Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
|---|---|---|---|
| AFG20070617n853 | RC EAST | 33.0050087 | 68.70246124 |
| Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007-06-17 21:09 | Friendly Action | Other | FRIEND | 7 |
| Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed in action | 6 | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
http://wardiary.wikileaks.org/afg/event/2007/06/AFG20070617n853.html
NOTE: The following information (TF-373 and HIMARS) is Classified Secret / NOFORN. The knowledge that TF-373 conducted a
HIMARS strike must be kept protected. All other information below is classified Secret / REL ISAF.
(S) Mission: O/O SOTF conducts kinetic strike followed with HAF raid to kill/capture ABU LAYTH AL LIBI on NAI 2.
(S)Target: Abu Layth Al Libi is a senior al-Qaida military commander, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) leader.
He is based in Mir Ali, Pakistan and runs training camps throughout North Waziristan.
Collection over the past week indicates a concentration of Arabs IVO objective area.
Result: 6 x EKIA; 7 x NC KIA, 7 x detainees
(S) Summary: HAF departed for Orgun-E to conduct link-up and posture to the objective immediately after pre-assault fires.
On order, 5 rockets were launched and destroyed structures on the objective (NAI 2).
The HAF quickly inserted the assault force into the HLZ. ISR reported multiple UIMs leaving the objective area.
The assault force quickly conducted dismounted movement to the target area and established
containment on the south side of the objective. During the initial assault, dedicated air assets
engaged multiple MAMs squirting off the objective area. GFC assessed 3 x EKIA squirters north
and 3 x EKIA squirters south of the compound were neutralized from air asset fires. The assault
force quickly maneuvered with a SQD element on the remaining squirters. The squirter element
detained 12 x MAMs and returned to the objective area. GFC passed initial assessment of 7 x NC KIA (children).
During initial questioning, it was assessed that the children were not allowed out of the building,
due to UIMs presence within the compound. The assault force was able to uncover 1 x NC child from the rubble.
The MED TM immediately cleared debris form the mouth and performed CPR to revive the child for 20 minutes.
Due to time restrictions, TF CDR launched QRF element to action a follow-on target (NAI 5).
They quickly contained the objective and initiated the assault.
The objective was secured and the assault force initially detained 6 x MAMs.
The GFC recommended that 7 MAMs be detained for additional questioning.
The TF CDR assessed that the assault force will continue SSE.
The local governor was notified of the current situation and requests for assistance were made to cordon
the AO with support from ANP and local coalition forces in search of HVI. A PRT is enroute to AO.
1) Target was an AQ (AL QAEDA) Senior Leader
2) Patterns of life were conducted on 18 June from 0800z 1815z (strike time) with no indications of women or children on the objective
3) The Mosque was not targeted nor was it struck initial reports state there is no damage to the Mosque
4) An elder who was at the Mosque stated that the children were held against their will and were intentionally kept inside
UPDATE: 18 0850Z June 07
- Governor Khapalwak has had no success yet in reaching President Karzai (due to the Presidents busy schedule today)
but expects to reach him within the hour (PoA reached later in the afternoon ~ 1400Z)
- The Governor conducted a Shura this morning, in attendance were locals from both the Yahya Yosof Khail & Khail Districts
- He pressed the Talking Points given to him and added a few of his own that followed in line with our current story
- The atmospherics of the local populous is that they are in shock, but understand it was caused ultimately by the presence of hoodlums
- the people think it is good that bad men were killed
- the people regret the loss of life among the children
- The Governor echoed the tragedy of children being killed, but stressed this couldve been prevented had the people exposed
the presence of insurgents in the area
- The Governor promised another Shura in a few days and that the families would be compensated for their loss
- Tthe Governor was asked what the mood of the people was and he stated that "the operation was a good thing,
and the people believe what we have told them"
- Additionally, the people accused the Yahya Khail Chief of Police and his officers of corruption and collusion with TB in the area
- The Governor and the Provincial NDS Chief relieved the CofP and his officers, disarmed them, and they are currently detained and enroute to
Sharana at this time unknown as to total numbers detained (MTF on this incident)
Report key: 15A27543-B022-4736-AC31-71006B18794E
Tracking number: 2007-186-112133-0753
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: CJTF-82
Unit name: CJTF-82
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SVB7220751882
CCIR: (SIR IMMEDIATE 7) Injury/Death of local national due to coalition actions
Sigact: CJTF-82
DColor: BLUE
One particularly sensitive report of a TF 373 operation dated June
17, 2007 is classified so secret that details of the mission must not be
passed on to other ISAF forces. On this day the soldiers appear to have
committed a particularly fatal error. The aim of the mission seems to
have been to kill the prominent al-Qaida official Abu Laith. The unit
had spent weeks watching a Koran school in which the Americans believed
the al-Qaida man and several aides were living. But the five rockets
they launched from a mobile rocket launcher ended up killing the wrong people.
Instead of the finding the top terrorist, the troops found the bodies of six dead children in the rubble of the completely destroyed school. One other child who was seriously wounded could not be saved even though a medic spent 20 minutes trying to revive him. Such a dramatic incident can't be kept secret and one day later the US army had to apologize publicly.
Routine Murder
The tone of the reports conveys how routine killing has become routine for the members of Task Force 373. One terse report on December 26, 2008 says an operation against a target identified as "Object Midway" cleared a number of compounds and found components for making improvised explosive devices. A brief entry lower down mentions that the soldiers killed 11 supposed insurgents and wounded one local Afghan civilian. The report makes no mention of the reason for the killing.
Even though it is an American unit, the revelations of its secret operations are likely to embarrass the German government. Some 300 soldiers from TF-373 have been stationed at the German military base Camp Marmal since the sommer of 2009. They operate as part of the Northern Regional Command, which is under German command.
Their presence was an awkward issue from the start and was something of a taboo even under Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, who took over the ministry last October. His only reference to them was during a visit to the troops in November 2009 when he said vaguely that the Germans "are grateful for any help provided by the US Army." Elite troops had just spent five days attacking the Taliban bastion of Gul Tepa north-west of Kunduz. Some 130 people were killed, all of them insurgents, according to the US Army.
how the Pentagon tracked down the source of the leaks.
On 21 May, a Californian computer hacker called Adrian Lamo was contacted by somebody with the online name Bradass87 who started to swap instant messages with him. He was immediately extraordinarily open: "hi… how are you?… im an army intelligence analyst, deployed to eastern bagdad … if you had unprecedented access to classified networks, 14 hours a day, 7 days a week for 8+ months, what would you do?"
For five days, Bradass87 opened his heart to Lamo. He described how his job gave him access to two secret networks: the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, SIPRNET, which carries US diplomatic and military intelligence classified "secret"; and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System which uses a different security system to carry similar material classified up to "top secret". He said this had allowed him to see "incredible things, awful things … that belong in the public domain and not on some server stored in a dark room in Washington DC … almost criminal political backdealings … the non-PR version of world events and crises."
Bradass87 suggested that "someone I know intimately" had been downloading and compressing and encrypting all this data and uploading it to someone he identified as Julian Assange. At times, he claimed he himself had leaked the material, suggesting that he had taken in blank CDs, labelled as Lady Gaga's music, slotted them into his high-security laptop and lip-synched to nonexistent music to cover his downloading: "i want people to see the truth," he said.
He dwelled on the abundance of the disclosure: "its open diplomacy … its Climategate with a global scope and breathtaking depth … its beautiful and horrifying … It's public data, it belongs in the public domain." At one point, Bradass87 caught himself and said: "i can't believe what im confessing to you." It was too late. Unknown to him, two days into their exchange, on 23 May, Lamo had contacted the US military. On 25 May he met officers from the Pentagon's criminal investigations department in a Starbucks and gave them a printout of Bradass87's online chat.
On 26 May, at US Forward Operating Base Hammer, 25 miles outside Baghdad, a 22-year-old intelligence analyst named Bradley Manning was arrested, shipped across the border to Kuwait and locked up in a military prison.
Gathered from 92,201 records of individual events or intelligence reports, The Guardian presents a selection of 300 of the key ones.
Piecing together details from the reports, The Guardian describes the operations of an undisclosed "black" unit of special forces, Task Force 373, whose mission was to hunt down targets for death or detention without trial.
On the night of Monday 11 June 2007, the leaked logs reveal, the taskforce set out with Afghan special forces to capture or kill a Taliban commander named Qarl Ur-Rahman in a valley near Jalalabad. As they approached the target in the darkness, somebody shone a torch on them. A firefight developed, and the taskforce called in an AC-130 gunship, which strafed the area with cannon fire: "The original mission was aborted and TF 373 broke contact and returned to base. Follow-up Report: 7 x ANP KIA, 4 x WIA." In plain language: they discovered that the people they had been shooting in the dark were Afghan police officers, seven of whom were now dead and four wounded.
The coalition put out a press release which referred to the firefight and the air support and then failed entirely to record that they had just killed or wounded 11 police officers. But, evidently fearing that the truth might leak, it added: "There was nothing during the firefight to indicate the opposing force was friendly. The individuals who fired on coalition forces were not in uniform." The involvement of TF 373 was not mentioned, and the story didn't get out.
However, the incident immediately rebounded into the fragile links which other elements of the coalition had been trying to build with local communities. An internal report shows that the next day Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Phillips, commander of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, took senior officers to meet the provincial governor, Gul Agha Sherzai, who accepted that this was "an unfortunate incident that occurred among friends". They agreed to pay compensation to the bereaved families, and Phillips "reiterated our support to prevent these types of events from occurring again".
Yet, later that week, on Sunday 17 June, as Sherzai hosted a "shura" council at which he attempted to reassure tribal leaders about the safety of coalition operations, TF 373 launched another mission, hundreds of miles south in Paktika province. The target was a notorious Libyan fighter, Abu Laith al-Libi. The unit was armed with a new weapon, known as Himars – High Mobility Artillery Rocket System – a pod of six missiles on the back of a small truck.
The plan was to launch five rockets at targets in the village of Nangar Khel where TF 373 believed Libi was hiding and then to send in ground troops. The result was that they failed to find Libi but killed six Taliban fighters and then, when they approached the rubble of a madrasa, they found "initial assessment of 7 x NC KIA" which translates as seven non-combatants killed in action. All of them were children. One of them was still alive in the rubble: "The Med TM immediately cleared debris from the mouth and performed CPR." After 20 minutes, the child died.
The coalition made a press statement which owned up to the death of the children and claimed that troops "had surveillance on the compound all day and saw no indications there were children inside the building". That claim is consistent with the leaked log. A press release also claimed that Taliban fighters, who undoubtedly were in the compound, had used the children as a shield.
The log refers to an unnamed "elder" who is said to have "stated that the children were held against their will" but, against that, there is no suggestion that there were any Taliban in the madrasa where the children died.
The rest of the press release was certainly misleading. It suggested that coalition forces had attacked the compound because of "nefarious activity" there, when the reality was that they had gone there to kill or capture Libi.
Glossary of military acronyms | |
| Acronym | Meaning |
|---|---|
| (number)IN | Infantry group |
| (number)US | Number of US personnel |
| (number)V | Vehicles |
| (Time)L | Local time |
| (Time)Z | Zulu time - GMT |
| 42 CDO RM | 42 Commando Royal Marines |
| 508 STB | 508th special troops battalion |
| 81 | 81mm mortar round |
| 9-liner | 9 Line MEDEVAC Request |
| A/C | aircraft |
| AAF | anti-afghan forces |
| ABP | Afghan Border Police |
| AC-130 | Gunship adapted from Hercules |
| ACK | Acknowledge |
| ACM | Anti-Coalition Militia |
| AFG | Afghans |
| AH-1W | Attack helicopter 1W - US Marines Super Cobra gunship |
| AIHRC | Afghan Independent Human Right Commission |
| AK-47 | Assault rifle |
| ANA | Afghan National Army |
| ANAP | Afghan National Auxiliary Police |
| ANBP | Afghan National Border Police |
| ANP | Afghan National Police |
| ANSF | Afghan National Security Forces |
| AO | Area of operation |
| AQ | Al Qaida |
| ARSIC | Afghan regional security integrated command |
| ASG | Area Support Group |
| ASV | armoured security vehicle |
| ATT | At this time |
| ATTK | Attack |
| AUP | Afghan uniform police |
| B-HUTS | Semi-permanent wooden structures used in place of tents |
| BAF | Bagram Air Field |
| BCT | Brigade combat team (US) |
| BDA | Battle damage assessment |
| BDE | Brigade |
| Beaten zone | Area where spread of rounds fired |
| BFT | Blue Force Tracking: identifying friendly forces in area |
| BG | Brigadier General |
| Blue forces | Nato/ISAF forces |
| Blue on Blue | Friendly fire |
| BN | Battalion |
| BP | Blood Pressure |
| BPT | Be [ing] prepared to |
| BRF | Brigade Reconnaissance Force |
| BSN | (Camp) Bastion |
| BSSM | Border Security Subcommittee Meeting |
| BTG | Basic target graphic |
| BTIF | Bagram theatre internment facility |
| BTL | Battalion |
| buzz saw | Signalling method by waving light stick in circle |
| C//NF | Confidential, no foreign nationals |
| C/S | Call sign |
| CAS | Close air support |
| CAT C | Category C patient - priority |
| CCA | carrier-controlled approach |
| CCIR | commander's critical information requirements |
| CD | Command |
| CDN | Canadian |
| CDR | Commander |
| CF | Coalition Forces |
| CG | Coldstream Guards |
| CGBG | Coldstream Guards Battle Group |
| cgbg 1 coy | 1 company, Coldstream Guards battle group |
| CHOPS | Chief of Operations |
| CIV | Civilian |
| CIVCAS | Civilian casualties |
| CJ2 | US intelligence and security command, afghanistan |
| CJ3 | Joint special ops |
| CJSOTF | combined joint special operations task force |
| CJTF | Combined Joint Task Force |
| CJTF-82 | Combined Joint Task Force-82: HQ of US Forces in ISAF and Regional Command East, March 2007-April 2008 |
| CLP | Combat logistics patrol [supply convoy] |
| CO | Commanding officer |
| CoP | Chief of Police |
| COP | Combat outpost |
| Coy | Company |
| CP | Check point |
| cpt | Captain |
| Csh | combat support hospital |
| CTC | ? counterterrorist center |
| CWIED | Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device |
| DBC | database code |
| DC | District Centre |
| DF | Direct fire |
| DOI | Date of incident |
| DoS | Department of State |
| DSHKA | Soviet-origin heavy machine gun |
| ECP | entry control point |
| EKIA | Enemy killed in action |
| Element | Part of a task force e.g. "Puma element" = part of Task Force Puma |
| ENG BDE | Engineer Brigade |
| EOC | Emergency Operation Centre |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal [bomb defuser] |
| eof | Escalation of Force [also 'exchange of fire'] |
| ETT | embedded training team |
| evac | Evacuation |
| EVACD | Evacuated |
| F-15 | Fighter /bomber |
| FB | Forward Base (context -"Do China FB") |
| FF | Friendly Forces |
| FFIR | Friendly Forces Information Requirement |
| FIR | First Impressions Report |
| FO | Forward observer |
| FOB | Forward Operating Base |
| FP | Firing point |
| fps | Facility protection service |
| FRA BG | French battle group |
| FSB | Forward Support Base |
| GBU | Guided Bomb Unit |
| GBU-12 | 500lb laser-guided "smart bomb" |
| GBU-31 | 2,000lb "smart bomb' |
| GBU-38 | GPS/laser guided 500lb 'smart' bomb |
| GCTF | Global Counter Terrorism Forces |
| GEN | General |
| GHZ | Ghazni |
| GIRoA | Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan |
| GMLRS | Multiple rocket launcher |
| Green on green | Fighting between Afghan forces |
| GSW | Gunshot wound |
| GT R2RR | Canadian troops: tactical group:2nd bn 22nd royal regiment |
| helos | Helicopters |
| HHB | Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion |
| HIMARS | latest GPS-guided multiple rocket system, mounted on v. mobile truck [carries GMLRS qv] |
| HLZ | helicopter landing zone |
| HMG | UK government (HM Government) |
| HMLA-169 | US Marines light attack helicopter sqadron |
| HRT | hostage rescue team |
| HVI | High-value Individual |
| HWY | Highway |
| IAW | In accordance with |
| IAW EOF SOP | in accordance with escalation of force standard operating procedure |
| ICOM | Radio |
| IDF | indirect fire |
| IED | Improvised explosive device |
| Illum | Illumination mortar, fired to provide light |
| INFIL | Infiltrate |
| INS | Insurgents |
| INTSUM | Intelligence summary |
| IO | Information operations |
| IOT | In order to |
| IR | Incident Report |
| ir | infrared |
| IR STROBE | Infrared Strobe |
| IRoA | Islamic Republic of Afghanistan |
| IRT | Incident Response Team? |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| ISN | Internment [or Insurgent] serial Number |
| ISO | In support of |
| ISR | Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance |
| IVO | In vicinity of |
| J COY 42 CDO | J company 42 Commando Royal Marines |
| JAF | Jalalabad Air Field |
| JAG | Judge Advocate General (Army legal team) |
| JBAD | Jalalabad |
| JDAM | Joint Direct Attack Munition |
| JDCC | Joint District Coordination Center |
| JDOC | Joint Defense Operations Center |
| JEL | Joint Effects List [hit list] |
| Jingle trucks | Brightly decorated trucks covered in bells common across central Asia |
| JOC | joint ops centre |
| JPEL | Joint Prioritised Effects List [hit list] |
| JTAC | Joint terminal air controller |
| JUGROOM | Fort, Garmsir, Afghanistan |
| KAF | Kandahar Air Field |
| KAIA | Kabul international airport |
| KDZ | Kunduz |
| KIA | Killed in action |
| KJI | Kajaki |
| KMTC | Kabul military training cetnre |
| KPRT | Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| L: | Location (in relation to S, A, L, T) |
| LEP | Law Enforcement Professionals |
| Line 1 | Location of the pick-up site. |
| Line 2 | Radio frequency, call sign, and suffix. |
| Line 3 | Number of patients by precedence: A to E with A being most urgent |
| Line 4 | Special equipment required |
| Litter | Stretcher used by medics |
| LKG | Lashkar Ghar |
| LN | Local national |
| LNO | Liaison Officer |
| LTC | Lieutenant Colonel |
| Luna | German drone |
| LZ | Landing Zone |
| m240b | Type of machine gun |
| M249 | light machine gun |
| M4/M-4 | Type of gun |
| MAJ | Major |
| MAR | Marine |
| MED OPS | Medical Operations |
| MED TM | Medical Team |
| medevac | Medical evacuation |
| MEY PRT | Meymaneh provincial reconstruction team |
| MG | Machine Gun |
| MHL | Mehtar Lam |
| MM | Military Message |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| MOI | Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior |
| MP | Military Police |
| MS | Military support |
| MSN | Nurse (with a masters) |
| Msr | main supply route |
| MTF | More to follow |
| MTT | military training team |
| N/I C | Nato/ISAF Confidential |
| NAI | Named areas of interest |
| NC | non-combatant |
| NCO | Non-commissioned officer |
| NDS | Afghan intelligence [national directorate of security] |
| NFI | Not Further Identified |
| NFTR | Nothing further to report |
| NMC | non mission-capable |
| NOFORN | no foreigners [secrecy classification] |
| NSTR | Nothing significant to report |
| OBJ | Objective |
| OC | Outcome |
| OCC- P | operational command centre - provincial |
| OCCD | Operational Coordination Center District |
| ODA | Operational Detachment (Alpha) - special forces |
| OGA | Other Government Agency (usually CIA) |
| OIC | Officer in charge |
| OMF | Opposing Militant Forces |
| Op | Operation |
| OP | Observation Post |
| OP grid | Operation/Observation post map coordinates |
| OPSUM | Operations Summary |
| ORSA | operations research and systems analysis |
| PA | Physician Assistant |
| PAK | Pakistan |
| PAKMIL | Pakistan military |
| PAO | Public Affairs Officer |
| PAX | Passengers/People |
| PB | Patrol Base |
| PBG | Polish battle group |
| PEF | poppy eradication force [afghan police] |
| PEN | Penich (outpost) |
| PHQ | Police headquarters (in reference to ANP) |
| PID | positive i.d. |
| PKM | Russian-made machine gun |
| PL | Platoon |
| PLT | Platoon |
| PLT SJT | Platoon Seargant |
| PMT | Police Mentor Team |
| PoA | President of Afghanistan |
| poc | point of contact |
| POI | point of impact |
| POO | Point of origin |
| PRED | Predator drone |
| PRO COY | protection company |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| PRT CDR | Provincial Reconstruction Team Commander |
| PSO | Post Security Officer |
| PT | Patient |
| PTS | Peace Through Strength (PTS) reconciliation process |
| QRF | Quick Response Force |
| RB | Road block |
| RC (N) | Regional Command North |
| RC CENTRAL | Regional Command Central |
| RC(E) / RC East | Regional Command East |
| RC(W) | Regional Command West |
| RC=S / RC(S) | Regional Command South |
| RCAG | Regional Corps Assistance Group |
| RCC / RC(C) | Regional Command Capital |
| RCP | Route clearance Patrol |
| rds/RDS | Rounds |
| rfs | Resident Field Squadron |
| RG | US armoured vehicle |
| RGR | Royal Gurkha rifles |
| ROE | Rules of engagement |
| Role 3 | Surgical facility |
| RPG | Rocket propelled grenade |
| RPK | Light machine gun, Kalashnikov (Ruchnoi Pulemyot Kalashnikova) |
| RPT | Report |
| RTB | Return to base |
| RTE | Route |
| RTF | Reconstruction Task Force [Australian at TF Uruzgan] |
| S-2 | Intelligence staff officer |
| S-5 | Staff member responsible for civil-military operations |
| S, A, L, T | Size, Activity, Location, Time (military report) |
| S, A, L, T, U, R | Size, Activity, Location, Time, Unit, Result (military report) |
| S: | Size (in relation to S, A, L, T) |
| S//REL | Secret or Selective release? (context - "S//REL TO USA, AFG, GCTF, ISAF, NATO") |
| SAF/Safire | Small ams fire/Surface to air fire |
| SAW | Squad Automatic Weapon [ machine gun] |
| SC-26 | Scorpion 26 - US special forces unit in Helmand |
| SCIDA | Site Configuration and Installation Design Authority? |
| SEWOC | Sigint Electronic Warfare Operational Centre |
| SFG | special forces group |
| Shura | Meeting of tribal elders and Afghan leaders |
| SIED | Suicide IED |
| SIGACT | Significant activity |
| SIR | Serious Incident Report |
| sof | Special ops force |
| SOG | Special ops group |
| Solatia | Payments to civilian victims of US attacks (or their families) |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| SOTF | Special Operations Task Force |
| SOTG | Special ops taskgroup |
| SPC | Specialist |
| SQD | Squadron |
| sqn | Squadron |
| Squirter | Someone running for cover |
| SSE | Sensitive site exploitation |
| SVBIED | suicide vehicle-borne IED |
| SWO | Surface warfare officer |
| SWT | Scout weapons team |
| T: | Time (in relation to S, A, L, T) |
| TB | Taliban |
| TBC | To be confirmed |
| TBD | To be decided |
| TCP | Traffic control point |
| TERP | Interpreter |
| TF | Task force |
| TF373 | task force 373 [special ops] |
| TFK | Task Force Kandahar |
| TG | Tactical Group |
| TG AREs | Tactical group Ares |
| Thready | Pulse that is very fine and scarcely perceptible. |
| TIC | Troops in contact |
| Toc | tactical op center |
| TTPs | tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| UAH | Up-armoured Humvee |
| UAV | Unmanned aerial vehicle [drone] |
| UH-1N | US Twin Huey transport/communications helicopter |
| UH-60 | Black Hawk helicopter |
| UNAMA | United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan |
| UNK | Unknown |
| usfor-a | United States Forces Afghanistan |
| UXO | unexploded ordnance [or unfired] |
| VBIED | VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device |
| VCP | Vehicle Check Point |
| vic | vicinity |
| VIC | Vehicle? (context - "ANP officer hit ANA officer with door of VIC...7 to 8 rounds struck ANP VIC") |
| vitals | Vital signs (for example blood pressure) |
| VP | Vulnerable point |
| VPB | Vehicle patrol base |
| VSA | vital signs absent [i.e. dead] |
| w/d | wheels down |
| w/u | wheels up |
| White Eagle | Polish task force |
RC EAST: 172100Z TF 373 OBJ Lane
NOTE: The following information (TF-373 and HIMARS) is Classified Secret / NOFORN. The knowledge that TF-373 conducted a HIMARS strike must be kept protected ...
| Affiliation | FRIEND |
| Type | Friendly Action |
| Category | Other |
| Date | 2007-06-17 21:09 |
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