as though, to break the fatal deadlock, the chessboard king was to be not only allowed to place himself in check but also granted the freedom of movement of the queen." 115 Shortly before midnight on August 9, the Council assembled in the underground shelter of the imperial palace. President of the Privy Council Baron Kichiro Hiranuma and four secretaries of the Council were also in attendance. The emperor entered the shelter at 2:30 in the morning of August 10 and sat in front of a gilded screen. His advisers were wearing either military uniforms or formal morning dress and were perspiring profusely. The heated arguments were again rehearsed and the deadlock was repeated. According to Emperor Hirohito's own version given before the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, "Everyone agreed on the condition to preserve the kokutai." War Minister Anami, his cheeks wet with tears, insisted on the three additional conditions. Otherwise, the courageous fight must continue and the Japanese people would "find life in death!" Suzuki then walked up to the table where the emperor was sitting. "I present myself humbly at the foot of the throne," he said, "and I request Your Imperial Majesty's opinion as to which proposal be adopted." With "visible emotion welling up within him," Emperor Hirohito said the people were suffering terribly; in view of the atomic bombing and the Soviet attack, Japan "could not but accept the terms of Potsdam." All those present broke down, with some throwing themselves forward-arms outstretched, prostrate on the tables, sobbing unashamedly." Tears flooded the emperor's eyes, and he concluded that he could not stand "the disarming of loyal and gallant troops and punishment of those responsible for the war"; "the time has come to bear the unbearable." He added, "I swallow my tears." As one member present on this fateful occasion reported: "All of us listened to the Emperor's decision with sobs. The Emperor, too, wiped his cheeks many times with his white gloved hands." He then left the room. 116 The Cabinet met on August 10 at 3 a.m. Togo proposed acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding that it did not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."

The American Reply

The Japanese surrender terms were received in Washington the same day at 7:33 a.m. But there was a fly in the ointment; an assurance was needed regarding the status of the emperor. This unexpected turn of events led to frantic consultations. Truman summoned Byrnes, Stimson, Forrestal, and Leahy for consultations. Stimson and Leahy said the emperor's help would be needed in obtaining surrender of scattered Japanese troops. It was of vital importance for Stimson to get Japan under American control "before the Russians could put in any substantial claim to occupy and help rule it." Byrnes, however, still feared a backlash. The demand for unconditional surrender was made before the two bombs were dropped and before the Soviet Union was a belligerent. "If any conditions are to be accepted", he insisted, "I want the United States and not Japan to state the conditions." 117 British and Soviet, and Chinese consent was also needed.

Stalin's armies were racing across Manchuria; there was no time to lose. Truman asked Byrnes to draft a reply to the Japanese surrender offer. The carefully drafted reply contained the sentence: "From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms." This assurance implied the retention of the emperor. Through deliberate ambiguity, Japan's conditional surrender was being accepted; but, at the same time, the fiction of unconditional surrender could be maintained. British and Chinese consent was easily obtained. Since the Soviet Union, Molotov said to American Ambassador Averell Harriman, did not consider the Japanese offer as unconditional surrender, the Red Army would continue its advance into Manchuria. After an unsuccessful attempt to get a Soviet commander share the occupation of Japan with MacArthur, Soviet consent to the American draft reply was finally obtained. The text was transmitted to Tokyo on August 11. The irony of Byrnes' eventually coming round to accept conditional surrender was not lost on Stimson. He scribbled in his diary that the continuance of the Japanese imperial dynasty was the issue he feared would cause trouble. The initial draft of the Potsdam Declaration contained an assurance about a constitutional monarchy. He added, "The President and Byrnes struck that out." 118

The Second Imperial Decision

The Japanese Cabinet met at 3:00 p.m. on August 12 to consider the American reply. Togo argued that despite the authority of the supreme commander, the position of the emperor remained unimpaired. President of the Privy Council Hiranuma, however, maintained that "the freely expressed will of the people" mentioned in the Potsdam Declaration could not alter the status of the emperor ordained by "divine will." Anami was for fighting to the bitter end. Togo was on the verge of resigning when Suzuki unexpectedly opposed acceptance of the Allied terms. Kido, however, persuaded the wavering Suzuki to follow the emperor's desire for an immediate peace. The Cabinet deadlock was repeated at the Supreme War Council that met at 8:30 a.m. on August 13. The stalemate persisted at another Cabinet meeting later in the day. Thirteen members voted in favour of acceptance of the American reply and three against. 119

Meanwhile, Truman and his advisers were getting impatient; they had waited for three days for a Japanese response. "Never", Byrnes recalled, "have I known time to pass so slowly." In order to coerce Japan's ruling elite, American planes dropped thousands of leaflets on Tokyo containing the text of the Japanese offer of surrender and the American reply. When Marquis Kido was handed one of these leaflets, he had a fright. "The soldiers knew nothing of our plans for surrender", he later confessed. "If they saw the leaflets, anything could happen." Kido rushed to the emperor. Suzuki, also sought an audience. It was for the first time that the two high dignitaries together were meeting the emperor. Hirohito then decided to call an Imperial Conference consisting of 25 members; they included members of the Cabinet and of the Supreme War Council, and the president of the Privy Council.

The Imperial Conference met in the air-raid shelter of the imperial palace at 10:30 a.m. on August 14. The conflicting arguments were repeated once again. Suzuki then apologised to the emperor for the continuing deadlock. Hirohito then told a hushed audience that he had decided that the American reply was acceptable. He then made an allusion to the humiliating intervention by Russia, Germany and France after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, forcing Japan to disgorge some of the fruits of its victory over China. "The decision I have reached," he said, "is akin to the one forced upon my grandfather, the Emperor Meiji, at the time of the Triple Intervention. As he endured the unendurable, so shall I, and so must you." He ordered an Imperial Rescript to be prepared so that he could address the Japanese people. Brushing a white-gloved hand across his eyes, Emperor Hirohito left the room. All those present "began crying and two ministers collapsed, sobbing uncontrollably on the floor." 120

Since June 1945, Emperor Hirohito had argued with his military commanders at their own level. Confronting their repeated assertions of the will to fight to the bitter end, he said, "The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance." Since this had been the case in the past, how could the Japanese armed forces repel the invaders? 121 It was, nevertheless, a traumatic moment for the fanatical elements within the armed forces. The titular heads of the Japanese armed forces may have reluctantly acquiesced in the emperor's directive; but those hotheads were resentful and plotting a coup or a final suicide battle. Kido was the main target because it was believed he had misguided Hirohito; he could not venture out of the imperial palace for fear of assassination. Anami, who had bowed to the emperor's decision, declared that anyone acting against it would have to do so over his dead body. Nuclear physicist Tsunesaburo Asada reported that the naval authorities had arrived at a horrible conclusion. "It was to isolate all the Japanese physicists in the caves of Nagano prefecture and to have them produce a bomb...The Navy had no intention to surrender." 122

The Cabinet approved the final draft of the Imperial Rescript and the emperor made a recording of it that was safely hidden. The conspirators even took over the imperial palace for a while. The rebellion was soon suppressed. General Anami's position throughout the final crisis was ambivalent. He insisted on three additional conditions before acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Otherwise, he was for fighting to the bitter end. He, however, refrained from submitting his resignation that would have automatically led to the collapse of the Cabinet. He could not allow his troops to overturn the emperor's final decision. True to the Samurai tradition, he committed harakiri by slashing his stomach with a sword; at his request, his brother-in-law helped him thrust a dagger in his throat. His body was found in a pool of blood with the head in the direction of the imperial palace. A bloodstained paper contained his last message: "Believing firmly that our sacred land shall never perish, I-with my death-humbly apologise to the Emperor for the great crime." Was it the crime of the part he played in the war or the crime of defeat and surrender? 123

The Japanese people heard the voice of the emperor for the first time at noon on August 15, 1945, and were stunned by his message. It was a carefully contrived, evasive message. The "war situation has developed", it said, "not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest." This was an oblique reference to the Soviet declaration of war. Moreover, the enemy had begun to "use a new and most cruel bomb." Continuation of the war would have caused not only the downfall of Japan "but also the destruction of all human civilisation." According to "the dictates of time and fate", therefore, he had "resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable." Thus, Hirohito, "in his divine benevolence" was saving all human civilisation from destruction. "As a result of the bombs", observes one commentator, "the Japanese had been transformed from aggressors to saviors, a magnificent feat of public relations." Hirohito's decision is called seidan or sacred decision. 124

Why Japan Surrendered?

Since the surrender occurred shortly after the atomic bombings, a myth developed that the bomb saved American lives. Modification of the terms of surrender, guaranteeing the future of the imperial dynasty, would have terminated the war much earlier. Japanese military officers who possessed "a scintilla of realism and a sense of responsibility" looked upon "the last battle" as a bargaining counter to obtain a negotiated surrender. By offering conditional surrender in their note of August 10, Japanese leaders were willing to take the risk of additional atomic bombing as well as of last-ditch resistance. As an old RAND study concluded, "The atomic bombs, far from being the 'controlling' factor, caused no significant reorientation of attitudes, no manifest change in point of view." The main factor triggering the timing of the offer was the Soviet declaration of war because it dispelled the illusion of Soviet mediation. If the bombs had been dropped but the Soviet intervention had not occurred, Japanese leaders would have still pinned their hopes on Soviet intentions. 125 The British assessment as well was that "the Russian declaration of war was the decisive factor in bringing Japan to accept the Potsdam declaration." 126 The atomic bombs killed one-seventh as many Japanese as the incendiary bombing. "Since Tokyo was not directly affected by the (atomic) bombing", Army Vice-Chief of Staff Torashiro Kawabe later pointed out, "the full force of the shock was not felt." In comparison, the Soviet entry into the war was a much greater shock. Chief of Staff Admiral Toyoda confessed after the war that the Russian attack rather than the atomic bombs hastened the surrender. 127

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not a decisive factor even in the sequence of events leading to the surrender. The army refused to discuss surrender at a meeting called soon after the Hiroshima bombing. The atomic bombings had "little or no impact on the Army's position." Had the civilian members of the Supreme War Council tried to surrender at that stage, there might have been a coup led by senior military officers. After the Soviet attack across the Manchurian frontier, however, its representatives participated in the discussions. The atomic bombing had "little or no impact on the army's position." 128 The Supreme War Council continued to be evenly divided after the disaster of Hiroshima; the same division persisted after the Nagasaki bombing and the Soviet declaration of war. The deadlock continued even within the Cabinet and the Imperial Conference. It cannot be denied, however, that the bomb did hasten the Japanese decision-making process. As the Japanese did not know that the United States had used its entire nuclear arsenal, they had to reckon with the grim prospect of additional bombs being dropped on their cities.

There was an important domestic factor as well impinging on the Japanese decision. As early as February 1943, Kido had a long conversation with Prince Konoye who "repeatedly spoke of the necessity of terminating the conflict as soon as possible lest unsettled internal conditions lead to an intensification of Communist activity within Japan." The stark choice, in his view, was between early cessation of hostilities or ultimate victory of Communism. 129 Soviet intervention threatened the survival of the imperial institution. Hirohito ordered his troops to stop fighting because its prolongation "may eventually result in the loss of the very foundation on which our Empire exists." Despite the fact that "the fighting spirit of the Imperial army and navy" was "still high", he was negotiating peace "for the sake of maintaining our glorious national polity." 130 The Japanese ruling elite feared that the people might become restless and unruly. Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa admitted on August 12, 1945, that the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war were "in a sense, gifts from the gods!" They provided a perfect excuse to terminate the war without losing face. 131

The rapid succession of events created the illusion that atomic coercion brought about the Japanese surrender. Such a focus on the timing of surrender ignores a series of preceding developments. Japanese leaders were fully aware that their country had been defeated but were unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. It was military vulnerability rather than civilian vulnerability that accounted for the Japanese surrender. The pulverisation of Japanese cities had resulted in millions of deaths and horrendous destruction. More than 10 million Japanese had fled from the bombed urban centres. Naval blockade had completely stopped all foreign sources of supply, crippling the economy and undermining military effort. With the fall of Okinawa in June 1945, American tactical air power brought Kyushu within its range. And the rapid collapse of the Manchurian Army was a warning that the Japanese armed forces would not be able to cope with the invasion of the Japanese islands. All factions within the ruling elite had supported, however unwillingly, the peace feelers and Soviet mediation to mitigate the terms of surrender.

It was the American failure to distinguish between defeating Japan and obtaining its surrender that prolonged the war. "The Japanese surrender" according to the RAND study, "illustrates the use of a defeated power's residual strength, combined with an insular position and an extreme will to fight, for the purpose of obtaining political concessions in return for surrender." 132 The only substantive change was in the American position. Thus, after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States agreed to the continuation of the imperial dynasty. Hanson Baldwin rightly pointed out, "We demanded unconditional surrender, then dropped the bomb and accepted conditional surrender." The United States was thus "twice guilty." 133 When the army historians in 1946 prepared their account of the atomic bombings, however, Secretary of War Robert Patterson said their statement that by June 26, 1945, the Japanese leaders had decided to surrender unnecessarily depreciated the contribution of the bomb. He interceded to ensure that the bombings rather than Soviet entry into the war were decisive in bringing about the Japanese surrender. 134


The Anxieties of the President of Harvard University

An overwhelming majority of Americans supported the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Opinion polls conducted shortly after the war showed that 4 per cent Americans supported the atomic bombings, 23 per cent were disappointed that more bombs were not dropped before the Japanese surrender, and only 5 per cent were critical of the decision. 135 Time magazine in its August 18, 1947, issue almost implied that the Japanese people were grateful for what had happened: "Hiroshima and its fellow bomb victim, Nagasaki, are the most pro-American cities in Japan," it reassured American readers. American visitors, it added, were "bombarded with questions as to how Hiroshima can be made a mecca (sic!) for peace-loving pilgrims. Hiroshimans feel that The Bomb purged them of all war guilt." 136

There were some voices of protest and anguish as well. In order to assess the effects of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan, the American government constituted a Strategic Bombing Survey consisting of a staff of over 1,000 military and civilian experts, including Paul Nitze, George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith. It produced 316 volumes-208 reports on Germany and 108 pertaining to the bombings on Japan. Paul Nitze supervised the detailed report on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and since then has been one of the most influential members of the American strategic community. It concluded, "Certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." 137 This conclusion suggested that the atomic bombings lacked a compelling military necessity. Moreover, The New Yorker devoted the entire issue of August 31, 1946, to an explosive article by John Hersey. Published as a book, it immediately became a bestseller. 138 A respected journalist, reviewing it, described the bombing as "the crime of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." 139

President of Harvard University James Conant perceived a backlash against the bomb. This "rubbed a raw nerve" in the generally unemotional scientist who felt obliged to orchestrate an early response. It was necessary for world peace, he felt, that "the American people stay tough in regard to the use of the bomb." They had "to get the past straight" before they could prepare for the future. 140 He was worried because the "spreading accusation that it was entirely unnecessary to use the bomb at all" was coming not from professional pacifists and religious leaders but from a small minority of the "sentimental and verbally minded" people in contact with American boys and girls in schools and colleges. As educators of the future generations, they could 'distort' history. Conant wanted to shape Americans' perception of their own leaders coping with troubling dilemmas and looked for someone who could speak with authority on the subject. No one could do it better, he thought, than the highly respected former Secretary for War Henry Stimson. He, therefore, requested Stimson to write an article justifying the use of the bomb. Because of his public stature, a mere recital of the facts leading to the bombing would be sufficient; this would eliminate possibilities of attacks by the critics necessitating a reply from the former secretary. 141

Stimson, who had agonised more than any other close adviser of Truman about the course of events leading to the bombings, reluctantly agreed to write the suggested article. His former aide Harvey Bundy and General Groves sent suggestions and drafts. The ghostwriter was a junior fellow of Harvard University, McGeorge Bundy, who later became national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Conant closely supervised the venture and gave editorial advice to the ghostwriter. His suggested revisions, deletions, and proposed additions were equally revealing. He urged McGeorge Bundy to eliminate all references to the issue of unconditional surrender because, in his view, it diverted "one's mind from the general line of the argument." As the above narration has shown, an overwhelming majority of Truman's civilian and military advisers had favoured an assurance about retention of the emperor. Stimson's own pleas for such an assurance had been rejected. By getting any reference to it deleted from the article, Conant was arranging the writing of 'history with a purpose.' It was like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Conant also wanted it to be mentioned that the scientific leaders of the Manhattan Project, including members of the Scientific Panel, did not protest against the bombings; this was necessary in order to counter the impression created by some scientists that they were against the use of the bomb. He asked Bundy to offer his apologies to Stimson in case he saw the "mutilated manuscript." 142

Henry Stimson Justifies the Bombings

Stimson's article entitled "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" appeared in the February 1947 issue of the Harper's magazine; permission was given to other magazines and newspapers to reprint it without any charge. His main argument was that the American objective from the beginning was "to be the first to produce an atomic weapon and use it." The bomb was considered "as legitimate as any other of the deadly explosives of modern war. The entire purpose was the production of a military weapon; on no other ground could the wartime expenditure of so much time and money have been justified." He implied that the only alternative to the use of the bomb was an invasion of the Japanese islands, planned for November 1945, that would have continued until the latter part of 1946. He was informed that it would have cost "over a million casualties to American forces alone." America's military allies would have suffered additional losses. No responsible American leader "holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face." He disclosed that the United States had only two bombs at its disposal and, therefore, could not afford to waste them for demonstration purposes. The decision to drop the bombs was, he insisted, "carefully considered." The bomb was "a psychological weapon"; the Japanese became so subdued that their surrender was brought about with unprecedented ease. American lives were saved and the agonies of war shortened. The alternative of a Soviet attack on Japan was not mentioned. Nor was there any explanation offered for the Nagasaki bombing. Stimson concluded with the remark that "this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice." 143

As Barton Bernstein has observed in his remarkable analysis of the origin and political functions of Stimson's article, its tone was "not one of celebration" but rather of necessity and grim duty. It avoided issues that would have raised awkward questions. "Calm, authoritative, and often seeming matter-of-act, it was a skillful brief presentation as a virtual narrative of events. It seemed honest and open, and never defensive." Ghostwriter McGeorge Bundy wrote to Stimson about the article's impact on his friends who fell in Conant's unkindly category of the "verbal-minded": "I think we deserve some sort of medal for reducing these particular chatterers to silence." Stimson told Truman that his article was "intended to satisfy the doubts of that difficult class of the community which would have charge of the education of the next generation, namely educators and historians." 144 Joseph Grew chided Stimson for not mentioning in his article the issue of assurance regarding the emperor. 145

The Hiroshima Myth

For many years, Stimson's account became the standard history of the atomic bombings. It became an article of faith that the alternatives before Truman were the loss of half a million American lives during a projected invasion of Japan or the use of the bomb. This assertion was designed to give legitimacy to the bombings; it blocked a detailed analysis of other options available in August 1945. The announcement by Truman on August 6, 1945, however, made no mention of the number of American lives saved. Then on December 15, 1945, he asserted: "It occurred to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities and I think they were and are." Truman's memoirs later inflated the figure to half a million lives saved. The "verbal-minded" educators and historians have now pointed out that all the estimates Truman received were well below half a million fatalities. For a balanced estimate of likely deaths of American servicemen during the projected invasion of Japan, it is worth remembering that the entire World War II cost the United States about 292,000 battle deaths and 672,000 wounded. 146

James Conant was happy with the justification. If "propaganda against the use of the atomic bombs had been allowed to grow unchecked", he wrote to Stimson, "the strength of our military position by virtue of having the bomb could have been completely weakened". 147 The entire structure of nuclear strategy is thus dependent on the justification of the bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is remarkable that "the president of the country's leading institution of liberal learning, having set in motion a process leading to the publication of the facts about an event, should intervene in order to censor details he judged it undesirable for the public to learn." 148

Many senior military advisers of Truman had varying degrees of reservations regarding the use and effectiveness of the bomb in bringing about the surrender of Japan. Admiral Leahy, who chaired meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had moral compunctions about the use of the bomb. He wrote after the end of World War II that the use of "this barbarous weapon" was of no material assistance to the war effort and "in being the first to use, we had adopted the ethical standards common to barbarians in the dark ages." General Arnold of the US Army Air Force was convinced that conventional bombing would be sufficient to bring about the Japanese surrender as Japan had lost control of the air. General McArthur was informed of the very existence of the bomb only five days before the bombings when he was given a copy of the order. He subsequently stated on many occasions that the atomic bombing was completely unnecessary. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz said, "The complete impunity with which the Pacific Fleet pounded Japan at pointblank range was the decisive factor" in Japanese efforts to obtain acceptable terms of surrender; "the atomic bomb merely hastened the process already reaching an inevitable conclusion". General Curtis LeMay maintained that the war would have ended within a few weeks; "the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war". These retrospective conjectures may reflect the normal tendency of officers, engaged in a savage military conflict and fully cognisant of the impending defeat of the enemy, to be keen to partake of the glory of victory. The atomic bomb tended to minimise the sacrifices their Services had made. But General Eisenhower, supreme commander of Allied Forces in Europe, had also expressed his misgivings to Stimson during the Potsdam Conference because he believed that Japan was already defeated and that atomic bombing was "completely unncessary." 149

British Nobel Laureate P.M.S. Blackett first put forward the theory that the atomic bombings were not so much the last gasps of World War II as the opening shots of the Cold War. His main argument was that the invasion of the Japanese islands was scheduled to begin on November 1, 1945, and as the German surrender took place on May 8, 1945, the Russian entry into the war against Japan was expected by early August 1945. The rush to drop the two bombs could be explained as an attempt to end the war before Russia entered it. As for the American argument about the mere coincidence of those events without any preconceived plan, Blackett wondered about this "curious preference to be considered irresponsible, tactless, even brutal, but at all costs not clever". 150 This view was earlier contested by many American scholars; but the weight of scholarly opinion now supports the conclusion that the bomb was used as a terror weapon in order to shock the Japanese into surrender and the Russians into an appropriately conciliatory mood after the war.

Thomas Schelling, one of the most influential civilian strategists in the United States, has discussed the implications of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. A country, which had only two bombs at its disposal, decided to use them in order to "stun the enemy into surrender". It was an attack on cities with large populations. "With a moderate pretense at military-industrial targeting", the two cities were bombed without any warning, "depleting the arsenal completely." The bombing of Nagasaki so soon after the first attack could only give the impression to the victims that more bombs were to follow. This initial use of the bomb as a weapon of terror has determined the subsequent elaboration of nuclear strategy. Schelling, however, added that he did not imply anything "derogatory or demeaning about strategic nuclear forces" but it is "worth remembering" this significant aspect of the use of the bomb. Without giving sufficient time to absorb the shock of Hiroshima, another bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. That was certainly a terror bomb for "it suggested a willingness to use the weapon without compunction; it was not in any sense a "demonstration", since a demonstration had already been made." Victor Weisskopf, a Manhattan Project scientist, says the Nagasaki bombing "was a crime". His colleague Bertrand Feld has commented on "its senselessness, its complete irrationality", and "its inexcusable and wanton disregard of human life." Barton Bernstein, the American nuclear historian who has extensively examined archival material, asserts that the bomb was used as "a terror weapon". It was designed to produce "the greatest psychological effect against Japan" and "as a bonus, cow other nations, notably the Soviet Union." 151


The American occupation authorities imposed a total ban on the publication of any information regarding the agonies of the survivors of the bombings. More details were published only after the Japanese peace treaty was signed in 1951. It was, however, not until 1973 that the American government returned to Japan about 20,000 items, including 2,000 photographs, which contain the most harrowing details of this casual slaughter.

A Japanese committee for the compilation of materials on the damage caused by the two bombs published a massive report in 1981. 152 It states that the bomb "was dropped directly on cities whose people had no way to anticipate, or to protect themselves from, its enormous destructive power." Japan was already on the brink of surrender. The objective was "to establish clearly America's post-war international position and strategic supremacy in the anticipated cold war setting." The report categorically states, "This historically unprecedented devastation of human society stemmed from essentially experimental and political aims". 153 It asserts: "The magnitude of the killing is, in essence, better termed genocide-if not also sociocide, biocide, and earthcide-for it is a complete negation of human existence." 154 It also indicts the Japanese government for its callousness towards the victims, "From the time of the bombings to the end of the war-when the victims' needs were most urgent" it "simply left them to fend for themselves." 155

Japan was not just a helpless victim in the last stages of the war. Its record of aggession, its nerve gas attacks on China and bacteriological experiments in Manchuria, the fanatical manner in which its troops behaved in the theatres of war, and its atrocious treatment of Allied prisoners of war had inflamed world public opinion. The Japanese kept captured American soldiers "locked for years in packing crates" and gleefully used "bayonets on civilians, on nurses and the wounded." There was much sadism and brutality on the other side as well. American soldiers were proud to possess "well-washed" Japanese skulls and "plenty of Japanese gold teeth were extracted-some from still living mouths-with Marine Corps Ka Bar knives." The situation grew so scandalous that the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet issued an order in September 1942 that said: "No part of the enemy's body may be used as a souvenir." In the vicious battle of Okinawa, "123,000 Japanese and Americans killed each other." It was a "war without mercy". American soldiers heard about the end of the war, according to one account, "with quiet disbelief coupled with an indescribable sense of relief...Except for a few widely scattered shouts of joy, the survivors of the abyss sat hollow-eyed and silent, trying to comprehend a world without war." 156

There were unprecedented gestures of amity between the United States and Japan after the war. General Curtis LeMay, having directed the incendiary and atomic bombings, was decorated with the First Class Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun for helping Japan build her air force after the war. Minoru Genda, who had masterminded the raid on Pearl Harbour, was later awarded the American Legion of Merit. 157

On the Hiroshima Cenotaph are inscribed the words: "Please rest in peace, for the error will not be repeated." It is not clear whether the error was the atomic bombing or Japanese militarism.


Note *: Matin Zuberi, Member, NSC

Note 1: Franck W. Chinnock, Nagasaki: The Forgotten Bomb (London, 1970), p. 207.

Note 2: Quoted in Gordon Thomas and Max Mogan-Witts, Ruin from the Air (London, 1982 edition), p. 390:

Note 3: Ibid., p. 397.

Note 4: Peter Goodchild, Oppenheimer (London, 1983), p. 158.

Note 5: Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, pp. 400, 420, and 428-434; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), p. 710; Robert C. Batchelder, The Irreversible Decision 1939-1950 (Boston, 1962), pp. 99-100.

Note 6: A poem by Masuji Ibuse quoted in Rhodes, n. 5, p. 712. Among those who died in Hiroshima were 23 American servicemen. According to a Time magazine report: "Some months after the war ended, a former Japanese policeman gave US occupation authorities twenty-three sets of dog tags (identification discs) that had been taken from US prisoners of war who were in Hiroshima when the bomb was dropped." Quoted in The Pacific War Research Society, The Day Man Lost: Hiroshima, August 6, 1945 (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 292-293. A group of 14 Japanese scholars produced this book after three years of research. The US government has never officially acknowledged the death of the American prisoners of war. Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance, (New York), 1975, p. 233.

Note 7: Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (New York, 1984), pp. 298-299, 302-303.

Note 8: W. Craig, The Fall of Japan (London, 1967), pp. 75-76.

Note 9: Stanley Goldberg, "What Did Truman Know, and When Did he Know it?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1998, p. 18.

Note 10: General Leslie M. Groves, Now It Can be Told (New York, 1983 ed.), p. 308.

Note 11: Rhodes, n. 5, p. 738.

Note 12: Luis Alvarez, Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist (New York, 1987), pp. 144-145. Alvarez is reported to have said: "We wanted some method of testing the effectiveness of the bomb over enemy territory." F.J.P. Veale, Advance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare From Serajevo to Hiroshima (London, 1968), p. 353.

Note 13: The full text of the letter is reproduced by Nobel Laureate Arthur Holly Compton in his Atomic Quest (New York, 1956), p. 258, and in Chinnock, n. 1, pp. 213-214.

Note 14: Alvarez, n. 12, p. 145.

Note 15: Chinock, n. 1, p. 9.

Note 16: Goodchild, n. 4, pp. 161-162.

Note 17: Chinock, n. 1, p. 25.

Note 18: Ibid., pp. 124-126, 168-174, 178.

Note 19: Ibid., p. 167.

Note 20: Alvarez, n. 12, pp. 145-146.

Note 21: Chinnock, n. 1, pp. 226-227.

Note 22: J. Harberer, Politics and the Community of Science (New York, 1969), pp. 192-193.

Note 23: Wyden, n. 7, pp. 86-88, 185-187; Robert J. Lifton, "The Hiroshima Connection", The Atlantic Monthly, November 1975, p. 88.

Note 24: Bertrand T. Feld, A Voice Crying in the Wilderness: Essays on theProblems of Science and World Affairs (Oxford, 1979), pp. 300-302.

Note 25: Chinnock, n. 1, p. 290.

Note 26: Quoted in H. Bruce Franklin, War Stars (New York, 1988), p. 98.

Note 27: Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power (New Haven), 1987, pp. 276-277; Robert Gullian, I Saw Tokyo Burning (Garden City, N.Y., 1981), p. 184. LeMay later told a correspondent, "I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal. Fortunately, we were on the winning side." Quoted in Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York, 1995), p. 21.

Note 28: General H.H. Arnold in Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, eds., One World or None (New York, 1946), p. 26.

Note 29: Mark Sheldon, "The Logic of Mass Destruction" in Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow (Stony Creek, 1998), p. 57.

Note 30: Richard A. Pape, "Why Japan Surrendered?", International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, Fall 1993, p. 163:

Note 31: Quoted in Dennis D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Westport, 1996), p. 9.

Note 32: Sherry, n. 27, p. 300.

Note 33: Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford, 1958), p. 155.

Note 34: Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 16-21.

Note 35: Murray Sayle, "Did the Bomb End the War?", The New Yorker, July 31, 1995, pp. 50-52.

Note 36: Wainstock, n. 31, p. 29.

Note 37: Ibid., pp. 30-33.

Note 38: Kecskemeti, n. 33, pp. 181-185.

Note 39: Ibid., p. 187.

Note 40: Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York, 1995), pp. 91-92.

Note 41: Ibid., p. 117-118.

Note 42: Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Palo Alto, 1954), p. 129.

Note 43: Robert L. Messer, "New Evidence on Truman's Decision", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 1985, p. 55.

Note 44: Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 45.

Note 45: "The Stimson Diary", entry for May 14, 1945, in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, p. 549.

Note 46: Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 68.

Note 47: Len Giovonnitti and Fred Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (New York, 1965), pp. 134-136. Emphasis in the original, Alperovitz, n. 40, pp. 68-69, 73-74.

Note 48: Alperovitz, Ibid., p. 70.

Note 49: Evan Thomas, "Why We Did It", Newsweek, July 24, 1995, p. 26; David Robertson, Sly and Able (New York, 1994), p. 410.

Note 50: Alperovitz, n. 40, pp. 298-301; Wainstock, n. 31, p. 73; Giovanitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 219-220.

Note 51: Giovannitti and Freed, Ibid., p. 226. Emphasis in the original.

Note 52: The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, p. 215.

Note 53: Ibid., p. 216.

Note 54: Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 229-232; Kecskemeti, n. 33, pp. 190-191; Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 76-77; George Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years (New York, 1970), p. 33.

Note 55: Carrol Quigley, "Pervasive Consequences of Nuclear Stalemate" in Paul R. Baker, ed., The Atomic Bomb: The Great Decision (Hinsdale, 1976), pp. 155-156.

Note 56: David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (London, 1980), pp. 128-133.

Note 57: Arjun Makhijani, "'Always' the Target?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995, pp.23-27.

Note 58: Robert C. Williams and Philip L. Cantelon, eds., The American Atom (Philadelphia, 1984), p. 5. Italics added; Barton J. Bernstein, "Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking About Tactical Nuclear Weapons", International Security, vol. 15, no. 4, Spring 1991, p. 151.

Note 59: The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, pp. 201-202.

Note 60: Roosevelt-Churchill Hyde Park Aide-Memoire, September 19, 1944, quoted in Williams and Cantelon, n. 58, p. 45. Italics added.

Note 61: Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, p. 65.

Note 62: Ibid., pp. 142-145.

Note 63: Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (Princeton, 1961), p. 71.

Note 64: Quoted in Thomas Powers, Heisenberg's War (New York, 1993), pp. 463-464.

Note 65: Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered", Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1, January/February 1995, p. 139; Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939-1846, vol. I: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Pennsylvania, 1962), p. 343.

Note 66: Groves, n. 10, p. 267.

Note 67: Ibid., p. 271; Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula (Boston, 1970), p. 95.

Note 68: Sayle, n. 35, p. 54.

Note 69: Wyden, n. 7, pp. 193-197. Italics added; Otis Cary, "Atomic Bomb Targeting-Myths and Realities", Japan Quarterly, vol. XXVI, no. 4, October-December 1979, pp. 506-514.

Note 70: Bernstein, n. 65, pp. 146-147, Groves, n. 10, p. 273.

Note 71: Giovonntti and Freed, n. 47, p. 137.

Note 72: Wyden, n. 7, p. 159; Bernstein, n. 65, p. 143.

Note 73: Barton J. Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945", Political Scence Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 1, Spring 1975, p. 51.

Note 74: Quoted in Ferenc Morton Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice (Albuquerque, 1984), p. 25.

Note 75: Sherwin, n. 6, p. 169; Leon V. Sigal, "Bureaucratic Politics & Tactical Use of Committees: The Interim Committee & the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb", Polity, vol. X, no. 3, Spring 1978, pp. 340-345.

Note 76: US Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearings Before Personnel Security Board, Washington DC, 1954, p. 34.

Note 77: Sherwin, n. 6, p. 203.

Note 78: Spencer R. Weart and Gertrude Weiss Szilard, Leo Szilard: His Version of the Facts: Selected Recollections and Correspondence, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass, 1980) pp. 183-186. "Byrnes tucked Szilard's memo into his suit coat pocket...and Szilard later imagined that the memorandum stayed there-all the way to the dry cleaner." William Lanuette, Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard (New York, 1992), p. 266.

Note 79: James Byrnes, All in Our Lifetime (New York, 1958), p. 284.

Note 80: Compton, n. 13, p. 238.

Note 81: Sigal, n. 75, pp. 346-351.

Note 82: The letter, dated October 1942, contained the sentence: "It is considered essential to the prosecution of the war that Mr. Szilard, who is an enemy alien, be interned for the duration of the war." Lanuette, n. 78, p. 240.

Note 83: Sigal, n. 75, pp. 249-250.

Note 84: Brian Loring Villa, "A Confusion of Signals", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1975, pp. 36-43.

Note 85: For the complete text of the Franck Report, see Alice Kimbal Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-7 (Chicago, 1965), pp. 560-572; Weart and Szilard, n. 78, pp. 211-213.

Note 86: Wyden, n. 7, p. 168.

Note 87: Williams and Cantelon, n. 58, pp. 63-64; Arthur Steiner, "Baptism of the Atomic Scientists", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1975, pp. 21-28. Italics added.

Note 88: Batchelder, n. 5, pp. 58-59.

Note 89: Weart and Szilard, n. 78, pp. 211-213. For the full text of the petition and names of the scientists who signed it, see Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, pp. 553-555.

Note 90: Edward Teller, Better A Shield Than A Sword (New York, 1987), pp. 56-57; Edward Teller, The Legacy of Hiroshima (Garden City, NY, 1962), p. 13.

Note 91: Teller, Ibid., pp. 58-59.

Note 92: Lanuette, n. 78, pp. 273-275.

Note 93: Wyden, n. 7, pp. 147-148. Oppenheimer later admitted that he had promoted the military use of the bomb. "We were concerned", he later publicly stated, "we were rightly and somewhat desperately concerned, that these weapons...should be manifest to all men to see and understand, that they might know what future war would be...It would not have been a better world if the unrealised possibility of these terrible weapons had been a secret shadow on our future." Quoted in Rhodes, n. 27, p. 203; S.S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Bethe, Oppenheimer and the Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Princeton, 2000), pp. 153-154.

Note 94: David H. Frisch, "Scientists and the Decision to Bomb Japan", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1970, p. 111.

Note 95: James G. Hershberg, "James B. Conant and the Atomic Bomb," The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, March 1985, p. 83.

Note 96: Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment (Oxford, 1985), pp. 155-158.

Note 97: Michael J. Yavenditti, "The American People and the Use of the Bomb on Japan: The 1940s", The Historian, 36, February 1970, pp. 237-238.

Note 98: Teller, n. 90, p. 60.

Note 99: Quoted in Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light (New York, 1985), p. 192.

Note 100: Williams and Cantelon, n. 58, pp. 52-53.

Note 101: Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, p. 206. Italics in the original; Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America's Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons (Columbus, 1998), p. 25.

Note 102: The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, p. 204. Emphasis added.

Note 103: Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, pp. 339 and 358; Kenneth M. Glazier, "Administrative and Procedural Considerations," in Baker, ed., n. 55, p. 121.

Note 104: Groves, n. 10, p. 265. Emphasis added.

Note 105: Rhodes, n. 27, p. 20; Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, pp. 123, 340 and 377.

Note 106: Philip Morrison, "Blackett's Analysis of the Issues", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1949, p. 40.

Note 107: Quoted in Bernstein, n. 73, p. 52; Goldberg, pp. 18-19; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb," Pacific Historical Review, February 1977, pp. 9-10.

Note 108: Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, p. 313.

Note 109: The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, . 253.

Note 110: Chinnock, n. 1, p. 251.

Note 111: The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, pp. 300-301.

Note 112: Sayle, n. 35, p. 56; Kecskemetic, n. 33, pp. 184-185.

Note 113: Butow, n. 42, pp. 162-163.

Note 114: Wainstead, n. 31, pp. 95-96; Ian Buruma, "The War Over the Bomb," The New York Review of Books, September 21, 1995, p. 30.

Note 115: The Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day: The Story of Japan's Struggle to Surrender-August 1945 (Suffolk, 1969), p. 29. The room in the underground shelter was only 18 feet by 30, and "being poorly ventilated, was a small inferno..." Ibid., p. 31. The narration of events, including an attempted coup, eventually leading to Japan's surrender was prepared by a group of 14 Japanese scholars.

Note 116: Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 96-100; Buruma, n. 114, p. 30; Wyden, n. 7, pp. 300-302; Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 275-278; Butow, n. 42, pp. 168-175; The Pacific War Research Society, p. 301-302.

Note 117: Quoted in Sayle, n. 35, p. 59.

Note 118: Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 102-105; Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 282-288. Emphasis in the original.

Note 119: Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 108-110.

Note 120: Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 292-294. Emphasis in the original. Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 111-112.

Note 121: Butow, n. 42, p. 175.

Note 122: Quoted in Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, p. 300. Emphasis in the original.

Note 123: Ibid., pp. 296-304; Sayle, n. 35, p. 60.

Note 124: Buruma, n. 114, p. 30; Sayle, n. 35, p. 60.

Note 125: Kecskemeti, n. 33, pp. 198-206.

Note 126: Major General S. Woodburn Kirby quoted in Pape, n. 30, p. 157.

Note 127: Pape, n. 30, pp. 187-188.

Note 128: Ibid., pp. 187 and 191-192.

Note 129: Butow, n. 42, p. 17 f.

Note 130: Sayle, n. 35, p. 60.

Note 131: Quoted in Buruma, n. 114, n. 31. Emphasis added.

Note 132: Kecskemeti, n. 33, p. 210.

Note 133: Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York, 1949), p. 92.

Note 134: Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York, 198), p. 210.

Note 135: Messer, n. 43, p. 51.

Note 136: Quoted in Yavenditti, n. 97, p. 233.

Note 137: US Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War, Washington DC, July 1, 1946, p. 13. General Groves immediately rejected the survey's conclusion

Note 138: John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York, 1946). Its immediate effect, according to a perceptive observer of American thought and culture, was curiously ephemeral and elusive. "Like the funeral rituals that provide a socially sanctioned outlet for grief and mourning, Hiroshima may have enabled Americans of 1946 both to confront emotionally what had happened to the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, in a psychological as well as a litteral sense, to close the book on that episode." Boyer, n. 99, p. 209.

Note 139: Norman Cousins, "The Literacy of Survival", The Saturday Review, September 14, 1946, reproduced in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, p. 305.

Note 140: James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York, 1993) pp. 298 and 304. See especially chapter 16.

Note 141: Barton J. Bernstein, "Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History", in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, pp. 163-196, Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 449.

Note 142: Alperovitz, Ibid., pp. 448-457.

Note 143: Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Bomb", reproduced in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, pp. 197-210.

Note 144: Bernstein, n. 141, p. 176.

Note 145: Ibid., p. 179.

Note 146: Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half a Million American Lives' Saved by the Bomb: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth", The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, March 1999, pp. 54-95; Rufus E. Miles, Jr., "The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved", International Security, vol. 10, n. 2, Fall 1985, pp. 121-140.

Note 147: Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 459.

Note 148: Louis Menand, "The Quiet American", The New York Review of Books, July 14, 1994, p. 18.

Note 149: Alperovitz, n. 40, pp. 321-365.

Note 150: P.M.S. Blackett, Fear, War and the Bomb (New York, 1949), pp. 137-139.

Note 151: Thomas C. Schelling, "The Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons," in Bernard Brodie, Michael D. Intrigrator and Roman Kolkowicz, eds., National Security and International Stability (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 209-225. He had earlier written that against "defenceless people there is not much that nuclear weapons can do that cannot be done with an ice pick." Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale, 1966), p. 191; Menand, n. 148, p. 18; Victor Weisskopf, The Joy of Insight (New York, 1991), p. 156; Feld, n. 24, p. 89; Bernstein, n. 65, p. 142.

Note 152: The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, translated by Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain (New York, 1981). It is the product of four years of labour and contains 39 closely printed pages of bibliography with about 1,000 entries.

Note 153: Ibid., p. 335. Italics added.

Note 154: Ibid., p. 340. Emphasis in the original.

Note 155: Ibid., p. 339-340. For an interesting review of the American reviews of Ibid., see Glenn D. Hook, "A Review Essay", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 12, no. 2, 1982, pp. 51-54.

Note 156: Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb," in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, pp. 216-217. Emphasis in the original. This highly emotional and angry piece by a professor emeritus of English at the University of Pennsylvania, who would have been among the American servicemen participating in the invasion of Japan, is in response to the American critics of atomic bombings. On John Kenneth Galbraith he remarks: "What did he do in the war? He worked in the Office of Price Administration in Washington. I don't demand that he experience having his ass shot off. I merely note that he didn't."

Note 157: Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, p. 453.

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