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Saturday, April 07, 2007

Spinoza and Sister Veronica Brady on Radio Australia


Alan Saunders: Hello, and welcome to The Philosopher's Zone. I'm Alan Saunders.

This week, a curious anniversary. Just 350 years ago last month, on July 27th, 1656, a proclamation in Hebrew was read in front of the ark at the Talmud Torah synagogue in Amsterdam. The congregation was Iberian: Jews who came, or whose parents had come, from Spain or Portugal. Their governing body, not the rabbis but the lay people who administered the synagogue, were known as the senhores of the ma'amad, and this is what they had to say.

Reading: The Senhores of the ma'amad having long known of the evil opinions and acts of Baruch de Spinoza, they have endeavoured by various means and promises to turn him from his evil ways. But having failed to make him mend his wicked ways, and, on the contrary, daily receiving more and more serious information about the abominable heresies which he practiced and taught and about his monstrous deeds, they have decided that the said Spinoza should be excommunicated and expelled from the people of Israel. By decree of the angels and by the command of the holy men, we excommunicate, expel, curse and damn Baruch de Spinoza, with the consent of God, Blessed be He, and with the consent of the entire holy congregation and in front of these holy scrolls; cursing him with the excommunication with which Joshua banned Jericho and with the curse which Elisha cursed the boys and with all the castigations which are written in the Book of the Law. Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies down and cursed be he when he rises up. Cursed be he when he goes out and cursed be he when he comes in. The Lord will not spare him, but then the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him, and the Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven. And the Lord shall separate him unto evil out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the covenant that are written in this book of the law.

Alan Saunders: The object of all this fury was a 23-year-old man Baruch - or Bento or Benedictus - Spinoza was not yet what he was later to become: one of the most significant and, in his own time, one of the most notorious of philosophers ever. So what had he done to merit this sort of treatment?

Steven Nadler, Professor of Philosophy and Jewish Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, is Spinoza's biographer and more recently, the author of an account of this event. But before we talked about that, I wanted to know from him why it matters. Why do we care what happened to Spinoza?

Steven Nadler: His importance for us today is merely as the most outspoken and radical proponent of democratic, secular tolerant society. Spinoza was extremely frightened by what he was seeing happening around him at the time, as the secular Dutch Republic was more and more becoming taken over by extreme ecclesiastic authorities, especially in the early 1670s. And the theological political treatise and the political treatise are pleas for freeing political authority from the reins of religious figures. And so you have this really deep cry that the most secure state, the most healthy state, will be one in which political authority is vested in the will of the people and it's free from interference by the church. And I think that there's no more important lesson today than that particular one; that society can achieve its most perfect form, its most secure condition when it's run in a tolerant, democratic and secular manner.

Alan Saunders: Well let's turn then to the cherem. This is a ban; it's normally referred to, not entirely accurately, as a ban of excommunication from the Jewish community. So what sort of Jewish community was there in Amsterdam at the time?

Steven Nadler: It was a very mutli-faceted one, with a very interesting history. Most of the Jews in Amsterdam in the 1610 to '20s and '30s, were Jews of Portuguese and Spanish background. They were families, or descendents of families that had been forced to convert to Catholicism in Spain and Portugal some generations earlier, and finally emigrated to Amsterdam, either directly from Spain and Portugal, or more proximately, from Antwerp. And when they arrived in Amsterdam, they found they were able, with a bit of a wink from the authorities around 1604, 1605, they were able to actually worship openly, return to Judaism. Of course, having been separated from Judaism for so long, they also had to re-educate themselves in the norms of Judaism. And over the next 10 or 20 years, there were almost 600 to 800 of these Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam, many of them quite well off because they were able to carry on the same mercantile businesses that they had established back in Iberia. So these were fairly well off Jews, a bit unorthodox in their Jewish practice because of the generations of Catholic influence. So for example, on the Purim holiday, they celebrated what they called the Feast of St Esther.

Spinoza was born in 1632 into this community. He himself was not one of these conversos, that is somebody who had actually been forced to convert. His parents were, but Spinoza was born a Jew and by the time he was born in Amsterdam, the Jewish community had three good-sized congregations that had finally merged into one fairly large congregation, and there were learned and active rabbis running a very well functioning community. You're absolutely right to say that we shouldn't think of what happened to Spinoza as an excommunication, because Judaism doesn't have communion. I mean, the cherem is not exactly a religious act, in fact in Amsterdam it was not pronounced by the rabbis, it was pronounced by the lay governors of the community. And these Jews in Amsterdam used the cherem quite frequently as a way of imposing a kind of order and discipline upon the community. So for example, you could be put under cherem for showing disrespect to a rabbi or taking books out of the library without permission; women could be banned for cutting the hair of gentile women. You could be put under the ban for engaging in theological discussions with gentiles, and my favourite instance is one man who was put under the ban because he - according to the document, he circumcised a Polish man without permission. Well, we can only hope that it wasn't without the Polish man's permission.

But Spinoza's ban is on the one hand not extraordinary, because the ban was used quite frequently as a way of disciplining a community that was still kind of educating itself in Jewish ways. But when you compare the vitriol and the text and the curses in Spinoza's cherem with all the other cherems from the period, you're just immediately struck by the length and the depth of the anger directed at Spinoza.

I have actually another example here of a cherem from the period. This is a man named Isaac de Peralta and he was put under a cherem because he had become angry at some of the leaders of the community and found them in the street, insulted them and assaulted them, and as a result of this violent act, here's the cherem that he was given. It says:

'Taking into consideration that Isaac de Peralta disobeyed the aforesaid governing board and that he responded with negative words concerning this issue, and not content with this, Peralta dared to go out and look for members of the board on the street and insult them, the aforesaid governing board, considering these things, and the importance of the case, decided the following:

It is agreed upon unanimously that the aforesaid Peralta be excommunicated because of what he has done. Because he has been declared under punishment of cherem, no-one shall talk or deal with him, only family and other members of his household may talk with him.'

Now this was for assaulting members of the governing board, and the anger here doesn't even begin to compare with what Spinoza received. I should say most of the cherems were easily removed by making an apology or paying a fine, but in Spinoza's case there is not even that hope of redemption offered.

Alan Saunders: And in Spinoza's case, and I should stress that this is a very, very young man we're talking about, it does seem to be 'his evil deeds and abominable opinions' that they're talking about. But this is before he's published any philosophical works, so what is going on here? What can we suppose might have happened? Because they say that he had abominable opinions, but they don't say what they were.

Steven Nadler: Yes, it's very clever of them, isn't it. On the one hand there's a mystery here; these words are ambiguous and we're not told exactly what he was saying or doing, we can be sure it was something more than simply going to a non-Kosher restaurant and eating. There's a view that used to be offered that it was ironic that Spinoza would be the victim of an inquisition in Amsterdam by men who had themselves escaped the Inquisition. But I don't think it was an inquisition. Some recent scholars have suggested that it was a purely legal matter. At this time Spinoza was seeking some protection from his creditors for debts he'd inherited from his father. And rather than going to the governing board of the Jewish community to resolve those debts, he went to the Dutch authorities, which was forbidden by the laws of the community. He was supposed to resolve it within the community.

I find it very hard to believe the depth of the anger in the cherem goes way beyond a mere legality. So on the one hand you have this mystery: what are the 'abominable heresies and monstrous deeds'? On the other hand, there's really no mystery if we read his later works and take a sampling of the opinions that are found there.

These are works that he began composing in the late 1650s and early 1660s, so it's not that far distant from the date of the cherem. And we also have some testimony of witnesses from around 1658, two years after the cherem, who say that they were in Amsterdam, they met this man named Spinoza and here's the kinds of things he was saying.

I would suggest there are four or five elements from Spinoza's mature philosophy that we have good reasons for thinking that he was uttering, even around the time of the cherem. At this time he was already educating himself in secular philosophy, of Aristotle, Descartes and others, and I find it perfectly plausible that the views, the theological and philosophical and political views that Spinoza lays out in his mature treatises, were already, at least in embryonic or not fuller form, in his mind around 1656. So for example, I think at this time, as he does in his work The Ethics', Spinoza denies the providential God of Judaism. Spinoza's God, (this appears in Part 1 of The Ethics) is a God who has no moral characteristics. God is neither good, nor perfect, nor just, nor wise, so God doesn't form plans; God doesn't judge things on the basis of how well they conform to his plans. Spinoza's God also has no psychological characteristics. His is not a God with a will and with desires or emotions. And by eliminating all these features, these anthromorphic features from God, Spinoza effectively eliminates the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob: not something that would be looked upon lightly by a 17th century rabbi.

He also denies that there's any metaphysically or morally interesting sense in which the Jews are a chosen people. The only sense in which the Jews are chosen is that for a long time they enjoyed political good fortune with a well-established kingdom, but that's gone now and so there's nothing whatsoever that distinguishes the Jews from other people.

He also - and this is the kind of thing that drew the greatest wrath in the period - in the theological-political treatise, which is regarded as the most blasphemous and heretical work of the time, something that some contemporary critic claimed was forged in hell; in that treatise Spinoza denies the divine origin of Scripture. He says that the Bible is not at all the work of God, it's certainly not all written by Moses either, but what it is is a collection of writings by human beings that were compiled over time and finally put together by an editor after the first exile, and therefore we should regard this as nothing more than a work of human literature. This is an astounding opinion for somebody to hold at the time.

Fourthly, Spinoza denies that Jewish halacha, Jewish law, has any continued validity for contemporary Jews, that the law was basically created around the ceremonies of the temple, and with the destruction of the temple Jewish law has lost its whole raison d'etre, and therefore contemporary Jews are no longer bound to observe halacha or Jewish regulations.

Finally, and this is what I think really pushed the rabbis over the edge, in The Ethics, Spinoza basically denies the immortality of the soul. He says that there are certain eternal elements of a human being, basically the kind of knowledge we can acquire of eternal truths. That's something that will outlive us because these are eternal truths, and to the extent that we grasp them in this lifetime, they become a part of us and when we die, they will persist, but we don't persist. When we die, we're dead. This is a very metaphysical or speculative position and ordinarily wouldn't have brought one into trouble. There's a lot of latitude in Jewish intellectual tradition for your views on the afterlife, and even on immortality. But for a variety of historical and social reasons, Amsterdam was simply the wrong place at the wrong time, in the 1650s, to be denying the immortality of a soul.

Alan Saunders: Well, you say that this was what pushed the rabbis over the edge. Now as you've said, the cherem was the work of the secular governing board of the synagogue, but you're suggesting now that the rabbis were behind it. So perhaps we should talk about them, because the rabbis in Amsterdam at the time were a fairly impressive bunch of guys, weren't they. I mean, they weren't obscurantists.

Steven Nadler: Absolutely not, that's right. They were a learned group of men. If you look at the four major rabbis of the period in Amsterdam, there was Saul Levy Mortera, who was well-schooled not just in Jewish philosophy but also in Latin philosophy. He was a well-educated man who came to Amsterdam originally from Venice. He certainly did not have a ghetto mentality. Then there was Rabbi Menasseh Ben Israel, perhaps the most famous Jew in all of Europe, and somebody who more than any other Rabbi, made an effort to communicate Judaism to a Gentile public. He was regarded in Europe at the time as, in a way, the kind of Jewish public face. Then there was Rabbi Isaac Aboab da Fonseca. He was given more to mysticism, but still not somebody who sought obscure doctrines, but rather who was engaged as a Kabbalist, nonetheless engaged in the welfare of the community. So I think you're absolutely right, that this is not an act of blind anger by an inquisitional committee. But I think that Spinoza's ideas here represented to these Rabbis, not the threat of modernity, because this was a very modern community. The Jews of Amsterdam in the 17th century, especially the Portuguese Jews, were in many says assimilated to Dutch mores. They dressed like the Dutch, they wore their beards like the Dutch, and they ran their businesses very often like the Dutch.

Alan Saunders: Yes, and we should say of course that if we want to look at names of the Jewish community in Amsterdam at the time, we can look at pictures by Rembrandt, for example.

Steven Nadler: That's right. This is not a ghetto, the Jews could live anywhere they wanted in Amsterdam, and they all tended to live in this neighbourhood because it was a newly built neighbourhood in a very crowded city, but this is not a closed, insular community. And so the cherem of Spinoza was not an attempt to keep out new ideas in general, because some of these Rabbis were very well read in new philosophy. But I do think that the Rabbis saw that these four or five opinions of Spinoza were possibly threatening to their efforts to maintain a normative Jewish community among people who were still coming in from Iberia and thus tempted by a kind of Catholicised Judaism, or a Judaism with rather unorthodox flavour. And I think that in one sense Spinoza's cherem was like the others, in that it was the attempt of the community to keep things under control, keep their house in order. But I don't think it should be read as an attempt to close off the minds of the members of the community. This was a highly educated cosmopolitan group of Jews.

Alan Saunders: And the Cherem, the expulsion, as far as we know doesn't seem to have meant a lot to Spinoza himself, does it?

Steven Nadler: Yes, I think his reaction was so much, you know, 'See you later'. One of his earliest biographers says that what Spinoza said was: So much the better, they don't do anything that I wasn't going to do myself anyway. It did make life a little bit more difficult for him from a business point of view, because with the ostracism in place he could no longer run his father's importing business within the community. But the evidence points to the fact that he wasn't a very good businessman to begin with and was probably happy to be done with that part of his life. So on the one hand, I think he saw this as a bit of a relief, potentially economically difficult, but probably spiritually he no longer had to keep up appearances - if he was even doing that at this time, I doubt that he was. And in a way it liberated him to become an independent philosopher.

Alan Saunders: Well, to what extent ultimately should we see Spinoza as a Jewish philosopher? I've heard it said that if you look at his book, '
The Ethics, the definition of God there, remote though it ultimately gets from the providential, judgmental God of Judaism, nonetheless the basic definition derives ultimately from the great mediaeval Jewish philosopher, Moshe Ben Maimon, also known as Moses Maimonides. So should we see Spinoza as a Jewish philosopher?

Steven Nadler: I think those two questions need to be distinguished. Is Spinoza a good Jew, and is Spinoza a good Jewish philosopher. The answer to the first question I think is clearly no, he was not a good Jew, and didn't see himself as a Jew at all. But does that not give us the right to say that he was nonetheless a good Jewish philosopher? And it all depends upon what your criteria are for deciding whether somebody belongs to the history of Jewish philosophy. Moreover, using the case of Spinoza's conception of God might be a bit misleading, because by denying the providential God of Judaism, maybe Spinoza isn't a good Jew, but the difference between religion and philosophy is that, unlike religion, philosophy never prescribes what the answers have to be, it only prescribes what the questions have to be. The minute philosophy starts prescribing the answers, you know, Jewish philosophy can't say, 'Here's what you must believe about X', because then it's no longer being philosophical, it's simply being dogmatic. I think to be a Jewish philosopher means two things:

First of all you're raising certain questions that are peculiar to the Jewish tradition. For example, the question of what is the status of Jewish law, and where does it derive its normative force? Why ought one or ought one not to obey Jewish law? Or another example: what is the status of the Jewish people? In what sense might they be described as 'chosen by God'? What are the origins of Scripture? And so on.

So, in this sense, Spinoza's certainly asking questions that are internal to the Jewish intellectual tradition. But here's an even more important sense in which I think Spinoza clearly belongs to the history of Jewish philosophy. Look at who he's in dialogue with: certainly contemporary thinkers like Descartes when Spinoza's talking about substance and nature, and the human being and the mind's relationship to the body. And he's in dialogue with another contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, the English philosopher, when Spinoza's discussing the origins of the State instead of nature in the social contract.

But Spinoza's also in dialogue with the tradition that very few other major philosophers of the time can tap into, and that is the Jewish philosophical tradition. And when Spinoza starts talking about nature and its relationship to God and the connection between virtue and happiness, and the role that reason plays in contributing to our well-being, and his discussion of the eternity of the mind as opposed to the immortality of the soul, all of these issues in his moral philosophy from the later parts of The Ethics, are I think very clearly a dialogue with mediaeval Jewish rationalist thinkers, and especially Maimonides and Gersonides, but also people like Ibn Ezra and Sa'adia Ben Joseph. Spinoza knew these thinkers but because he's in this conversation with these Jewish philosophers on the same questions, I think that that makes him a Jewish philosopher; that he is philosophizing in a certain tradition, taking in a certain philosophical conversation over questions that are essential to these earlier Jewish thinkers.

So I would answer yes, we should think of him as not a good Jew but as a very good Jewish philosopher, and in fact why not think of Spinoza not as representing a break with all of the Jewish philosophy that's come before him, but on the contrary, as its ultimate culmination: that if you take Maimonidean rationalism, this notion that the key to human happiness is an understanding of the universe, and to understand and love God, is to know nature. If you take all of this to its ultimate logical conclusion, and push it as far as perhaps Maimonides was not willing to push it, I think we could get a Spinoza.

Alan Saunders: Steven Nadler, it's an endlessly fascinating topic, the subject of Spinoza and indeed the subject of intellectual life in The Netherlands in the 17th century. Thank you very much indeed for sharing it with us.

Steven Nadler: It's my pleasure. Thank you for having me.

Guests


Steven Nadler
Professor of Philosophy and Jewish Studies
The University of Wisconsin
Madison
http://philosophy.wisc.edu/nadler/

http://www.abc.net.au/rn/philosopherszone/stories/2006/1709362.htm


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Friday 06 April 2007

CLASSIC LNL: Sister Veronica Brady

A conversation from 1996 - a sort of LNL Desert Islands Discs - with the veteran educator and social justice advocate.

Guests

Sister Veronica Brady
Educator, social justice advocate, Roman Catholic nun.

Presenter

Phillip Adams

Story Researcher and Producer

Chris Bullock

[Image]

Topic: Feasting on hope in an age of terror

Speaker Biography

Veronica Brady is a Roman Catholic nun, a member of the Institute of The Blessed Virgin Mary (Loreto Sisters), who has taught for many years in the Department Of English at the University of WA where since her retirement she has been an Honorary Senior Research Fellow. She has held a number of public offices, including the Board of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the Library and Information Services of Western Australia, The Appeals Tribunal of the Department of Social Services in WA and Chair of the Older Australians Advisory Council in Western Australia. She has also published widely on Australian literature, culture and belief in journals in Australia and overseas. Her most recent book is “South of My Days”, a biography of the poet Judith Wright.


Nun and academic, Born 1929, Melbourne Vic
Born in Melbourne in 1929, Veronica Brady became one of the first Australian nuns to teach in a university, broadcast on radio or join in socio-political debate. After teaching at Loreto Convent in Kirribilli, NSW, she moved to the University of Western Australia in 1972, becoming an Associate Professor in 1991.

She has spoken out publicly against the Vatican stance on abortion, homosexuality and contraception, and has been involved in the Aboriginal rights movement and the anti-uranium mining lobby. She also supports the ordination of female priests in the Catholic Church.

Sister Veronica Brady is a member of many organisations including Amnesty International, the Campaign against Nuclear Energy, the Campaign against Racial Exploitation, the Fellowship of Australian Writers and the Association for Study of Australian Literature. She is the author of several books including The Future People, The Mystics and Crucible of Prophets.



Peter Kenna: A Hard God

by Sister Veronica Brady

Ireland is a hard land, for all that it is beautiful to look at. The green fields are very small and the rocks, picturesquely breaking the surface, make it very difficult to make a living. In the past it was even more difficult, since the British landlords owned most of it and what little the small farmers made, went to pay the rent. Bitterness, then, made the hard land more harsh. Bowling along on a bus, even today it is not difficult to imagine angry men hiding in the hedges waiting for the agent - the man who worked for the landlord and collected the rents - to set on him and 'teach him a lesson', which sometimes even meant killing him. The lesson, of course, which was learned on both sides, was violence and dogmatism, each side convincing itself not only that it was in the right, but that this right was absolute; God's right, as it were, not something relative to the present social political situation. So Irish and British, Catholics and Protestants not only learned to hate one another but to believe that they had every right to do so. The God they served was often, perhaps generally, a hard God, a tribal God who blessed those who belonged to the 'proper' tribe, ours, and brought evils down upon the rest, who were regarded as the enemy.

The people in this play, the Cassidy family, come from this kind of background. Even if they live in Australia their parents have handed down to them their memories, the memories of several hundred years of oppression and suffering presented and indeed enlarged and embellished by the fact that, even in Australia, the Irish tended to be somehow different. Partly they tended to be despised - the English thought them feckless and dirty; the Scots, drunken and disorganised - and partly they kept themselves apart, not only to protect one another against the prejudice directed at them but also to 'keep the faith'. For the Irish, Catholicism was tribal. It defined them and gave them their sense not only of identity but also of purpose, of being somehow peculiarly blessed. Being 'a good Catholic' meant belonging to a group with its own ways of behaving, believing and even taking its pleasures.

For young people like Joe, for instance, it involved going to the Catholic Youth Organisation and enjoying debates with topics like 'the age of chivalry is not dead', and boys and girls being much more reserved with one another - though equally it was expected that Catholic boys and girls would marry one another. 'Mixed marriages' - marriages that is between Catholics and Protestants - were to be avoided at all costs. Once married, it meant strict fidelity to the Church's rules against contraception and above all, no divorce. When Aggie, exasperated with Paddy's wife, Sophie, who has taken not only to gambling and neglecting him and the family, but now has another man, says to Paddy that he could divorce her for what she has done, he replies, scandalised. 'Aggie, we're Catholics. I wouldn't dream of disgracing the family with a divorce.' This would be a greater disgrace than anything Sophie has done.

To be Catholic meant going to Mass unfailingly every Sunday - Dan's first enquiry of his brother Paddy is, 'you're still keeping to the Mass, I hope'. It meant sending children to Catholic schools and paying attention to the Brothers and Sisters who teach there as well as to the priests. One of Paddy's worries about Sophie's behaviour is 'what the Christian Brothers (will) say when the boys go to school'. To be Catholic meant saying the family Rosary together at night. As Paddy remembers it from childhood on the farm, it is also an exercise in family discipline:

Father used to make us kneel as straight as ramrods on the hard stone floor. One sag at the knees and you'd catch it across the shoulders with the buggy-whip he held in the hand that wasn't dangling the beads. How he could watch us and concentrate on the Hail Marys was always a wonder to me.

All this may sound narrow and constraining, almost a prison, and in some respects it was. But it did give ordinary lives a dignity, a sense of mattering somehow, being part of a larger order of things and having a purpose within it. At times, this made for melodrama, even fantasy. Martin, for example, may not be particularly happy in his marriage - he is married to Monica who is something of a religious fanatic. He may have to work as an ordinary labourer building one of the big darns that were part of the large-scale construction projects of the 1950s, even though he has dreams of being a writer. But he sees the world split into two camps: good, whose champions are the Catholics; and evil, the Communists (whom he believes to be everywhere), seeking to undermine society in general and take control of the trade unions in particular. As a good Catholic, he sees it as his task to oppose the 'Commies' everywhere, especially at work. So he involves himself with the secret movement of Catholics, inspired by B A Santamaria, which works not only against the influence of Communism on the worksite but also against the left wing generally, and against any changes in traditional ways of thinking and behaving. This gives him the feeling of being something of a crusader. 'God's with me Dan. It's his fight I am fighting', he tells his brother. But it also makes him quite paranoic. He sees the influence of 'the Comrades' everywhere, though 'it's difficult to prove anything unless you actually catch them at it.' He sees their hand in an attempt to pull his tent down, for example, though there may of course have been other reasons for that event. People who keep as much to themselves, and disapprove so much of the world they live in, do tend to become unpopular, especially when their preoccupation with sex makes them so intolerant. The greatest charge against Russia, for instance, seems to be that 'they have free love' there. In contrast with his brother Dan, Martin will bear nothing good about his enemies. When he tells Dan about the 'free love' in Russia and Dan asks him what it is, he defines it as 'cohabiting outside marriage'. But even though Dan is shocked, he keeps his sense of proportion, remarking, 'I hear we've got some of that out here as well.' Martin, though, insists on the difference: Russian society is by definition wicked. In Russia, he declares, free love is a 'rule of law. That's the difference.' In the long run then, it is not entirely surprising that he is killed in an accident at work. The family believe that he was pushed over the cliff by the 'Commos' and is thus a kind of martyr; some of his workmates suggest that he has committed suicide, and others that he slipped. Whatever the truth may have been - and we never find out what it is - Dan is an example of someone who lives melodramatically and dies in the same way.

In his case, this belief makes for a kind of fanaticism, no doubt influenced by his wife. (It also probably seems rather silly to many people today, especially when, under Gorbachov, Communism, the kind practised in Russia, is beginning to seem at least as much dedicated to peace, though not perhaps human rights, as our system). Nevertheless, the Cassidy family's kind of belief does have a heroic, even noble quality about it - and this, of course, is one of the many things which make it so interesting dramatically. First of all, it does represent an attempt to defend themselves, to preserve some kind of dignity in a society inclined to despise them. Think, for instance, of their memories of the times when they were all together on the farm when they were able to live as they would have liked to have lived in Ireland. Land is nearly as important for Irish people as it is for Aborigines. As Dan remembers it: 'Things were much simpler there. There weren't as many decisions to be made. If you had a crop to sow there was time to do it and that was the only time. It either rained or it didn't and when the crop ripened you harvested it.' They had a way of life which still kept them in touch with forces beyond themselves, the forces evident in the rain or, indeed, in the lack of it, which they were able to associate with the God they worshipped at Mass and in saying the Rosary and also in keeping the rules they believed to be laid down for them.

This God was not always comfortable either. Marx's famous criticism of religion, that it is merely the 'opium of the people', a figment of the imagination, a kind of projection of their needs for comfort and consideration, does not really apply to them. The crop was not always harvested, their belief does not make them prosperous and they do not really believe that they have a right to experience success, esteem and influence. What their belief does give them, rather, is a deep sense of belonging together and of being able to trust that what happens will be, if not good, at least bearable. Fanatical as he is in many ways, Martin expresses this sense in his memory of the 'good old days':

When the crop was harvested, do you remernber those Saturday night dances ... the word went out and it was understood everybody was to be there. If you played an instrument you brought it with you, and if you didn't, you collected a few gum leaves on the way. When everybody danced the dust rose up off the floor and they had to open the windows and then all the insects of the night swarmed into the light and the girls cried because they'd spent the entire day starching their petticoats and ironing the ruffles on their dresses, and we'd been at it for hours as well, scrubbing our toes and plastering our hair down. But another reel came up and the dust and the insects were forgotten. (p36)

This in contrast to the fear of nature often expressed in Australian writing: by Catherine Martin, for example, in The Incredible Journey, first published in 1926:

Nature so often terrifies us, in the guise of a power that is no more concerned with the good or ill of human creatures, than she is with the subtle device of a serpent's sting or with the insects that swarm by the millions into existence on a tropical night, tiny flames of light lit in the midst of infinity - only to be quenched in a few brief hours ... In the presence of such ghastly waste, dark questionings arise as to any beautiful end set before the world and its inhabitants. 1

Dan and Aggie may have doubts, and Joe may despair of his own salvation - that is, of his place in the 'Catholic' order of things - but they do not ever see the world so bleakly. God may be 'hard', may be difficult for them to understand, but in the long run they believe that the world has a meaning. 'God', in fact, is for them the word that represents that meaning, and so, while things may be difficult, they are never absurd. So, as the play ends, even as Aggie knows that Dan has incurable cancer, she is still able to pray, to still put her trust in the power of prayer, as she prays the 'Hail Mary', asking Mary, who gave birth to Jesus, who is God himself, to 'pray for us sinners now and at the hour of our death.' The last phrase she cannot bring herself to name but, for all that, she accepts it and mouths it as the curtain falls.

So despite everything, being a Catholic means being at home in the universe, having a sense of direction. When drought forces the Cassidys off the land, Aggie wandering through the city streets, suddenly discovers she is lost - 'I suppose I got gawking at the people in cabs and the things in shop windows and ... suddenly I didn't have any idea of where I was, it was as if I'd been picked up and dumped down in some other country.' She goes into a Catholic church, into a confessional in fact, and the priest calls one of the boys from the school yard to show her the way home. She has another court of appeal as it were: Catholics belong to one another and to another order of things.

Though they seem very ordinary people who lead rather dull and unsuccessful lives, in fact their lives are bound up with a part of the larger story of Christian faith which involves not only the story of the Scripture but also of heroic Christians throughout the ages, the saints, the martyrs and holy people generally. In this way they have at least something in common with so-called primitive peoples: like the Aborigines, for instance, who take the direction of their individual lives from the Dreaming stories they tell over and over, stories about the great heroes of the beginning of time which lay down the proper pattern of all human behaviour. The Cassidys, too, live under the terms of their myths, the stories which explain why things are as they are, which they celebrate when they go to Mass and reflect on when they say the Rosary. So the recollection of the Malaysian writer, K S Maniam, of his childhood, also shadowed by sacred stories (in his case, the great Indian myths), applies equally to these simple, rather shabby people living in the western suburbs of Sydney in 1946:

How does one describe the land one lived in but never saw? It was more tangible than the concrete one we flitted through each day. Darkness gave it its true dimensions. Then it vibrated in our hearts... There was a lot of colour in our invisible world. The gigantic flowers that filled our imagination were turned out in bright togas, arms heavily braceleted, necks studded with gold and heads awashed with intricate crowns. Fair, gentle men and women (gods and goddesses, I suppose), fought off the more scheming and brutal characters in battles that clashed over our sleeping heads. The tension between good and evil shimmered therefore like an inevitable consciousness within our heads. 2

Even Maniam's conclusion, 'we were a gentle people', is also true of the Cassidys, even if at first it does not seem to be so. The occasional harshness and intolerance is the response of gentle people who have been hurt or feel threatened, especially when the stories which guide and rule them are challenged.

These common dreams, then, made for the strong sense of community evident in A Hard God. But this sense was increased also by a feeling of being somehow different because what they believe in seems to others strange , sometimes amusing but at other times dangerously anti-social. They are also drawn together, on the one hand, by a common memory of persecution in the old country and, if not persecution, at least a certain amount of suspicion in the new one; and on the other hand by a common hope which takes in not just this world but the next one. It is not only the fanatical Monica who believes that there is a life after death and that the living can help the dead with their prayers while the dead also remember them in heaven. Hell, eternal punishment, is a possibility, one which Mission priests, who come into a parish every year to preach repentance and conversion, use to frighten people back to virtue; but somehow Catholics seldom imagine themselves or anyone dear to them in hell - God cannot resist an act of contrition, of repentance and of appeal to God's loving mercy. It is only someone whose faith is as extreme and tortuous as Monica's who would,worry after Martin's death that 'he might not have had time for an act of contrition before he went over the edge'. The rest of the family, like most Catholics, have a greater trust in God's forgiveness. Paddy, for instance, is prepared to hope that 'he had time to say one on the way down'. From the time of the Reformation onwards, Protestants have tended to see this as somehow lax, lacking a proper sense of human sinfulness on the one hand and of the power of God's grace on the other. Whether that is so or not, people like the Cassidys do have a strong sense of hope that however much they may suffer in this world, things will be better in the next life. Nevertheless, this does not mean despising their existence here and now. People like Dan and Aggie are the kind of people who never manage to make money, being too honest and, in the long run, too little interested in money. They like fun, the family are genuinely fond of one another and look after one another - there is always a meal, advice and support for Dan and Aggie's loyalty to him means that she will look after them too, however undeserving they may seem to be. Monica's is a different case and so to a certain extent is Martin's. No doubt influenced by her, he is obsessed with his 'sinfulness'.

It is this sense of community of course which makes Joe's position so painful. His threat to 'leave the Church' might seem exaggerated, even funny, but it is a gesture not just of defiance but of a kind of spiritual suicide. It also involves a kind of blackmail, threatening Jack with the responsibility for his damnation, his exclusion from eternal life, the community of the blessed echoed by his exclusion from the Catholic community.

When you're at Mass this Sunday just remember I won't be there. Let your conscience live with that and I won't go to confession either and I'll leave the Catholic Youth Organisation. (p.71)

Jack's response, 'it's your soul, Joe', even when Joe goes one better and threatens to 'go with other men', may seem quite sensible to most of the audience, but the Cassidy's kind of Catholicism believes otherwise. For them, we are, in effect, responsible for one another as we are in the view of Scripture, of course.

Joe is the most painful figure in the play. Belonging to the next generation, he has to bear the burden of being suspended between two worlds and two cultures: the old closed tribal world of his parents' Catholicism and the world of his own desires, especially of his increasingly urgent sexual feelings. It would have been easy for the playwright to make a great deal of this awakening and confused sexuality on the one hand or of the pressures of the society around him. Even in 1946 Australia was growing increasingly Americanised, influenced by Hollywood, popular music and advertising, and increasingly obsessed with sex. Indeed, there is a kind of sub-genre which has grown up in Australian literature and film which deals with the problems of 'growing up Catholic' in this environment. But Peter Kenna is much more subtle. As his symbolic use of space - Joe and Jack have their own space throughout and changes of place and situation are indicated by lighting - suggests, his intention is not to document the actual physical and social situation but to point to what lies underneath, the deepest concerns of heart and conscience.

Joe's real problem, then, is not just the usual problem of growing up, of learning how to balance the claims of the body with the claims of the spirit, but something more complicated, his own more urgent version of the problem his father and mother have also to deal with; how to adjust the tradition of belief and of living, inherited from the past on the other side of the world and from a very different kind of society, to the actual world in which they live. As Dan works side-by-side with Buddhists, Muslims and Hindus loading and unloading ships, he comes to realise that there are other ways of worshipping God and living decently than the ways in which he has been brought up. He can no longer believe that only Catholics are saved and that everyone else is in error. Nor can he say with any confidence any more what he once said to Martin, that God will look after those who believe in him and live 'good Catholic lives'. What happens to Martin and Paddy and their wives makes that only too clear. As for Aggie, she comes to realise that, in a sense, Dan has been her religion. As she tells him: 'I've loved you above everything else in my whole life'. According to the way she has been brought up, this means that perhaps she has not been 'a very good Catholic after all'. Perhaps even more troubling to traditional belief, she claims the right to deny Dan's fate when she tells him fiercely, protectively, not long after his illness has been diagnosed as cancer: 'Nothing's going to happen to you, Dan. I wouldn't allow it'. The fact that, of course, she's helpless and that he is going to die, a fact that she has come to accept as the play closes, does not affect this defiance. But - and this is the point the play makes - it does not make her any less Christian because it is the expression of love. True, an old-time narrow kind of Catholicism, Monica's kind, might be shocked, but it is the central teaching of Christianity that the measure of our love of God is our love for our fellow human beings. This becomes increasingly clear to Dan as he grows more and more aware that the word 'God' is not as easily understood and accounted for as he once thought. Watching people of other religions at their worship, he is impressed by the thought of a god whose love embraces everyone and who is more and more mysterious yet also very powerful. Watching them, 'I can't believe they're praying to an empty space', he tells Aggie. But whoever it is, whatever it is outside ourselves, it's not telling anybody. So it is 'our total ignorance of what he's about ... (which) finally drives us to distraction', making us see him as 'a hard god'. Nevertheless Dan hangs on to the centre of belief., 'It would be unbearable if I wasn't sure he loved me and I am sure of that.'

In this way, coming to a belief which puts emphasis on love rather than mere duty, on faith rather than dogmatic pronouncements and above all, insists that they must live as fully, lovingly and bravely as they can here and now rather than fixing their eyes on the next world, they in fact become better, more orthodox Christians - and the word 'Catholic' is, or ought to be a synonym of the word 'Christian'. But where Aggie and Dan succeed in combining faith and experience, their son Joe fails. This is partly because of his lack of experience - the battles he is fighting are largely still theoretical, the God he is rejecting is still a God concerned almost entirely with rules and regulations not the true Christian God of love and understanding, Aggie and Dan discover. But the main reason is his homosexuality.

Sexuality in general is, for a whole variety of reasons, something which the Catholic Church still finds difficult to deal with - hence the preoccupation with the rights and wrongs of contraception, abortion, clerical celibacy, pre-marital sex and so on. This is not to say that the opposition to promiscuity and to the mindless cult of sex and bodily pleasure generally, is not important for the defence of dignity, women's especially, and freedom (which is properly defined not as doing what you like but what you ought). But it is also the case that the body is good and sexuality something not only sacred but essential for a proper human life, though 'sexuality' here means not just the physical act but accepting and loving oneself as a sexual being. It is clear, too, that the kind of Catholicism Joe Cassidy inherited had not given much thought to this. His parents, it seems, married, made love and had children in a relatively uncomplicated way. But once Jack has made him realise that he, Joe, is attracted to him sexually and they have made love to one another, there is nothing to help him cope with his feelings. By and large, the Catholic Church sees homosexual love as wrong, wicked even, especially when making love is seen as justified only in order to have children. Homosexual love, of course, can find no such justification.

Jack, who at first seems much more of a 'free thinker' than Joe, is conscience-stricken after they have actually made love. He sees the sudden storm which blows up as a kind of warning, a threat of punishment to come, and resolves to give up his friendship with Joe. It seems that he was just experimenting. But having discovered that he is homosexual, attracted to men and not to women, Joe is faced with a choice, between that attraction which has become so important to him, and between continuing to be a 'good Catholic'. His Catholic conscience tells him that what he has done is seriously sinful. Therefore he must go to confession to ask God's forgiveness. But to be forgiven he must resolve never again to do what he has done, and he cannot - indeed, will not - in honesty promise that. The play leaves him there. But it is important that he is neither given the last word nor allowed to strike any very dramatic pose. The fact that in the play's last moments, miserable as he is, Aggie appeals to him for help in coping with Dan's illness suggests, I think, that he still has a long way to go in finding out who he is and that some kind of accommodation may be possible between the two sides of himself.

The important thing about A Hard God is perhaps just this, the refusal to paint characters clearly black or white, good or evil, or to resolve the struggle between good and evil in any clear or simple way. The absence of melodramatic resolutions is Kenna's great achievement. The Catholicism he dramatises he sees as something narrow and constraining and in some respects even superstitious, but also as a 'great inheritance' something which gives the Cassidys a place in the world and a power and a dignity all their own.

Notes

1. Catherine Martin, The Incredible Journey, Sydney, Pandora, 1988, p. 26.

2. K S Maniam, The Return, London, Writing in Asia Series, 1981, p. 37.


EDUCATED? or an intolerant swine?

Sister Veronica Brady. This noxoious old bitch was holding a lecture where she prattled on about european auzzies being "afraid of the black heart" and not being able to handle the spritual desert and how we had to get down on our hands and knees and beg forgivness of the earth." some how the Pilbara became a metapor for our fear of the australian landscape.

Here at least I had a something to focus on. I had worked in the Pilbara and wasnt remotely afraid of the place. If she doesnt like the pilbara then she neednt go there - it sure as Hell wouldnt like her. Too easy.

Then she started out on some bizzare non sequiter about Old Rene Decarte and cogito ergo sum as smacking of secular humanism. Well this disgusted me utterly. When Rene died and they shipped his body from Copenhagen (I think) back to France he was widely belived to be a shoo in for Sainthood consequently bits of him were filched all the way back as potential relics. There wasnt much left of the poor bugger and now this fucking stupid old bag is trying to make him out the be some kinda commie.

When I started to make the reasonable suggestion that she liven the grindingly dull performance up by "Showing us yer tits love" she couldnt even manage a bit of gentle heckling any standup comedian, which I had concluded she was should have dealt with effortlessly.

http://www.observationdeck.org/weblogs/?p=1135

Thursday, April 05, 2007

Chomsky

The following article forgets to mention that TERROR was (and is) created by clandestine state-agents. Google Keywords: false-flag terror, strategy of tension, gladio.

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The Semiwarriors

Andrew J. Bacevich

review | posted April 5, 2007 (April 23, 2007 issue) THE NATION

In books, essays and op-eds, complaints about presidential power run amok have once again become legion--with the still-unfolding saga of the Gonzales Eight the most recent, if hardly the most egregious, example. These complaints derive from a common source: the perceived excesses of the Bush Administration, perpetrated under the pretext of prosecuting the Global War on Terror. Yet as a close reading of the books considered here makes plain, "unchecked and unbalanced" presidential power is itself not the problem but merely its outward manifestation. The imperial presidency is not the disease; it is a symptom. To imagine that getting rid of Bush will cure what ails the body politic is akin to assuming that excising a tumor will alone suffice to cure cancer.

The real affliction is more insidious. For want of a better label, call it "semiwar," a term coined after World War II by James Forrestal to promote permanent quasi mobilization as the essential response to permanent global crisis. A man who saw demons everywhere, Forrestal was convinced that he alone grasped the danger they posed to the United States.

Forrestal was also a zealot, the prototype for a whole line of national security ideologues stretching across six decades from Dean Acheson to Donald Rumsfeld, from Paul Nitze to Paul Wolfowitz. Geoffrey Perret's acerbic description of Acheson applies to them all: His "mind turned to the apocalyptic as easily, if not as often, as other men's thoughts turn toward money or sex." For semiwarriors, time is always short. The need for action is always urgent. The penalty for hesitation always promises to be dire.

From Forrestal's day to the present, semiwarriors have viewed democratic politics as problematic. Debate means delay. To engage in give-and-take or compromise is to forfeit clarity and suggests a lack of conviction. The effective management of national security requires specialized knowledge, a capacity for clear-eyed analysis and above all an unflinching willingness to make decisions, whatever the cost. With the advent of semiwar, therefore, national security policy became the preserve of experts, few in number, almost always unelected, habitually operating in secret, persuading themselves that to exclude the public from such matters was to serve the public interest. After all, the people had no demonstrable "need to know." In a time of perpetual crisis, the anointed role of the citizen was to be pliant, deferential and afraid.

For Forrestal and other members of the emergent national security elite, fired by the need to confront a never-ending array of looming threats, the presidency served as an accommodating host. Semiwarriors built the imperial presidency. On behalf of the chief executive--increasingly referred to as the Commander in Chief--they claimed new prerogatives. They created new institutions that became centers of extra-constitutional power: the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various agencies that make up the intelligence "community." When out of office, they inhabited think tanks, consulted, lobbied and generally raked in the dough, all the while positioning themselves for a return to power.

They also imprinted on the capital city a new style, one that emphasized perils without precedent, activism on a global scale and a preference for hard power. In 1933, when Franklin Roosevelt became President, the District of Columbia was merely a seat of government and the United States was still a republic. When FDR's successor left office twenty years later, Washington fancied itself the center of the universe, with the United States now the self-anointed Leader of the Free World. As Cullen Murphy observes in Are We Rome?, a mordantly funny essay filled with arresting observations, this transformation of status fostered large delusions: "that the world is small, that society is malleable, and that the capital's stance is paramount." To reside in the imperial city was to believe that "assertions of will can trump assessments of reality: the world is the way we say it is."

Forrestal committed suicide.

... the Pentagon hung Forrestal's portrait in the hallway, named an aircraft carrier in his honor ...

... (cynic US-centric crap deleted)

The events of 9/11 endowed semiwar with a new lease on life. That the crisis touched off by the events of September 11, 2001, will continue in perpetuity has become an article of faith. Politicians now talk of peace the way cynical preachers speak of the Second Coming: Paying homage to the idea remains an obligation, but only rubes take such stuff seriously. No credible presidential candidate in either party has dared to question the wisdom or necessity of waging the Global War on Terror. Like the poor, apparently, the GWOT--or, as some style it, "The Long War"--promises to be with us always.

In Unchecked and Unbalanced, Frederick Schwarz Jr. and Aziz Huq tabulate the chilling byproducts of this sort of groupthink. Among the most egregious: Justice Department memos justifying torture; the blizzard of "signing statements" in which President Bush claims the prerogative of selectively disregarding the law; domestic surveillance implemented on a scale without precedent; the open-ended imprisonment of "detainees"--including American citizens--without charge; and a program of "extraordinary rendition" that secretly delivers suspected terrorists into the hands of foreign intelligence services for interrogation.

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An example of HATE PRESS in the USA:

Newton South stands by Noam Chomsky invitation

By Kristin Erekson - Thursday April 5 2007

[Image]
Noam Chomsky

Controversial professor to address students on Iraq war

Despite mounting pressure, Newton South High School has decided to allow controversial figure Noam Chomsky to address students about his perspective on Iraq.

In a statement e-mailed to the press on Tuesday, Principal Brian L. Salzer said the student-run Social Awareness Club extended an invitation to Chomsky two weeks ago to offer a presentation on “A Unique Perspective of U.S. Foreign Policy: Finding Peace in Iraq.” The lecture is scheduled to take place during the lunch period on April 11. Students will attend voluntarily and will be encouraged to ask questions.
Chomsky, professor emeritus of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, is known as a vitriolic critic of Israel. The (PRIVATE-BOUGHT PARTISAN) Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America stated that Chomsky met with leaders of the terrorist organization Hezbollah in May and received a “hero’s welcome.” CAMERA also reported that Chomsky supports the arming of Hezbollah (THAT IS A LIE), and pointed to an appearance on Al Manar TV in which he said that Hezbollah’s weapons were a “deterrent to potential aggression” of Israel’s attacks on Lebanon.
Regarding the rash of e-mails and phone calls from parents to the school in response to the scheduled presentation, Chomsky told the Advocate: “These things should be discussed, and I am happy to discuss them.”
Chomsky said he will speak about “the whole Middle East situation,” remarking that his views on Iraq happen to be “right in the political mainstream.” He noted that he will discuss in detail how American troops should withdraw from Iraq on a fixed timetable, and that he plans to touch upon the situation in Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
And while many have expressed disbelief about his trip to Lebanon, taken only months before the war in Israel last summer, Chomsky added that he wants it known that he devoted a portion of his trip to visiting with Walid Jumblatt, a leading Hezbollah opponent.
“As for the right for Hezbollah to be armed … the question is: Does Lebanon have a right to a deterrent against an Israeli attack,” Chomsky said.
Salzer said he decided to permit Chomsky to visit the school after what he described as a lengthy examination process and consultation with “administrative leadership, school committee leadership and community leaders.”
“Our students are among the most intelligent, cultured, sophisticated and mature students I have worked with,” Salzer added in a statement. “They will bring thoughtful questions, healthy skepticism, remarkable academic preparedness, and the values their parents have instilled in them to listen to a philosopher, academician, linguist, and informed scholar. They will glean knowledge … and walk away wiser.”
Newton resident Victor Zak, whose 15-year-old daughter, Aliza, attends the school, said he feels Chomsky’s visit is not “a good idea at all.” While acknowledging that he doesn’t know exactly what the renowned linguist will say, Zak added that he is familiar with Chomsky’s “anti-Western, anti-Jewish and anti-Israel” record.
“What concerns me is that he has been brought to speak and contaminate the minds of our children,” Zak said. “The position of our school is that the school isn’t bringing him. [Rather, Chomsky was invited by a student organization.] I wonder what the school’s position would be if somebody tried to bring a speaker with a strong racist or anti-gay message.”
Alan Ronkin, deputy director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Boston, said Chomsky’s visit to the school “is a problem,” especially since he is an expert in linguistics and “has no credentials” to speak about the Middle East. Ronkin added that at the moment the JCRC was not organizing any initiative to balance the event.
“I haven’t read [Chomsky’s] views about Iraq, but it wouldn’t surprise me if he thought that the solution [to it] was the dissolution of the Jewish state or the end of occupation,” Ronkin said. “A person like Chomsky believes that Israel is the root of all evil in the Middle East.”
David Fisher, a junior at the high school and co-president of the Social Awareness Club, said in a statement that Chomsky’s presentation is worthwhile, as listening to others’ viewpoints on divisive issues helps students to develop their own perspectives.
“When I hear something I clearly disagree with it helps me to take a step back from my own perspective and understand more thoroughly why I believe what I do,” Fisher added.
As an educator, Salzer said it’s important for students to learn from “a variety of different people in a variety of ways.”
Added Salzer: “We have to learn to have trust in our children.”

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FROM THE NECESSARY ILLUSIONS PAGE

http://wwwdsp.ucd.ie/~daragh/chomsky.html


Title: The Big Idea - Interview with Noam Chomsky
Aired by: British Broadcasting Corporation, February 1996
Source: Transcribed by Daragh McDonnell (daragh@tesla.ucd.ie)
Keywords:
Synopsis: Chomsky defends his Propaganda Model
See-also:

The Big Idea - Interview with Noam Chomsky

British Broadcasting Corporation, 1996

The following is a transcript of "The Big Idea" - a half hour interview between Noam Chomsky and British journalist Andrew Marr, first aired by the BBC in February, 1996.

Marr:

Professor Chomsky, could we start by listening to you explain what the "Propaganda Model", as you call it, is. For many people, the idea that propaganda is used by democratic, rather than merely authoritarian governments, will be a strange one.

Chomsky:

Well... the term "propaganda" fell into disfavour around the Second World War, but in the 1920's and the 1930's, it was commonly used, and in fact advocated, by leading intellectuals, by the founders of modern political science, by Wilsonian progressives and of course, by the public relations industry, as a necessary technique to overcome the danger of democracy. The institutional structure of the media is quite straightforward - we're talking about the United States, it's not very different elsewhere - there are sectors, but the agenda-setting media, the ones that set the framework for everyone else (like the New York Times and the Washington Post, and so on), these are the major corporations, parts of even bigger conglomerates. Like other corporate institutions, they have a product and a market: Their market is advertisers, that is, other businesses; their product is relatively privileged audiences, more or less...

So they're selling audiences to...

They're selling privileged audiences - these are big corporations selling privileged audiences to other corporations. Now the question is, what picture of the world would a rational person expect to come out of this structure? Then we draw some conclusions about what you would expect, and then we check, and yes - that's the picture of the world that comes out.

And is this anything more than the idea that, basically, the press is relatively right wing, with some exceptions, because it's owned by big business - which is a truism, it's well known?

Well, I would call the press relatively liberal. Here I agree with the right wing critics. So, especially the New York Times and the Washington Post, which are called, without a trace of irony - the New York Times is called the "establishment left" in say, major foreign policy journals - and that's correct, but what's not recognised is that the role of the liberal intellectual establishment is to set very sharp bounds on how far you can go - "this far, and no further".

Give me some examples of that...

Well, let's take say, the Vietnam War - probably the leading critic, and in fact one of the leading dissident intellectuals in the mainstream, is Anthony Lewis of the New York Times, who did finally come around to opposing the Vietnam War about 1969 - about a year and a half after Corporate America had more or less ordered Washington to call it off, and his picture from then on is that the war (as he put it) began with blundering efforts to do good, but it ended up by 1969 being a disaster and costing us too much - and that's the criticism...

So, what would the "non-propaganda model" have told Americans about the Vietnam War at the same time?

Same thing that the mainstream press was telling them about Afghanistan. The United States invaded South [Vietnam]... had first of all in the 1950s set up a standard Latin American-style terror state, which had massacred tens of thousands of people, but was unable to control local uprising (and everyone knows - at least every specialist knows - that's what it was), and when Kennedy came in, in 1961, they had to make a decision, because the South [Vietnamese] government was collapsing under local attack, so the U.S. just invaded the country. In 1961 the U.S. airforce started bombing South Vietnamese civilians, authorised Napalm crop destruction... then in 1965 - January, February 1965 - the next major escalation took place against South Vietnam, not against North Vietnam - that was a sideshow - that's what an honest press would be saying, but you can't find a trace of it.

Now, if the press is a censoring organisation, tell me how that works - you're not suggesting that proprietors phone one another up, or that many journalists get their copy "spiked", as we say?

It's actually... Orwell, you may recall, has an essay called "Literary Censorship in England" which was supposed to be the introduction to Animal Farm, except that it never appeared, in which he points out "look, I'm writing about a totalitarian society, but in free, democratic England, it's not all that different", and then he says unpopular ideas can be silenced without any force, and then he gives a two sentence response which is not very profound, but captures it: He says, two reasons - first, the press is owned by wealthy men who have every interest in not having certain things appear but second, the whole educational system from the beginning on through gets you to understand that there are certain things you just don't say. Well, spelling these things out, that's perfectly correct - I mean, the first sentence is what we expanded...

This is what I don't get, because it suggests - I mean, I'm a journalist - people like me are "self-censoring"...

No - not self-censoring. There's a filtering system that starts in kindergarten and goes all the way through and - it doesn't work a hundred percent, but it's pretty effective - it selects for obedience and subordination, and especially...

So, stroppy people won't make it to positions of influence...

There'll be "behaviour problems" or... if you read applications to a graduate school, you see that people will tell you "he doesn't get along too well with his colleagues" - you know how to interpret those things.

I'm just interested in this because I was brought up, like a lot of people, probably post-Watergate film and so on, to believe that journalism was a crusading craft, and that there were a lot of disputatious, stroppy, difficult people in journalism, and I have to say, I think I know some of them.

Well, I know some of the best... best-known investigative reporters in the United States - I won't mention names - whose attitude toward the media is much more cynical than mine. In fact, they regard the media as a sham. And they know, and they constantly talk about how they try to... play it like a violin: If they see a little opening they'll try to squeeze something in that ordinarily wouldn't make it through. And it's perfectly true that this is a crusading profession, adversarial, "We stand up against power", very self-serving view. On the other hand, in my opinion, I hate to make a value judgement but, the better journalists, and in fact, the ones who are often regarded as the best journalists, have quite a different picture and, I think, a very realistic one.

How can you know that I'm self-censoring? How can you know that journalists are...

I don't say you're self-censoring - I'm sure you believe everything you're saying; but what I'm saying is, if you believed something different, you wouldn't be sitting where you're sitting.

We [the UK] have a press which has, it seems to me a relatively wide range of views - there is a pretty schmaltzy Conservative majority but there are left-wing papers, and there is a pretty large offering of views running from the far right to the far left, for those who want them. I don't see how a propaganda model...

That's not quite true. I mean there have been good studies of the British press and you could look at them - James Curran is the major one - which point out that, up until the 1960s there was indeed a kind of a social democratic press, which sort of represented much of the interests of working people, and ordinary people and so on, and it was very successful - I mean, the Daily Herald for example had not only more... it had far higher circulation than other newspapers, but also a dedicated circulation. Furthermore, the tabloids at that time - the Mirror and the Sun - were kind of labour based. By the '60s, that was all gone, and it disappeared under the pressure of capital resources. What was left was overwhelmingly the... sort of... centre to right press with some dissidence - it's true, I mean...

We've got I would say, a couple of large circulation newspapers, which are left of centre and which are putting in neo-Keynesian views which - you call them elites - are strongly hostile to.

It's interesting that you call neo-Keynesian "left of centre" - I'd just call it straight centre. "Left of centre" is a value term...

Sure.

... there are extremely good journalists in England, a number of them, they write very honestly, and very good material; a lot of what they write wouldn't appear here [the US]. On the other hand, if you look at the question overall, I don't think you're going to find a big difference, and the few (there aren't many studies of the British press), but the few that there are have found pretty much the same results, and I think the better journalists will tell you that. In fact, what you have to do is check it out in cases. So let's take what I just mentioned - the Vietnam War. The British press did not have the kind of stake in the Vietnam War that the American press did, because they weren't fighting it. Just check sometime, and find out how many times you can find the American war in Vietnam described as a US attack against South Vietnam, beginning clearly with outright aggression in 1961, and escalating to massive aggression in '65. If you can find 0.001% of the coverage saying that, you'll surprise me, and in a free press, 100% of it would have been saying that. Now that's just a matter of fact - it has nothing to do with left and right.

Let me come up to a more modern war, which was the Gulf War which, again, looking at the press in Britain and watching television, I was very, very well aware of anti-Gulf War dissidence...

Were you?

The "no blood for oil" campaigns, and I have the...

That's not the dissidence...

"No blood for oil" isn't the dissidence?

No. Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait took place on August 2nd. Within a few days, the great fear in Washington was that Saddam Hussein was going to withdraw and leave a puppet government, which would be pretty much what the US had done in Panama. The U.S. and Britain therefore, moved very quickly to try to undercut the danger of withdrawal. By late August, negotiation offers were coming from Iraq, calling for a negotiated Iraqi withdrawal. The press wouldn't publish them here, they never publish them in England. It did leak however...

There was a great debate about whether there should have been a negotiated settlement...

No, sorry, no there was not a debate - there was a debate about whether you should continue with sanctions, which is a different question... because the fact of the matter is, we have good evidence that by mid- or late-August the sanctions had already worked, because these stories were coming from high American officials in the State Department - former American officials like Richard Helm - they couldn't get the mainstream press to cover them, but they did manage to get one journal to cover them - Newsday - that's a suburban journal in Long Island, the purpose obviously being to spook out the NYT, cause that's the only thing that matters. It came out in Newsday and this continued (I won't go through the details), but this continued until January 2nd. At that time, the offers that were coming were apparently so meaningful to the State Department, that State Department officials were saying that "Look, this is negotiable, meaningful, maybe we don't accept everything, but it's certainly a basis for a negotiated withdrawal". The press would not cover it. Newsday did. A few other people did - I have a couple of op-eds on it, and to my knowledge - you can check this - the first reference to any of this in England is actually in an article I wrote in the Guardian, which was in early January. You can check and see if there's an earlier reference.

Okay - let's look at one of the other key examples, which you've looked at too, which would appear to go against your idea, which is the Watergate affair...

Watergate is a perfect example - we've discussed it at length in our book in fact, and elsewhere - it's a perfect example of the way the press was subordinated to power. In fact...

But this brought down a President!

Just a minute - let's take a look. What happened there... here it's kind of interesting, 'cause you can't do experiments on history, but here history was kind enough to set one up for us. The Watergate exposures happened to take place at exactly the same time as another set of exposures; they were the exposures of COINTELPRO.

Sorry - you'll have to explain that to us.

It's interesting that I have to explain it, because it's vastly more significant than Watergate - that already makes my point. COINTELPRO was a program of subversion carried out, not by a couple of petty crooks, but by the national political police - the FBI - under four administrations. It began in the late Eisenhower administration, ran up until...

This is the end of the Socialist Workers Party in America?

The Socialist Workers Party was one tiny fragment of it. It began... by the time it got through (I won't run through the whole story), it was aimed at the entire New Left, at the Women's movement, at the whole Black movement; it was extremely broad - it's actions went as far as political assassination. Now what's the difference between the two? Very clear. In Watergate, Richard Nixon went after half of US private power, namely the Democratic Party, and power can defend itself. So therefore, that's a scandal. He didn't do anything... nothing happened - look, I was on Nixon's enemies list. I didn't even know, nothing ever happened. But...

Nonetheless, you wouldn't say it was an insignificant event, to bring down a President...

No, it was a case where half of US power defended itself against a person who had obviously stepped out of line. And the fact that the press thought that was important shows that they think powerful people ought to be able to defend themselves. Now, whether there was a question of principle involved happens to be easily checked in this case. One tiny part of the COINTELPRO program was itself far more significant in principle than all of Watergate; and if you look at the whole program, I mean, it's not even a discussion. But you have to ask me what COINTELPRO is. You know what Watergate is. There couldn't be a more dramatic example of the subordination of educated opinion to Power, here in England, as well as the United States.

I know you've concentrated on foreign affairs, and some of these key areas...

I've talked a lot about domestic problems.

Well, I'd like to come onto that, because it still seems to me that, on a range of pretty important issues for the Establishment, there is serious dissent...

That's right.

... Gingrich and his neo-conservative agenda in America has been pretty savagely lampooned. The apparently fixed succession for the Republican candidacy at the Presidential election has come apart. Clinton, who is a powerful figure, is having great difficulty with Whitewater. Everywhere one looks, one sees disjunctions, openings.

Within a spectrum so narrow that you really have to look hard to find it - let me give you...

Can I just stop you there, because you say that the spectrum is narrow, but on the one hand...

Let me illustrate...

... We've got flat tax...

Can I illustrate?

... flat tax Republicans, right the way through to relatively big state Democrats.

Find one - find a big state Democrat. The position now is exactly what Clinton said: "The year of big government is over, big government has failed, the war on poverty has failed, we have to get rid of this entitlement business" - that was Clinton's campaign message in 1992. That's the Democrats. What you have now is a difference between sort of moderate Republicans, and extreme Republicans. Actually, it's well known that there's been a long standing... sort of split in the American business community; it's not precise, but it's sort of general, between high-tech, capital-intensive, internationally-oriented business, which tends to be what's called "liberal", and lower-tech, more nationally-oriented, more labour-intensive industry, which is what's called "conservative". Now, between those sectors, there have been differences and in fact, if you take a look at American politics, it oscillates pretty much between those limits (there's good work on this incidentally - the person who's done the most extensive work is Thomas Ferguson, he's a political scientist...)

One more example, which will have some resonance in Britain and Europe, is the great argument over the North American Free Trade Association - the NAFTA argument - where...

This is an interesting one.

... if there is something which one could describe as a global opposition movement, that is, trade union-, environmental-, community-based, then it was certainly present in the anti-NAFTA...

Shall I tell you what happened?

Well...

Shall I tell you what happened?

What I was going to say is that...

Never reported...

... those arguments were well... we were well aware of those arguments.

No! That is flatly false. They were not permitted into the press, and I documented this. I'll give you references if you like.

We read all about it in Britain is all I will say.

No you did not; for example...

I'm sorry, but we did...

Well, let me ask you: Did you read the report of the Office of Technology Association of Congress?

Well...

Sorry - did you read the report of the Labour Advisory Committee?

Well, I don't get these reports, but I read...

Sorry, that's...

... I read many articles about the anti-NAFTA argument that's very...

I'm sorry. Well if you're interested in the facts, I'll tell you what they are, and I'll even give you sources. The NAFTA argument was signed more or less in secret by the three presidents, in mid-August, right in the middle of the presidential campaign. Now, there's a law in the United States - the 1974 Trade Act - which requires that any trade-related issue be submitted to the Labour Advisory Committee, which is union-based, for assessment and analysis. It was never submitted to them. A day before they were supposed to give their final report, in mid-September, it was finally submitted to them. The unions are pretty right wing, but they were infuriated. They had never been shown this. Even at the time that they had to write the... they were given 24 hours to write the report... they didn't even have time to look at the text. Nevertheless, they wrote a very vigorous analysis of it, with alternatives presented, saying "Look, we're not against NAFTA, we're against this version of it" - they gave a good analysis, happened to be very similar to one that had been given by the Congressional Research Service, the Office of Technology Assessment - none of this ever entered the press. The only thing that entered the press was the kind of critique that they were willing to deal with: Mexico-bashing, right wing nationalists, you know, and so on. That entered the press. But not the critical analysis of the labour movement. Now...

But somehow, by a process of osmosis or something, I picked up quite a lot of anti-NAFTA arguments, on the basis of worker protection, environmental degradation...

May I continue? This goes on in the press, right until the end... there were big popular movements opposing it - it was extremely hard to suppress all of this, to suppress everything coming out of the labour movement, out of the popular movements, and so on - but they did. At the very end it had reached such a point that there was concern that they might not be able to ram this through. Now, take a look at the New York Times and the Washington Post - say the "liberal" media and the national ones in the last couple of weeks - I've written about it and I'll tell you what you find. What you find is a hundred percent support for NAFTA, refusal to allow any of the popular arguments out, tremendous labour-bashing...

Can I come back, to make sure that I understand the point about the liberal press as against the conservative press because, in Britain over the last 2 years, politicians I come across are deeply irritated, ranging on furious, about attacks on them in the press, day after day, on issues which have come to be known as "sleaze". They feel that they are harassed, that they are misunderstood and that the press has got above itself, is "uppity" and is destructive: That's the message that they are giving to us. Now, are you saying that that whole process doesn't matter, because it's all part of the same...

It's marginal... Same thing is true here - when the press focuses on the sex lives of politicians, reach for your pocket, and see who's pulling out your wallet, because those are not the issues that matter to people. I mean, they're very marginal interest. The issues that matter to people are somewhere else, so as soon as you hear, you know, the press and presidential candidates and so on, talking about "values", as I say, put your hand on your wallet - you know that something else is happening.

But it's been much more than... certainly with us, it's been much more than "bed-hopping", it's also been about taking money, it's been about the corporations paying for political parties...

Corruption, sure... corrupt judges - fine topic...

Corrupt parties?

Yeah - corrupt parties. Big Business is not in favour of corruption, you know, and if the press focuses on corruption, Fortune Magazine will be quite happy, they don't care about that - they don't want the society to be corrupt, they want it to be run in their interest - that's a different thing. Corruption interferes with that. So, for example, when I was, let's say... I just happened to have come back from India: The Bank of India released an estimate - economists there tell me it's low - that a third of the economy is "black", meaning mostly rich businessmen not paying their taxes. Well, that makes the press, because in fact, certainly trans-nationals don't like it. They want the system to be run without corruption, robbery, bribes and so on - just pouring money into their pockets. So yes, that's a fine topic for the press. On the other hand, the topics I've talked about are not fine topics, 'cause they're much too significant.

What would a press be like, do you think, without the Propaganda Model? What would we be reading in the papers that we don't read about now?

I've just given a dozen examples. On every example - it's only you've picked, I haven't picked, I mean I could pick my own, but I'm happy to let you pick 'em - on every one of those examples I think you can demonstrate that there's been a severe distortion of what the facts of the matter are - this has nothing to do with left and right as I've been stressing - and it has left the population pretty confused and marginalised. A free press would just tell you the truth. This has nothing to do with left and right...

And given the power of Big Business, the power of the press, what can people do about this?

They can do exactly what people do in the Haitian slums and hills - organise - and Haiti, which is the poorest country in the hemisphere, they created a very vibrant, lively civil society, in the slums, in the hills, in conditions that most of us couldn't even imagine. We can do the same, much more easily.

You've got community activists in America...

Yes we do.

... I'm not talking about the so-called "Communitarian" movements, but I'm talking about the local community activists and writers, all over the place....

All over the place... all over the place... take say, a city like Boston, with all sorts of people: They don't even know of each other's existence. There's a very large number of them. One of the things I'll do consistently is run around the country giving talks; one of my main purposes, and the purpose of the people who invite me, is to bring the people together, people in that area, who are working on the same things and don't know of each other's existence, because the resources are so scattered, and the means of communication are so marginal, there isn't just much they can do about it. Now, there are plenty of things that are happening. So take say, community-based radio, which is sort of outside the system...

I was going to ask you about that, and about the Internet, which has certainly got pretty open access, at the moment.

Well, the Internet, like most technology, is a very double-edged sword. Like any technology, including printing, it has a liberatory potential, but it also has a repressive potential, and there's a battle going on about which way it's going to go, as there was for radio, and television, and so on.

About ownership and advertising...

Right - and about just what's going to be in it, and who's going to have access to it. Remember, incidentally, that the Internet is an elite operation. Most of the population of the world has never even made a phone call, you know, so that's certainly not on the Internet. Nevertheless, it does have democratising potential, and there's a struggle going on right now as to whether that's going to be realised, or whether it'll turn into something like a home marketing service, and a way of marginalising people even further. That discussion went on in the 1920s (it was Radio) - that's interesting how it turned out - it went on over Television, it's now going on over the Internet. And, that's a matter of popular struggle. Look: We don't live the way we did 200 years ago, or even 30 years ago - there's been a lot of progress. It hasn't been gifts from above. It's been the result of people getting together, and refusing to accept the dictates of authoritarian institutions. And, there's no reason to think that that's over.

You've been portrayed, and some would say, occasionally portrayed yourself, as a kind of lonely dissident voice - you clearly don't feel lonely at all.

I say nothing like that. I certainly do not portray myself that way. I can't begin to accept a fraction of the invitations from around the country: I'm scheduled two years in advance. And at that, I'm only selecting a fraction...

And you're speaking to big audiences.

Huge audiences. And these are not elite intellectuals either. These are mostly popular audiences. I probably spend 20 or 30 hours a week just answering letters, from people all over the country, and the world. I wish I felt a little more lonely. I don't. Of course, I'm not in PR, you know, I wouldn't be in the mainstream media, but I wouldn't expect that. Why should they offer space to somebody who's trying to undermine their power, and to expose what they do? But that's not loneliness.

Professor Chomsky, thank-you very much.

====================


Media Lens Cogitation: Mind Training - Part 1

by David Edwards - Thursday, 05 April 2007



Laughing At The New Generation

I am fascinated by the differences that separate peoples and cultures. If human beings are the animal for which life is a problem requiring an answer - liberated, as we are, from the autopilot of instinctual programming - then what could be more interesting than answers to life developed by radically different cultures over thousands of years?

Other cultures, after all, provide us with an entry point for investigating the nose-on-our-face problems, the nose-on-our-face mistakes, that bedevil us individually and as a society. In one of his most telling observations, Thoreau wrote:

"Every generation laughs at the old fashions, but follows religiously the new." (Thoreau, Walden, Penguin, 1983, p.68)

When we encounter, and quite possibly laugh at, foreign cultures, the precious opportunity also arises of laughing at our own. This is a laughter of liberation - not just from the disco flares and bowler hats of “the old fashions“, but from the worship of the flag, of the “fatherland”, from hatred of the official ‘enemy’. As I will discuss below, it is also an opportunity to laugh at our notions of how best to make ourselves happy.

The Internationally Famous Cabbage Dish


In late 2005, I visited South Korea for the first time. I was delighted to sit on floor cushions around low restaurant tables to be confronted by dozens of small dishes of food, most of it unknown, almost all of it devilishly spicy. Equally delightful were the loud noises made by my endlessly polite and kind Korean hosts as they slurped their noodles and guzzled their soup. The part of me that remains forever ten-years-old felt at last vindicated by the fact that a whole society deemed civilised and polite the same behaviour that had earned me fierce looks as a child. Thoreau again:

“The greater part of what my neighbours call good I believe in my soul to be bad, and if I repent of anything, it is very likely to be my good behaviour. What demon possessed me that I behaved so well?” (Ibid, p.53)

I also enjoyed slurping the mysterious, traditional herbal teas with curious objects bobbing about in them; the fruits I’d never seen before; the ornate rice cakes and other mysteries of the ancient Korean culture. I feel there is something heart-warming about seeing difference and thinking: ‘That’s how they like it - that’s what they enjoy,’ even when what they enjoy means nothing to me. I find it wonderful that Koreans are deeply proud of their spicy pickled Chinese cabbage, ‘kimchi’, the national dish. A guide book declares with typically supercharged Korean enthusiasm:

“Visitors cannot really say they have been to Korea if they have not tasted kimchi, the internationally famous cabbage dish... These days kimchi is gaining popularity worldwide for its nutritional value and disease-prevention effect.”

In Seoul there is even a kimchi museum! (http://www.kimchimuseum.co.kr/english/information.htm)

A few years ago I went with my Japanese girlfriend to an English pub for the first time. As we sat down, she took out two small, folded towels and placed them next to her glass on the table - one to wipe her glass, as required, and one to dab her face. The joy of seeing that little ritual carried out in the middle of a spit-and-sawdust pub is exactly what I have in mind. Difference reminds us of the uniqueness of others, of their preciousness, transience, and in fact of their fundamental aloneness in the world.

A sense of fellow feeling and compassion can also be found in a sense of unity beneath difference - others may do things differently, but we can understand what it is they like about it; we can empathise with their happiness in doing things ‘just so’ in a way that makes them feel more comfortable in the world.

By contrast, there is something depressing and dehumanising about the thought of people as anonymous crowds, as blank “masses” of humanity. I’ve always recoiled from the title of John Carey’s book, The Intellectuals and the Masses. Regardless of the contents of the book, the title always reminds me of the sense, which many “intellectuals” seem to have, that a select few brainy types are real, serious individuals, while the rest of us are mere “masses”, “proletarians”, a kind of human porridge.

But what exactly is an “intellectual”? If someone describes themselves as an “intellectual”, I cringe, much as I do when I hear someone describe themselves as “a celebrity” or “famous”. I greatly enjoyed reading this description of an intellectual upper class in H.G. Wells’ novel The First Men In The Moon:

"These beings with big heads, on whom the intellectual labours fall, form a sort of aristocracy in this strange society, and at the head of them, quintessential of the moon, is that marvellous gigantic ganglion the Grand Lunar... The unlimited development of the minds of the intellectual class is rendered possible by the absence of any bony skull in the lunar anatomy, that strange box of bone that clamps about the developing brain of man, imperiously insisting 'thus far and no farther' to all his possibilities." (H.G. Wells, The First Men in The Moon)

By some quirk of fate, Wells’ description finds amusing and contradictory echoes in Noam Chomsky’s analysis of the role of liberal intellectuals in our own society:

“... what's not recognised is that the role of the liberal intellectual establishment is to set very sharp bounds on how far you can go - ‘this far, and no further’”. (Chomsky, The Big Idea, BBC2, 1996; http://www.zmag.org/Chomsky/interviews/9602-big-idea.html)

In opposition to individual and cultural arrogance, it seems to me a far happier and more rational thing to recognise that the world is full of interesting ways of being - possibilities that may well be improvements on our own - than to think that our culture has all the answers, all the best solutions. It is brutal and foolish to look down on others, to dismiss their ways of living and loving developed over millennia as ’primitive’. Surely all human cultural responses to the extraordinary problem of living - even those we find unpalatable - are worthy of our interest and respect.

Certainly, when it comes to evaluating foreign cultures, little is as it seems to our prejudiced eye. During the Vietnam war, the American GIs referred to their Vietnamese enemy as ‘Gooks’, a term that has become synonymous with dehumanising racism. How tragic and poignant that American use of the word in fact originated in the Korean war - ’guk’ is a Korean word which means ’people’. The Koreans call themselves ‘Hangukin’, which means ‘the people of the Han river’.

Or to consider an extreme example, could anything be more alien to Westerners than the act of suicide bombing? Although it has almost never been reported, there had never been a suicide bomb attack in Iraq before the 2003 invasion. The UN’s IRIN news network reported on March 8 that a 41 year-old Iraqi woman, Um Abdallah, was learning how to turn herself into a suicide bomber. Revulsion, horror, incomprehension - isn’t her decision the epitome of the ‘alienness’ of foreign culture to many Britons? And yet IRIN fills in some of the background:

"Um Abdallah is one of thousands of Iraqis who have lost their relatives in the past four years. Her two boys and one girl were killed during a US military attack in her neighbourhood.

"'My husband was killed four months ago by Iraqi forces. Killed alongside him were my son-in-law and his two children. I cannot even remember how many bullets the children had in their bodies,' she said.

"She does not know exactly when she is going to detonate herself but she is sure she will be ready whenever she is asked." (IRIN, ‘Killings drive women to become suicide bombers,’ March 8, 2007)

Is Um Abdallah really such an alien being? She has lost her sons and daughter, her husband, and other loved ones besides. She has lost everything. Is her response really so impossible to comprehend? Is not our response to wish we could somehow do something to relieve her suffering and protect her from her own plan precisely because her suffering is so comprehensible? And yet, if our media are to be believed, our reaction should simply be one of loathing for this ‘alien’ product of an ‘alien’ culture.

So much of what we are taught to hate is actually the product of suffering - real, comprehensible and very human - rather than of some weird, mystical phenomenon called ’evil’. And far too much of that suffering originates with our own lack of compassion, our own system of domination and exploitation preaching hate. As Nietzsche said so well:

“Mistrust all in whom the urge to punish is strong!”

West Is Best.... Ignored!

In 1955, the British governor of Kenya, declared:

"The task to which we have set our minds is to civilise a great mass of human beings who are in a very primitive moral and social state." (Quoted, John Pilger, 'Iraq is a War of National Liberation,' The New Statesman, April 15, 2004)

In "civilising" the country, the British army killed 10,000 Kenyans for the loss of 32 European lives.

In a March 2000 Guardian article, Polly Toynbee wrote in similar vein:

"In our political and social culture we have a democratic way of life which we know, without any doubt at all, is far better than any other in the history of humanity. Even if we don't like to admit it, we are all missionaries and believers that our own way is the best when it comes to the things that really matter." (Toynbee, ‘The West really is the best,’ The Observer, March 5, 2000)

Unfortunately, this arrogance appears to be a common theme among the “beings with big heads, on whom the intellectual labours fall”.

Happily, the people that Westerners deem in a “very primitive moral and social state” do not share their view. Historian John Bodley reported:

“According to Captain Cook’s account of his first landing on the Australian mainland, Aborigines on the beach totally ignored both his ship and his men until they became obnoxious... a complete lack of interest in white people’s habits, material possessions, and beliefs was characteristic of Aborigines in a variety of contact settings.” (John Bodley, Victims of Progress, Mayfield Publishing, 1982, p.16)

In his book Re-Enchantment, Jeffrey Paine described a common Asian view of Westerners in 1912:

“Many Asians then thought that white people, though wizards at technology, were otherwise mentally deficient.” (Paine, Re-Enchantment, Norton, 2004, p.31)

If ever there was a shocking challenge to some key nose-on-our-face assumptions about the world, then this surely is it. Aren’t Third World people supposed to share Toynbee’s view of the magnificent West? Alas, there is more bad news. Paine added of a particular group of Asians:

“Tibetans had tended to view Caucasians as idiot savants, preternaturally good at, say, constructing engines but otherwise dumb to the subtleties of the spirit.” (Ibid, p.56)

Tibetan Buddhist teachings, in particular, were deemed completely beyond us: “One does not teach the precious dharma to Westerners,” was the operating assumption. (Ibid p.59)

Big ships, big engines, big buildings - small impression!

This might seem remarkable at first sight, but actually the reasoning is not so strange - Tibetans appreciated that Westerners were more or less completely bewildered when it came to matters of psychological understanding. Consider, for example, the issue of psychological health and happiness.


The Internationally Famous Cabbage Dish

In late 2005, I visited South Korea for the first time. I was delighted to sit on floor cushions around low restaurant tables to be confronted by dozens of small dishes of food, most of it unknown, almost all of it devilishly spicy. Equally delightful were the loud noises made by my endlessly polite and kind Korean hosts as they slurped their noodles and guzzled their soup. The part of me that remains forever ten-years-old felt at last vindicated by the fact that a whole society deemed civilised and polite the same behaviour that had earned me fierce looks as a child. Thoreau again:

“The greater part of what my neighbours call good I believe in my soul to be bad, and if I repent of anything, it is very likely to be my good behaviour. What demon possessed me that I behaved so well?” (Ibid, p.53)

I also enjoyed slurping the mysterious, traditional herbal teas with curious objects bobbing about in them; the fruits I’d never seen before; the ornate rice cakes and other mysteries of the ancient Korean culture. I feel there is something heart-warming about seeing difference and thinking: ‘That’s how they like it - that’s what they enjoy,’ even when what they enjoy means nothing to me. I find it wonderful that Koreans are deeply proud of their spicy pickled Chinese cabbage, ‘kimchi’, the national dish. A guide book declares with typically supercharged Korean enthusiasm:

“Visitors cannot really say they have been to Korea if they have not tasted kimchi, the internationally famous cabbage dish... These days kimchi is gaining popularity worldwide for its nutritional value and disease-prevention effect.”

In Seoul there is even a kimchi museum! (http://www.kimchimuseum.co.kr/english/information.htm)

A few years ago I went with my Japanese girlfriend to an English pub for the first time. As we sat down, she took out two small, folded towels and placed them next to her glass on the table - one to wipe her glass, as required, and one to dab her face. The joy of seeing that little ritual carried out in the middle of a spit-and-sawdust pub is exactly what I have in mind. Difference reminds us of the uniqueness of others, of their preciousness, transience, and in fact of their fundamental aloneness in the world.

A sense of fellow feeling and compassion can also be found in a sense of unity beneath difference - others may do things differently, but we can understand what it is they like about it; we can empathise with their happiness in doing things ‘just so’ in a way that makes them feel more comfortable in the world.

By contrast, there is something depressing and dehumanising about the thought of people as anonymous crowds, as blank “masses” of humanity. I’ve always recoiled from the title of John Carey’s book, The Intellectuals and the Masses. Regardless of the contents of the book, the title always reminds me of the sense, which many “intellectuals” seem to have, that a select few brainy types are real, serious individuals, while the rest of us are mere “masses”, “proletarians”, a kind of human porridge.

But what exactly is an “intellectual”? If someone describes themselves as an “intellectual”, I cringe, much as I do when I hear someone describe themselves as “a celebrity” or “famous”. I greatly enjoyed reading this description of an intellectual upper class in H.G. Wells’ novel The First Men In The Moon:

"These beings with big heads, on whom the intellectual labours fall, form a sort of aristocracy in this strange society, and at the head of them, quintessential of the moon, is that marvellous gigantic ganglion the Grand Lunar... The unlimited development of the minds of the intellectual class is rendered possible by the absence of any bony skull in the lunar anatomy, that strange box of bone that clamps about the developing brain of man, imperiously insisting 'thus far and no farther' to all his possibilities." (H.G. Wells, The First Men in The Moon)

By some quirk of fate, Wells’ description finds amusing and contradictory echoes in Noam Chomsky’s analysis of the role of liberal intellectuals in our own society:

“... what's not recognised is that the role of the liberal intellectual establishment is to set very sharp bounds on how far you can go - ‘this far, and no further’”. (Chomsky, The Big Idea, BBC2, 1996; http://www.zmag.org/Chomsky/interviews/9602-big-idea.html)

In opposition to individual and cultural arrogance, it seems to me a far happier and more rational thing to recognise that the world is full of interesting ways of being - possibilities that may well be improvements on our own - than to think that our culture has all the answers, all the best solutions. It is brutal and foolish to look down on others, to dismiss their ways of living and loving developed over millennia as ’primitive’. Surely all human cultural responses to the extraordinary problem of living - even those we find unpalatable - are worthy of our interest and respect.

Certainly, when it comes to evaluating foreign cultures, little is as it seems to our prejudiced eye. During the Vietnam war, the American GIs referred to their Vietnamese enemy as ‘Gooks’, a term that has become synonymous with dehumanising racism. How tragic and poignant that American use of the word in fact originated in the Korean war - ’guk’ is a Korean word which means ’people’. The Koreans call themselves ‘Hangukin’, which means ‘the people of the Han river’.

Or to consider an extreme example, could anything be more alien to Westerners than the act of suicide bombing? Although it has almost never been reported, there had never been a suicide bomb attack in Iraq before the 2003 invasion. The UN’s IRIN news network reported on March 8 that a 41 year-old Iraqi woman, Um Abdallah, was learning how to turn herself into a suicide bomber. Revulsion, horror, incomprehension - isn’t her decision the epitome of the ‘alienness’ of foreign culture to many Britons? And yet IRIN fills in some of the background:

"Um Abdallah is one of thousands of Iraqis who have lost their relatives in the past four years. Her two boys and one girl were killed during a US military attack in her neighbourhood.

"'My husband was killed four months ago by Iraqi forces. Killed alongside him were my son-in-law and his two children. I cannot even remember how many bullets the children had in their bodies,' she said.

"She does not know exactly when she is going to detonate herself but she is sure she will be ready whenever she is asked." (IRIN, ‘Killings drive women to become suicide bombers,’ March 8, 2007)

Is Um Abdallah really such an alien being? She has lost her sons and daughter, her husband, and other loved ones besides. She has lost everything. Is her response really so impossible to comprehend? Is not our response to wish we could somehow do something to relieve her suffering and protect her from her own plan precisely because her suffering is so comprehensible? And yet, if our media are to be believed, our reaction should simply be one of loathing for this ‘alien’ product of an ‘alien’ culture.

So much of what we are taught to hate is actually the product of suffering - real, comprehensible and very human - rather than of some weird, mystical phenomenon called ’evil’. And far too much of that suffering originates with our own lack of compassion, our own system of domination and exploitation preaching hate. As Nietzsche said so well:

“Mistrust all in whom the urge to punish is strong!”

West Is Best.... Ignored!

In 1955, the British governor of Kenya, declared:

"The task to which we have set our minds is to civilise a great mass of human beings who are in a very primitive moral and social state." (Quoted, John Pilger, 'Iraq is a War of National Liberation,' The New Statesman, April 15, 2004)

In "civilising" the country, the British army killed 10,000 Kenyans for the loss of 32 European lives.

In a March 2000 Guardian article, Polly Toynbee wrote in similar vein:

"In our political and social culture we have a democratic way of life which we know, without any doubt at all, is far better than any other in the history of humanity. Even if we don't like to admit it, we are all missionaries and believers that our own way is the best when it comes to the things that really matter." (Toynbee, ‘The West really is the best,’ The Observer, March 5, 2000)

Unfortunately, this arrogance appears to be a common theme among the “beings with big heads, on whom the intellectual labours fall”.

Happily, the people that Westerners deem in a “very primitive moral and social state” do not share their view. Historian John Bodley reported:

“According to Captain Cook’s account of his first landing on the Australian mainland, Aborigines on the beach totally ignored both his ship and his men until they became obnoxious... a complete lack of interest in white people’s habits, material possessions, and beliefs was characteristic of Aborigines in a variety of contact settings.” (John Bodley, Victims of Progress, Mayfield Publishing, 1982, p.16)

In his book Re-Enchantment, Jeffrey Paine described a common Asian view of Westerners in 1912:

“Many Asians then thought that white people, though wizards at technology, were otherwise mentally deficient.” (Paine, Re-Enchantment, Norton, 2004, p.31)

If ever there was a shocking challenge to some key nose-on-our-face assumptions about the world, then this surely is it. Aren’t Third World people supposed to share Toynbee’s view of the magnificent West? Alas, there is more bad news. Paine added of a particular group of Asians:

“Tibetans had tended to view Caucasians as idiot savants, preternaturally good at, say, constructing engines but otherwise dumb to the subtleties of the spirit.” (Ibid, p.56)

Tibetan Buddhist teachings, in particular, were deemed completely beyond us: “One does not teach the precious dharma to Westerners,” was the operating assumption. (Ibid p.59)

Big ships, big engines, big buildings - small impression!

This might seem remarkable at first sight, but actually the reasoning is not so strange - Tibetans appreciated that Westerners were more or less completely bewildered when it came to matters of psychological understanding. Consider, for example, the issue of psychological health and happiness.

Living Life To The Full

Contemporary Western culture assumes that happiness can best be achieved by gathering to ourselves as many pleasurable experiences as possible. When we talk of “making the most of life” and “living life to the full”, we mean a life filled with pleasure. Our focus is therefore, of course, very much externally directed. The psychologist Erich Fromm asked:

"What is meant by happiness? Most people today would probably answer the question by saying that to be happy is to have 'fun,' or 'to have a good time'... What does this fun consist in? Going to the movies, parties, ball games, listening to the radio and watching television, taking a ride in the car on Sundays, making love, sleeping late on Sunday mornings, and travelling... we might say that the concept of happiness is, at best, identified with that of pleasure." (Fromm, The Sane Society, Routledge, 2002, p.194)

What is so remarkable is that, as we are doing all this, we give barely a thought to the condition of the inner, psychological ‘receptacles’ into which these experiences are, as it were, poured and in which we hope happiness will arise - our minds! How sophisticated would we judge a farmer who eagerly planted seeds without giving a thought to the quality of the soil in which those seeds were sown?

Up until quite recently, many people in the West gave little thought even to the importance of physical fitness for health - the concern struck many of us as an effete indulgence, a symptom of hair-shirted hypochondria. But how many people today recognise the need, or even possibility, of maintaining psychological fitness and health beyond taking time out to relax? How many of us even believe it is possible to train our minds, much less for some version of mental or emotional fitness? Neuroscientist Richard Davidson of the University of Wisconsin-Madison comments:

“There is a tremendous lacuna in our worldview, where training is seen as important for strength, for physical agility, for athletic ability, for musical ability - for everything +except+ emotions.” (Quoted, Sharon Begley, Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain, Ballantine, 2007, p.231)

As it turns out, for all the accumulation of pleasurable experiences, the Western crop of happiness is blighted by psychological weeds, toxic mental soil and ideational frosts. For the truth is that the untrained human mind is almost guaranteed to be filled with suffering - a statement of obvious fact for many Asians, but an almost meaningless comment in the West.

Psychologist Oliver James reports that almost a quarter of Britons currently suffer from serious emotional distress, such as depression and anxiety, and that another quarter are on the verge of such conditions - that‘s half the population! James believes that much of this emotional distress is rooted in what he calls “affluenza”:

“It entails placing a high value on acquiring money and possessions, looking good in the eyes of others and wanting to be famous.” (James, Affluenza, Vermilion, 2007, p.vii)

These values, in turn, are all oriented towards external pleasurable experiences. So to what extent do they deliver happiness, for example for people who are maximally ‘successful‘?

One survey found that over one-third of a sample of super-rich people (those with net wealth of £70 million or more) were less happy than the national average. A second study found no difference between the happiness levels of lottery winners and comparison samples of people with average incomes, or even of paraplegics. (Ibid, p.34)

In truth, as the statistics make very clear, we in the West are tormented by the fact that our minds are more or less out of control. Who amongst us has not been kept awake at night by a storm of angry, fearful, craving, jealous, or grieving thoughts? From the moment we wake up, to the moment we fall asleep, day after day, thoughts can completely tyrannise the mind. Our emphasis, in response, tends to be on ‘action’ - by which we mean external action. We believe that doing something, going somewhere, seeing someone, drinking something, can bring peace of mind, control. Quite often none of this really helps.

I think one of the most shocking realisations we have as we reach adulthood is the dramatic power of the uncontrolled mind, the sheer intensity of psychological suffering, in the event of some kind of crisis. The feeling that nothing can be done, that we are helpless in the face of our own thoughts - often interpreted in the West as a belief that there’s nothing we can do about ’life’ - is a cause of incalculable misery.

But it seems to me that our suffering is pointing us towards a solution. Indeed, I think this is a perfect example of how we can benefit greatly from opening our minds to non-Western cultural solutions. As ever, doing so requires the humility to see that we are not all-powerful, that we do not stride the world as giants among intellectual and cultural pygmies.

If we are tormented by uncontrolled thoughts, then perhaps answers can be found by asking the obvious question: Can some kind of control be gained over destructive thoughts? Can something be done?

Part 2 will follow shortly...

Contemporary Western culture assumes that happiness can best be achieved by gathering to ourselves as many pleasurable experiences as possible. When we talk of “making the most of life” and “living life to the full”, we mean a life filled with pleasure. Our focus is therefore, of course, very much externally directed. The psychologist Erich Fromm asked:

"What is meant by happiness? Most people today would probably answer the question by saying that to be happy is to have 'fun,' or 'to have a good time'... What does this fun consist in? Going to the movies, parties, ball games, listening to the radio and watching television, taking a ride in the car on Sundays, making love, sleeping late on Sunday mornings, and travelling... we might say that the concept of happiness is, at best, identified with that of pleasure." (Fromm, The Sane Society, Routledge, 2002, p.194)

What is so remarkable is that, as we are doing all this, we give barely a thought to the condition of the inner, psychological ‘receptacles’ into which these experiences are, as it were, poured and in which we hope happiness will arise - our minds! How sophisticated would we judge a farmer who eagerly planted seeds without giving a thought to the quality of the soil in which those seeds were sown?

Up until quite recently, many people in the West gave little thought even to the importance of physical fitness for health - the concern struck many of us as an effete indulgence, a symptom of hair-shirted hypochondria. But how many people today recognise the need, or even possibility, of maintaining psychological fitness and health beyond taking time out to relax? How many of us even believe it is possible to train our minds, much less for some version of mental or emotional fitness? Neuroscientist Richard Davidson of the University of Wisconsin-Madison comments:

“There is a tremendous lacuna in our worldview, where training is seen as important for strength, for physical agility, for athletic ability, for musical ability - for everything +except+ emotions.” (Quoted, Sharon Begley, Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain, Ballantine, 2007, p.231)

As it turns out, for all the accumulation of pleasurable experiences, the Western crop of happiness is blighted by psychological weeds, toxic mental soil and ideational frosts. For the truth is that the untrained human mind is almost guaranteed to be filled with suffering - a statement of obvious fact for many Asians, but an almost meaningless comment in the West.

Psychologist Oliver James reports that almost a quarter of Britons currently suffer from serious emotional distress, such as depression and anxiety, and that another quarter are on the verge of such conditions - that‘s half the population! James believes that much of this emotional distress is rooted in what he calls “affluenza”:

“It entails placing a high value on acquiring money and possessions, looking good in the eyes of others and wanting to be famous.” (James, Affluenza, Vermilion, 2007, p.vii)

These values, in turn, are all oriented towards external pleasurable experiences. So to what extent do they deliver happiness, for example for people who are maximally ‘successful‘?

One survey found that over one-third of a sample of super-rich people (those with net wealth of £70 million or more) were less happy than the national average. A second study found no difference between the happiness levels of lottery winners and comparison samples of people with average incomes, or even of paraplegics. (Ibid, p.34)

In truth, as the statistics make very clear, we in the West are tormented by the fact that our minds are more or less out of control. Who amongst us has not been kept awake at night by a storm of angry, fearful, craving, jealous, or grieving thoughts? From the moment we wake up, to the moment we fall asleep, day after day, thoughts can completely tyrannise the mind. Our emphasis, in response, tends to be on ‘action’ - by which we mean external action. We believe that doing something, going somewhere, seeing someone, drinking something, can bring peace of mind, control. Quite often none of this really helps.

I think one of the most shocking realisations we have as we reach adulthood is the dramatic power of the uncontrolled mind, the sheer intensity of psychological suffering, in the event of some kind of crisis. The feeling that nothing can be done, that we are helpless in the face of our own thoughts - often interpreted in the West as a belief that there’s nothing we can do about ’life’ - is a cause of incalculable misery.

But it seems to me that our suffering is pointing us towards a solution. Indeed, I think this is a perfect example of how we can benefit greatly from opening our minds to non-Western cultural solutions. As ever, doing so requires the humility to see that we are not all-powerful, that we do not stride the world as giants among intellectual and cultural pygmies.

If we are tormented by uncontrolled thoughts, then perhaps answers can be found by asking the obvious question: Can some kind of control be gained over destructive thoughts? Can something be done?


Part 2 will follow shortly... www.medialens.org